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FOREWORD
On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on
U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. Created in 1985
by retired generals Richard Stilwell of the United States and Sun Yup Paik
of the Republic of Korea, the Council’s aim was to initiate a conference that
would bring together top scholars and practitioners on the most important
issues facing the two countries and their important bilateral alliance. Since
then, the Council has successfully hosted an annual conference, alternating
every other year between meetings in Seoul and Washington.
Although begun as an idea with a relatively small scale, in 2001 the
Council hosted one of the largest meetings ever, bringing together over
50 presenters and discussants and several hundred participants. Due
to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center the preceding month,
the planned participation of high-level U.S. government officials was
curtailed. However, those attending the conference heard from many of
the leading experts on Korean, Northeast Asian, and U.S. foreign policy
issues and problems. Major speakers included the Republic of Korea
(ROK) Ambassador to the United States, the Deputy Director of the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs.
The unexpected attacks just 1 month prior to the conference caught
everyone by surprise, not the least the authors. Thus, the papers did not
capture adequately an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the
terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy, its implications for the two Koreas,
and its probable effects on China and Russia. There were suggestions that
the attack would have major effects, but few details about what those would
be, which was understandable with so little time having elapsed since the
attack. On the other hand, papers such as Victor Cha’s stressed that in
important ways much had not changed: U.S. commitments had not been
shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments
had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had
been demonstrated through South Korea’s strong support for the war on
terrorism.
The terrorist attack may have contributed to some extent to a broad mood
of uneasiness, even outright concern, at the conference. Some authors, such
as Tae Woo Kim, noted the stagnation or stalemate now existing in NorthSouth and U.S.-Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations.
There was consensus as articulated by Nicholas Eberstadt that North Korea
had not made serious progress in either relationship: it had yet to install a
iv

significant reform program, making only modest economic improvements
and none that reflect an easing of the structural problems in the economic
and political systems. Most importantly, North Korea had not opened up
to the outside world.
Interestingly, unlike previous conferences, there was no concern about
a collapse of the North with its myriad of unfortunate consequences.
Instead, recent developments were taken mainly as evidence that the North
lacks any serious commitment to reform, to engagement, and to opening
up to the world, which is why the North is neglecting the opportunities
offered by the Sunshine Policy and the Bush administration’s offer to
resume negotiations, and why the North did not respond effectively to the
opportunity raised by the 9/11 incidents to deepen engagement with the
United States. However, this was not a unanimous view. Some participants
suggested the Bush administration was still not serious about talking with
Pyongyang, and that the North really has made a significant commitment
to change but that we are expecting too much too soon in this regard. In
response, the pessimists carried their criticism further, suggesting that the
Sunshine Policy has actually had a corrosive effect in South Korean politics
and that the United States has not demanded sufficient reciprocity from
Pyongyang. In short, one element captured in the conference papers was
not just that engagement was not working but that it was too costly.
Some papers such as Tong Whan Park’s and Jin Young Chung’s also
expressed concern about the state of the alliance. To be certain, some
analysts, particularly the government speakers who offered the official
view from each country, emphasized that the alliance and the larger U.S.ROK relationship are quite sound. They cited the very high caliber of the
alliance forces, the excellent level of cooperation and consultation within the
alliance, the reciprocal support each government has offered for the other’s
major efforts in the past year: on engagement, terrorism, and economic
recovery. But others saw public support for the alliance as likely to wane
in the United States if the alliance was not refocused and public support
for the alliance continuing to drop in the ROK due to a string of complaints
about the U.S. military presence. In addition, there is growing sentiment
in some quarters that, with the United States as the only superpower and
North Korea very much weakened, the alliance was now much less about
defending Korea and much more about goals and purposes of each of the
two governments that may be increasingly divergent. They cited the clear
disagreements between the Bush administration and President Kim DaeJung over the Sunshine Policy. Others, such as Miong Sei Kang, argued that
regional trade blocs, particularly the U.S. interest in developing one in the
v

Americas, could drive a wedge into U.S.-Korean economic relations in the
coming years. Their overall point was that the alliance lacks deep roots,
particularly as the generation passes on that personally experienced how
and why the alliance came into existence and the shared sacrifices it has
entailed.
The papers also expressed a somber mood about the environment
in South Korea. Speakers disagreed in assessing the South’s economic
situation. Most saw the state as still too deeply involved in running the
economy, the economic reforms as too limited, and the future bleak in
terms of economic growth, with the ROK facing increased competition
from China’s low costs and Japan’s advanced technology. Many of the
authors referred to President Kim as a lame duck with well over a year
left in his term, and felt that the sharp domestic political divisions in South
Korea had produced some paralysis on important matters.
Finally, there was considerable pessimism expressed about the future
of the Agreed Framework and KEDO, which oversees its operation. At
the time of the conference, it was unclear how North Korea was going to
meet its requirements under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Agreed
Framework and be sufficiently transparent and cooperative about its
nuclear programs. If it did not, then either the Agreed Framework or the
standards it is supposed to uphold would collapse. Offsetting this potential
outcome were KEDO’s continued efforts to move the project ahead, even
with significant delays. At the time these papers are being published, the
situation has become far more serious, with the entire Agreed Framework
apparatus in disarray.
The participants were very grateful for the strong support the conference
enjoyed from the Korean Association of International Studies, the ROK
Ministry of National Defense, the Federation of Korean Industries, the
Korea International Trade Association, the Korea Chamber of Commerce
and Industry Hanwha Group, the Hae Sung Institute for Social Ethics and
Korea Line Cooperation, Korean Airlines, and The Heritage Foundation.

BALBINA Y. HWANG

PATRICK MORGAN
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PART I: SETTING THE STAGE

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE ALLIANCE CHALLENGED
Donald W. Boose, Jr.
The principal focus of the papers collected in this book is the
Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance and the challenges it faces
from tensions within the alliance, the effects of the alliance partners’
interaction with North Korea, and the economic pressures that affect
the alliance.
These papers were presented at the 16th Annual Conference
of the Council on U.S.-Korea Security Studies in October 2001.
Because of the elapsed time, the reader could be tempted to think
that the events since these papers were presented have overtaken
the arguments of the presenters. This is far from the truth. Each
of these papers reflects the enduring historical forces, geopolitical
realities, and national interests that affect Northeast Asia, the Korean
peninsula, and the ROK-U.S. alliance. The descriptions of the alliance
mechanisms, the Armistice machinery, the Agreed Framework,
and the economic imperatives that affect the alliance thus have
continuing value. The policy recommendations are still germane
and worthy of the consideration of those to whom the future of the
alliance is entrusted.
At the time of the conference, the prevailing tone was cautiously
optimistic, although the challenges were severe. Soon after President
George W. Bush entered office, he had announced that U.S. policy
toward North Korea would be reviewed, a process that brought
most of the on-going dialogue between the United States and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to a halt. During his
March 7, 2001, summit meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung,
President Bush supported President Kim’s engagement policy and
the 1994 Agreed Framework, but expressed skepticism of the North
Korean leader and stressed the need for “complete verification”
in any future agreements with the North.1 Many in South Korea
believed that President Bush had demonstrated lukewarm support
for President Kim and, in spite of U.S. statements to the contrary,
concluded that there was a cooling in the ROK-U.S. relationship. On
1

the other hand, a January 2001 agreement that allowed the ROK to
build missiles with ranges and payloads up to those permitted by
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the conclusion of
an investigation into the killing of South Korean civilians near the
village of No Gun Ri during the Korean War, and the revision of
the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement, increasing ROK ability to
prosecute American soldiers under Korean law,2 all helped to defuse
public criticism of the United States.
While U.S.-DPRK dialogue was generally moribund, there were
some contacts between the United States and the North throughout
2001, and South-North dialogue proceeded fitfully. In the wake of the
cataclysmic terrorist attacks against the United States on September
11, 2001, sympathy for the United States temporarily overshadowed
anti-U.S. feelings. South Korea offered support and North Korea
condemned the attacks. Thus, by the time of the October conference,
there seemed to be some grounds for optimism, although some of
the conference participants raised concerns about North Korean
actions and intentions and noted the underlying tensions between
the alliance partners and within South Korea itself.
Post-Conference Events: Continuity and Change.
In the months immediately following the conference, hopes
were raised further with indications that the South-North dialogue
was reviving and that contact between the United States and the
DPRK was about to resume. However, during his State of the Union
address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush reflected
the skepticism of his administration toward the north by including
North Korea with Iraq and Iran in what he called an “Axis of Evil.”
In spite of further statements by President Bush and other members
of his administration that the United States remained prepared to
negotiate with North Korea, the immediate effect of his speech was
to raise North Korean hackles and bring the incipient moves toward
dialogue to an abrupt end. The speech also aggravated those in
South Korea who saw the United States as an obstacle to Korean
reconciliation.3 While prospects for U.S.-DPRK dialogue were set
back, the operation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) (the multinational organization established
to carry out the provisions of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear Agreed
Framework) continued throughout the year, as did much of
2

the South-North dialogue, including ministerial and economic
meetings. The course was not smooth, with several of the meetings
being abruptly cancelled by the North Koreans and with periodic
naval clashes in the West (Yellow) Sea. Nonetheless, the cautious
optimism of most of the conference participants seemed justified
until the Autumn of 2002, when a series of events shook the SouthNorth dialogue, the U.S.-ROK relationship, and KEDO.
During the first week of October, James A. Kelly, the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs made
his long-anticipated visit to North Korea. Two weeks later, U.S.
officials said that during the visit, Kelly’s North Korean interlocutors
acknowledged the existence of a clandestine uranium enrichment
program and, according to Kelly, declared the 1994 Agreed
Framework “nullified.”4
On October 25, the Korean Central News Agency reported
comments by a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman, who accused
the United States of hostile intent against North Korea, exemplified
by the “Axis of Evil” speech, nuclear threats, and failure to make
good on its obligations under the Agreed Framework. Under the
circumstances, he said, the DPRK could not ”sit idle” and was
“entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon[s] but any type of
weapon more powerful . . . so as to defend its sovereignty and right
to exist” in the face of the U.S. threat. Nonetheless, the spokesman
said, the DPRK was prepared to seek a negotiated settlement if the
United States recognized DPRK sovereignty, assured the DPRK of
nonaggression, and did not “hinder the economic development of
the DPRK.”5 The United States announced that it was willing to talk
to North Korea, but only if the DPRK renounced its nuclear weapons
program first.6
Thus, the situation reached an impasse and, although SouthNorth ministerial talks took place in October and economic talks and
other dialogue and contacts continued in November, the revelation
began a dangerous series of moves and countermoves, amid strong
rhetoric on both sides.
On November 6, the DPRK announced that it might end its
freeze on missile tests.7 Eight days later, the KEDO Executive Board
issued a statement of condemnation of North Korea’s “pursuit of
a nuclear weapons program, which is a clear and serious violation
of its obligations under the Agreed Framework” and announced
that heavy fuel oil shipments would be suspended, beginning
3

with the December shipment.8 On November 29, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a
resolution deploring the DPRK’s public claim that it is entitled to
possess nuclear weapons, declaring that claim to be “contrary to
its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” and
insisting that “North Korea urgently and constructively cooperate
with the IAEA in opening immediately all relevant facilities to IAEA
inspections and safeguards and [urging] North Korea to give up
any nuclear weapons program, expeditiously and in a verifiable
manner.”9 North Korea rejected the request for inspections.10
On December 11, President Bush released a “National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” reiterating the U.S. policy
reserving the right to respond with overwhelming force, including
conventional and nuclear capabilities, to the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against the United States, its overseas forces, or
its allies. While this document did not name North Korea, it is clear
that the DPRK was among those referred to as “the world’s most
dangerous regimes.”11
On the same day that the President released the WMD strategy,
Spanish and U.S. forces intercepted a North Korean cargo ship
transporting missiles to Yemen. The Yemeni government insisted
that the missiles had been purchased legally and the ship was
released, but North Korean rhetoric escalated even further, with
accusations that the United States was engaged in piracy.12
On December 12, North Korea announced that it intended to
restart the Yongbyon and Taechon reactors, the issue that had
precipitated the crisis of the summer of 1994 and led to the negotiation
of the Agreed Framework. The putative rationale for restarting the
plant was that North Korea had a critical energy shortage due to
the suspension of oil shipments by KEDO and lack of progress on
the light water reactors being built in North Korea pursuant to the
framework agreement. It seems more likely, however, that the move
was intended to put pressure on the United States to resume talks.13
As these events were taking place, the ROK-U.S. alliance came
under increasing strain in the face of anti-American demonstrations
prompted by the acquittal of two soldiers who had accidentally
crushed to death two Korean school girls under the treads of their
armored vehicle on June 13, 2002. The acquittals served as a focus
for long-simmering unhappiness with American actions and the
aggravations caused by the presence of large numbers of U.S.
4

soldiers in South Korea. The anti-American turmoil and outrage
was reflected in statements by both presidential candidates in the
campaigning then underway and led to calls by President Kim Daejung for further renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement.14
This message was delivered to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld by ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Jun at the
annual Security Consultative Meeting in December 2002, although
the joint communiqué diplomatically referred only to Minister Lee’s
“keen interest in improving the implementation of the Status of
Forces Agreement,” while, “Secretary Rumsfeld listened carefully to
Minister Lee’s explanation.”15
In the December 19, 2002, ROK presidential elections, ruling
Millennium Democratic Party candidate Roh Moo-hyun defeated
conservative opposition leader Lee Hoi-chang. President-elect Roh,
a 56-year old human rights and labor lawyer, had previously been
critical of U.S. policies, calling for continued engagement with North
Korea and revision of the Status of Forces Agreement. However, the
initial contacts between Roh and U.S. President Bush were cordial,
and the new president-elect quickly indicated his strong support
for the alliance. The new year began with the ROK President-elect
identifying “peaceful settlement of the ongoing North Korean
Nuclear Crisis” as his top priority and U.S.-ROK-Japan consultations
on the appropriate response to the North Korean actions.16
The nuclear situation continued to escalate as North Korea broke
the seals on the previously sealed spent plutonium fuel rods at the
Yonbyong reactor, disabled the monitoring cameras, brought in
fresh fuel rods, and ejected the International Atomic Energy Agency
on-site inspectors.17
Clearly, the situation in Northeast Asia has changed in many
ways since these papers were presented. Yet, there is continuity in the
fundamental dynamics of the alliance, in the issues and challenges
facing the alliance, and in the various forums and mechanisms
through which the alliance works. Even with the unexpected “wild
card” of the North Korean nuclear revelations, our commentators,
writing a year before that event, were generally accurate in their
identification of the crucial issues, potential points of crisis, and
likely broad course of events. It is worthwhile reading their analyses
in the light of the actual circumstances since the conference.

5

Challenges and Proposals: The View from October 2001.
In his chapter, Professor Victor Cha argues for the value and
relevancy of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the post-Cold War world, even
after the eventual reunification of Korea, with the assumption clearly
held by most of the conferees that reunification, when it comes, will
be under the ROK. Not only does the alliance have enduring value
for the security of both nations, he insists, but it is also grounded
in shared values, a fact that is often unrecognized by Americans.
Professor Cha warns that the alliance could dissolve, to the detriment
of both nations, and recommends actions by both parties to rethink
the alliance’s rationale, emphasizing the mutually-shared ideals of
freedom, justice, and democracy.
Dr. Jin-Young Chung examines the alliance from the perspective
of the cost sharing that symbolizes the balance of the relationship
and reflects other, deeper, issues. Dr. Chung suggests that debates
on cost sharing provide a forum not just for the discussion of alliance
support, but for more far-reaching dialogue on the future purpose
and nature of the alliance. He proposes strengthening the alliance
by developing through this dialogue a new vision of purpose to
assure its continuation after reunification, as well as the replacement
of the current system of constitutional processes with automatic
guarantees of wartime assistance, and other actions to assure a more
equal partnership.
Professor Tong Whan Park examines the U.S.-ROK alliance in
terms of its relative costs to the United States compared to the costs
of having no alliance, the costs of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the
costs of the alliance to the ROK. He concludes that the alliance is
advantageous for the ROK, and even more advantageous for the
United States in terms of political, economic, and military security.
Professor Kyudok Hong traces the history of United Nations
involvement with Korean security, with an emphasis on the U.S.led United Nations Command (UNC). In its quest for a U.S.-CPRK
agreement that would lead to the removal of U.S. forces from Korea,
North Korea has attempted to abrogate the Armistice Agreement and
has called for the disestablishment of the UNC. But Professor Hong
argues that both the Armistice Agreement and the UNC are valuable
mechanisms that contribute to the security of the United States and
the ROK, as well as to the effective working of the alliance.
Professor Jeongwoon Yoon describes the various agreements,
6

forums, and structures through which the ROK-U.S. alliance
operates. After explaining the content and value of the many forums,
he provides policy recommendations to improve these mechanisms.
He suggests increased emphasis on mid to long-term issues, a
clearer division of labor between the bilateral Security Consultative
and Military Committees, the establishment of standing offices
for on-going discussion, and the active participation of the ROKU.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) leadership in the security
deliberations of the committees. He then describes the various
combined and multinational exercises carried out by the two nations,
providing policy recommendations for increasing the value of these
exercises. He proposes short notice exercises at varying times of the
year and greater emphasis on interoperability. He also recommends
exercises based on scenarios in which the United States is engaged in
military operations elsewhere in the world when a crisis breaks out
in Korea in order to test the U.S. ability to respond to simultaneous,
widely-separated contingencies. Finally, he argues that, so long as
North Korea refuses to engage in substantive confidence-building
and arms control efforts, the practice of curtailing exercises in order
to avoid jeopardizing dialogue should be discontinued. Professor
Yoon then explains the structure and roles of the ROK-U.S. Combined
Forces Command, which is the integrated headquarters for the
defense of Korea and the conduct of bilateral military operations. He
recommends that CFC focus on its deterrence role and be prepared
to adapt to changes in the international security environment. He
also argues that CFC needs more effective options for countering
the rising tide of anti-U.S. criticism and North Korean propaganda
designed to divide the allies.
Professor Nicholas Eberstadt introduces a note of caution. He
examines the evidence in the months prior to the conference that
North Korea was beginning a process of reform. His close reading
of North Korean political, economic, and military statements and
actions lead him to conclude, however, that, far from reforming, the
Pyongyang leadership had remained steadfast in its policies and was
using the South Korean “Sunshine” policy of engagement to attempt
to drive a wedge between the United States and the ROK.
Professor Taewoo Kim examines the divergent views within
the South Korean populace and leadership concerning North
Korea and U.S. Forces in Korea. He uses the term “liberal” to
describe those who work from the basis of Korean ethnic identity,
7

favoring active engagement with the North, downplaying the North
Korean threat, seeking reconciliation, and viewing the presence of
U.S. forces in Korea as intrusive, unwelcome, obnoxious, and an
obstacle to reunification. He applies the term “conservative” to
those who see the North not only as a counterpart in negotiation
toward reunification, but also as a dangerous, threatening, and
untrustworthy neighbor. The conservatives, while not uncritical
of U.S. actions contrary to Korean interests, value the alliance as
both necessary for security and a reflection of shared values that
transcend ethnic identity. Professor Kim expresses concern that this
“South-South ideological conflict” was having a corrosive effect,
threatening the social fabric and national cohesion of the South and
undermining the alliance, thereby jeopardizing ROK security. He
argued that this dire outcome could only be averted by dialogue
and mutual understanding--reconciliation within South Korea as
a prerequisite to effective interaction with the North to achieve the
reunification and peace that are the goals of both “conservative” and
“liberal” Koreans in the South.
Professor Haksoon Paik provides a very thorough discussion
of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), which he sees as a successful
mechanism for engaging North Korea. Professor Paik argues that
KEDO provides a useful precedent for international engagement
with North Korea, a conclusion that remains valid even if the nuclear
confrontation that began in October 2002 results in the end of KEDO
as currently constituted.
Professor Miongsei Kang examines the trade situation
confronting the ROK, noting that the pattern of trade has shifted,
with less dependence on the American market for Korean exports.
Nonetheless, the United States remains the second largest trading
partner, after China and Hong Kong, as well as an essential element
of Korea’s security. While the relative proportions of Korea’s trade
have changed, the country has also come under increasing pressures
through “regionalism,” as Professor Kang calls the growth of
regional economic trading arrangements, such as the European
Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has proposed an Asian trade
bloc from which the United States would be excluded, but Professor
Kang argues that Korea is best served by open trade arrangements.
He notes that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
8

provides a mechanism for addressing trade and other economic
issues without the constraints inherent in participation in regional
preferential trade arrangements.
Professor Kyu-Ryoon Kim delineates South Korea’s foreign
direct investment (FDI) policies in the context of what he calls the
“Asiatic mode of economic development,” based on an exportoriented development strategy. The ROK has many economic
advantages of geography, high quality labor and management, a
strong industrial and research base and infrastructure, and a rapidly
growing information technology sector. The ROK Government has
built on this foundation with policies that encourage and facilitate
foreign direct investment. Nonetheless, Professor Kim suggests that
South Korean firms may not be making the most of the opportunities
available to them for FDI. Furthermore, while South Korea has
weathered the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, that crisis
raised questions about rapid economic growth and the government’s
role in economic development. The attitudes and actions of North
Korea and the state of South-North relations also affect investment
and growth. Professor Kim calls for a rethinking of ROK policies
and consideration of whether moderate and sustainable economic
growth and multilateral cooperation may not be the best pattern for
the future.
Economic cooperation is essential to the process of South-North
reconciliation and was a key element of former President Kim
Dae-jung’s “Sunshine” policy of engagement, which decoupled
economic cooperation from political issues. Yet, as Professor
Joseph A.B. Winder explains, there have been many obstacles to the
development of South-North economic links. Nearly all of them can
be attributed to the North Korean leadership, whose attitudes and
actions have been incompatible with the norms of modern commerce
and industry. The two Koreas have negotiated a framework for
economic cooperation, however, and, even during the tensions that
resulted from the October 2002 revelations concerning the North
Korean nuclear program, economic talks continued.
Enduring Realities, Persistent Challenges.
Collectively, these papers set forth the structure of the alliance,
provide useful background information, and place the alliance in
its political, social, and economic context. They provide a basis for
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understanding and dealing with current and future challenges to
peace and security in Northeast Asia.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Transcript: Presidents Bush, Kim Dae Jung March 7 Press Briefing, http://
usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42yr.html, accessed December 11, 2002.
2. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is an international agreement
between the United States and the ROK that sets forth the rights and responsibilities
of U.S. military and supporting civilian personnel in Korea. The texts of the 1966
agreement and 1991 revision are at http://www.korea.army.mil/sofa/sofa1966_
ui1991.pdf, while the text of the 2001 revision is at http://www.korea.army.mil/sofa/
2001sofa_english%20text.pdf, both accessed January 7, 2003.
3. See, for example, Donald G. Gross, “Riding the Roller Coaster,” Comparative
Connections, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 2002, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0201Qus_
skorea.html, accessed December 11, 2002.
4. For Kelly’s account, see James A. Kelly, “U.S.-East Asia Policy: Three
Aspects,” remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, December
11, 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2002/15875pf.htm, accessed December 15,
2002.
5. “Conclusion of Non-Aggression Treaty Between DPRK and U.S. Called
for by Pyongyang,” Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, October 25, 2002, in
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSN)Daily Report, October 25,
2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0210/OCT25.html#item1, accessed December 10,
2002.
6. “US Ambassador Says Talks With N. Korea Hinge on Dismantling Nuclear
Program,” Agence France-Presse, December 2, 2002, in NAPSN Daily Report,
December 2, 2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0212/DEC02.html#item2, accessed
December 15, 2002. See also Kelly, “U.S.-East Asia Policy.”
7. Doug Struck, “N. Korea Hints at Missile Test Threat Aimed at Jump Starting
Talks With Japan,” Washington Post, November 6, 2002, in NAPSN Daily Report,
November 8, 2002. http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0211/NOV08.html#item3, accessed
December 15, 2002.
8. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO News for 12/
12/2002,” KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes-November 14, 2002,” http:
//www.kedo.org/news_details.asp?News=10, accessed December 10, 2002.
9. IAEA Media Advisory, “IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on
Safeguards in the DPRK,” http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/med10

advise_033.shtml, accessed December 11, 2002.
10. Sang-Hun Choe, “North Korea Rejects Call For Inspections,” Associated
Press, Seoul, December 4, 2002; and “N. Korea Rejects U.N. Nuclear Watchdog’s
Call,” Reuters, Seoul, December 4, 2002, in NAPSN Daily Report, December 4,
2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0212/DEC04.html#item1, accessed December 15,
2002.
11. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02121121.htm, accessed December
14, 2002.
12. Thomas E. Ricks and Peter Slevin, “Spain and U.S. Seize N. Korean
Missiles,” Washington Post, December 11, 2002; “Suspected North Korean Missiles
Found on Ship,” Agence France-Presse, December 11, 2002; and Steve Holland
and Mohammed Sudam, “U.S. Frees Ship With Scud Missiles For Yemen,” Reuters,
Washington/Sanaa, December 11, 2002, in NAPSN Daily Report, December 11,
2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0212/DEC11.html#sect1, accessed December 15,
2002; “North Korea Ratchets Up Tension, Accuses Washington Of Piracy,” Agence
France-Presse, December 13, 2002, in NAPSN News Daily Report, December 13,
2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html#sect1, accessed December 15, 2002.
13. Doug Struck, “North Korea Says it Will Resume Work at Reactors,”
Washington Post Foreign Service, December 13, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A47924-2002Dec12.html, accessed December 15, 2002.
14. Doug Struck, “Resentment Toward U.S. Troops Is Boiling Over in South
Korea, Acquittal of Soldiers Stokes Protests, Campaign Rhetoric,” Washington Post
Foreign Service, December 9, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A28621-2002Dec8.html, accessed December 13, 2002; “South Korean President
Calls For New Pact on US Troops,” Agence France-Presse, December 3, 2002, in
NAPSN News Daily Report, December 3, 2002, http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/
0212/dec03.html, accessed December 11, 2002.
15. “Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué,”
United States Department of Defense News Release, December 5, 2002, http:
//www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/b12052002_bt619-02.html, accessed December
11, 2002.
16. ROK Government Press Release, New Gov’t Unveils 10 Goals, January 7,
2003, http://www.korea.net/, accessed January 7, 2003; Oh Young-Hwan, “Halfcentury alliance shows signs of strain,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 6, 2003, http:
//english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20030106101958&sid=F00, accessed January 7,
2003; and Glenn Kessler, “U.S. and Asian Allies Discuss North Korea,” Washington
Post, January 7, 2003, p. A08.

11

17. Paul Shin, “North Korea Begins Moving Fuel Rods Into Nuclear Reactor,”
Associated Press, Seoul, December 26, 2002; Louis Charbonneau, “N. Korea
Moving Fresh Fuel To Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, Vienna, December 25, 2002 in
NAPSN News Daily Report, December 26, 2002, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/
0212/DEC26.html#item1, accessed December 27, 2002; Peter S. Goodman, “U.N.
Inspectors to Leave North Korea,” Washington Post, December 29, 2002, p. A25;
and “N. Korea Threatens to Abandon Treaty,” Washington Post, January 1, 2003,
p. A13.

12

PART II: THE ALLIANCE

13

CHAPTER 2
AMERICA’S ALLIANCES IN ASIA:
THE COMING “IDENTITY CRISIS”
WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA?
Victor D. Cha
The bilateral security relationship with the Republic of Korea
(ROK) has been one of the most successful U.S. post-war alliances
in terms of levels of interoperability and attainment of security
objectives. However, as with other alliances forged in the Cold War,
there are increasing questions about its resiliency in the post-Cold
War era. Some have argued that the absence of a principal enemy
for the alliance (i.e., the end of the Soviet threat or the future end of
the North Korean threat), would by definition mean an end to the
alliance itself. Others have debated such an outcome, arguing that
adjustments in the rationale as well as the components of the alliance
can guarantee its resiliency.1
While the question is right, I argue that the answers are more
complicated and multi-faceted. First, it is by no means certain
that the end of North Korea will equate with termination of the
alliance; there are both empirical and theoretical justifications for the
continuance of the alliance after the threat is gone. Second, in the
present and future, an alteration in the rationale and adjustments in
components of the alliance on the ground are critical and requisite
to future resiliency. However, focusing solely on these issues instills
a false sense of confidence in the alliance’s longevity and obscures
a deeper conceptual obstacle to alliance resiliency, its normative
underpinnings. This factor is given short shrift in other analyses,
yet I believe it is critical because the true test of alliances in the postCold War era is not merely their continuation in peacetime but the
domestic support for fulfilling of these commitments in wartime.
The likelihood of the latter is greater when the allies have a strong
normative link. Otherwise, confidence in the alliance’s longevity
today and in the future could be shattered when the effort to activate
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alliance commitments comes up empty.
The Past and Present Success of the Alliance.
Formed in 1953, the alliance with the ROK was America’s
quintessential Cold War relationship in Asia. There was no preceding
history of interaction (aside from sporadic and minor commercial
exchanges in the 1800s) on which to draw, no common values as a
frame of reference. In fact, the United States knew virtually nothing
about Korea when it received the Japanese surrender in the southern
half in 1945, and knew only marginally more when it committed to
defend the South in 1950 as a bulwark against communism and a
front line of defense for Japan. Korea’s value to the United States
was never intrinsic and always strategic (i.e., keeping it out of the
adversary’s camp). In spite of this, the alliance later blossomed into
one of America’s most successful and vibrant bilateral relationships
in East Asia.
Across a range of criteria that determine the functional success of
a military alliance, the U.S.-ROK alliance has done well.2 The alliance
enabled the stationing of what is now some 37,000 U.S. troops
directly at the point of conflict on the peninsula, which provided the
South with an unequivocal symbol of the U.S. defense commitment
and deterred the North with its tripwire presence. The two militaries
represent the classic example of an alliance operating under a joint,
unitary command (the Combined Forces Command or CFC) with
a common doctrine, as well as with a clear division of combat roles
practiced through frequent and extensive joint training. While there
have been some negative civil-military externalities associated with
the stationing of U.S. forces, overall host country support for the
alliance has been and continues to be strong. Arguably the United
States and ROK have evolved into ideal military allies, far more
workable and efficient together than the U.S.-Australia alliance or
U.S.-Saudi Arabia partnership and paralleled only by NATO and
the U.S.-Japan alliances.3
The U.S.-ROK Alliance’s Place in the Region.
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance, while focused
on peninsular security, also constituted an integral part of a larger
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security triangle in Northeast Asia with the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Despite the historical antagonisms between the ROK and Japan, the
United States sought to strengthen the cohesion of this triangle and
effectively treated the two alliances as strategically complementary.
U.S. ground forces in South Korea were as much an extended
frontline of defense for Tokyo as for Seoul. The U.S. Seventh Fleet
and Marine units in Japan provided rear-guard support for the
ROK. This relationship was spelled out in 1969 with the Nixon-Sato
Korea clause (and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s National Press Club
speech) in which Japan acknowledged that ROK security was crucial
to Japan and, therefore, would allow the United States unlimited
access to bases in Okinawa (post-reversion) to defend the South.4
In exercises as well as actual maneuvers during the Cold War,
the two essentially comprised one integrated unit in U.S. defense
planning. U.S.-ROK military exercises regularly employed bases
in Japan for logistic support; U.S. tactical air wing deployments
rotated frequently between Japan and Korea; and air and naval
surveillance of the North was operated out of bases in Japan. In
addition, Seoul and Tokyo conducted periodic exchanges of defense
officials, developed bilateral fora for discussion of security policies,
and engaged in some sharing of intelligence and technology.5
While the triangle was driven during the Cold War by the
task of deterring Chinese and Soviet communist expansion on the
peninsula and in the region generally, the post-Cold War linkage
of the two alliances has as its primary focus a North Korean
contingency. Stemming from a potential collapse or aggression by
the North are coordinating roles for the Japanese Maritime and Air
Self-Defense Forces (MSDF and ASDF) in and around the peninsula
with regard to wartime logistics and activities like minesweeping,
anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol, search and rescue, refugee
processing, and noncombatant evacuation. The catalyzing force for
greater integration of the U.S.-ROK alliance with Japan was the Nye
initiative6 and the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, which not
only better delineated the respective roles of Washington and Tokyo
in a military contingency, but also highlighted the need for greater
communication and coordination between the CFC in Korea and the
SDF in Japan. Since its inception, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and indeed
the U.S.-ROK-Japan triangle, had to contend with its place vis-à-vis
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Washington’s relationship with China. When the latter was bad,
there was no question of the former’s place in the region. However,
improvements in Washington-Beijing relations always raised a
degree of ambiguity and insecurity among the Asian allies about
U.S. intentions. During the Cold War, these ranged from concerns
that the United States was downgrading ties with Korea and Japan
(partly motivated by trade tensions) and elevating those with China,
to fears that the U.S. reconciliation with China was motivated not by
the success of the Cold War alliances but by their perceived failure.7
In the post-Cold War era, trepidation arose again in Seoul and Tokyo
regarding the Clinton administration’s “strategic partnership” with
China.
Two distinctions require highlighting with regard to this
problem. First, such concerns about China have often been couched
in terms of a potential fracturing or erosion of the convergent
interests that have traditionally undergirded the U.S.-ROK and
U.S.-Japan alliances. However, rather than being symptomatic of an
alliance breakdown, these concerns are simply symptomatic of an
alliance. Fears of abandonment are an inherent part of any alliance
relationship and particularly salient in asymmetrical relationships
such as those with Korea and Japan.8 If anything, abandonment
fears are a sign of a healthy and vibrant alliance--indifference would
be more symptomatic of an erosion. Second, the notion of a grand
U.S.-China condominium that undermined Korean and Japanese
security interests overlooks the fundamental difference between
a “partnership” and an alliance. The U.S. alliances with the ROK
and Japan are not only among the most successful but also carry the
most indisputable symbol of commitment--troop deployments. This
is easily taken for granted, as it has been an established and integral
component of the alliances since their inception; nevertheless, it
is an unmistakable sign of who is the primary ally and who is the
“partner.” Finally, convergent rather than competing views between
these two sets of relationships on core issues like nonproliferation
and maintaining the peaceful status quo on the peninsula are more
prevalent in the post-Cold War era, reducing the sort of zero-sum
tradeoffs perceived during the Cold War.
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The Future Rationale and Components.
With regard to the future resiliency of the U.S.-Korea alliance, the
key question is whether the alliance can survive the end of the North
Korean threat. The stated policy of both Washington and Seoul is
that the alliance and U.S. military presence will continue in the postunification era.9 However, political pronouncements about this and
the groundwork to achieve it are two separate matters. Resiliency
will require adjustments in both the rationale and components of the
alliance. Foremost is a reorientation of the alliance’s overall purpose
toward the promotion of broader regional stability.10 The primary
rationale would no longer be deterring the North Korean threat, but
would entail three different but related objectives. One purpose of
the alliance would be to prevent dangerous power vacuums from
forming on the peninsula. As the experience of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries showed, whenever Korea has been unified, such
vacuums have been an invitation for major power competition and
war. Second, the U.S.-Korea alliance would remain an important
political symbol of U.S. forward engagement as a Pacific power,
which, in turn, would be key to ameliorating security dilemmas
between China and Japan. As has already become clear in the
post-Cold War period, Tokyo supports the U.S. presence as a check
against China’s rise in the region; and Beijing implicitly supports
the continuing U.S. presence as it views Japan’s future intentions
with suspicion. Moreover, this amelioration effect would be weaker
without the U.S.-Korea alliance. In other words, cutting the U.S.
presence in a post-unified Korea but keeping a token presence
in Japan is not likely to achieve the same effect, as Japan would
remain uncertain of the U.S. commitment (given events in Korea),
and China would have heightened suspicions due to Japanese selfhelp security behavior. A third purpose of the alliance would be
to reassure a reunified Korea of its security, thereby preempting
rash turns to self-help behavior that might be destabilizing in the
region (e.g., nuclearization, ballistic missile development). The flip
side of this same coin would be for a continued U.S.-Korea alliance
to play a “binding” role on a reunified Korea that, replete with
resurgent nationalism, might otherwise engage in arms buildups
and provocative behavior toward Japan.
In addition to revised alliance rationales, adjustments in specific
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alliance components on the ground are necessary. These include
changes in the composition of U.S. forces in Korea as well as alterations
in cost-sharing arrangements, the CFC structure, and base locations
to be more amenable to host country complaints.11 A reconstitution
of U.S. forces would largely follow from the reorientation of the
alliance’s rationale to regional security. For example, given the
alliance’s current mandate (deterring and defending against a
northern attack), the overwhelming majority of the 98 U.S. military
installations are Army. A regional security mandate would mean
substantial upgrading of air and naval presence and mobile rapid
reaction capabilities at the expense of traditional ground forces. For
example, the future U.S. force presence might no longer consist of
two full brigades, prepositioned Army and Marine equipment (in
Korea and Guam), and an infantry division ready to be flown in
from Hawaii; instead, it might be 10-15,000 troops largely air and
navy-based, a small contingent of ground forces south of the 38th
Parallel and substantially less prepositioning.
Regarding the CFC, operational control has been a delicate
sovereignty issue for the two governments. Operational control
traditionally belonged to the United States until December 1995,
when peacetime control (as well as the position of Senior Member
of the United Nations (U.N.) command component of the Military
Armistice Commission) was transferred to South Korea. A postNorth Korea, diminished-threat environment would bolster a
united Korea’s desires for wartime operational control; however,
this faces two obstacles: (1) the lack of adequate Korean intelligence
capabilities (which Seoul wants the United States to provide);
and (2) U.S. reluctance to concede wartime operational control in
any theater. Most likely, an alternative arrangement would need
consideration, similar to a NATO-type combined control system
in wartime or a U.S.-Japan system of independent control but with
specified guidelines about roles and expectations for cooperation.
Cost-sharing calculations are likely to be readjusted in a revised
alliance system. Until the early 1970s, the United States covered
all costs for maintenance of the security presence in Korea. In the
early 1980s, the ROK committed to share maintenance costs for
joint facilities (up to $45 million/year in 1989), and by the early
1990s, increased its contribution to one-third of total base costs (up
to $300 million/year by 1995). By 1998, the ROK share had risen to
20

$399 million, but in 1999, in the wake of the financial crisis, the two
countries negotiated a new multi-year Special Measures Agreement.
Under this agreement, the ROK contributed some $333 million in
1999, and the contribution rose to $391 in 2000.12
The United States currently occupies 78.6 million pyong [1 pyong
= 3.954 yards, ed.] for 36,272 troops. This amounts to .23 percent
of total South Korean land (30 billion pyong) and 40 percent of
metropolitan Seoul (183 million pyong).13 The percentage, location,
and terms of land for the U.S. base presence are likely to undergo
change in a revised alliance. The precedent for this was set in June
1990, when the two governments agreed to the staged relocation
of Yongsan out of central Seoul to Osan and Pyongtaek, including
headquarters for U.N. Forces, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), CFC, and all
supporting troops). After completion of an initial phase (relocation
of the Yongsan golf course) in March 1991, the plan was postponed
indefinitely with the North Korean nuclear crisis, and since then
disputes have arisen over the costs of relocation (originally to be
borne by the ROK government), estimated in 1990 at over 2 trillion
won. Adjustments in the terms of land usage are also likely. Relative
to Japan or the Philippines, the ROK provides more exclusive land
use rights to the United States without compensation to the private
sector or does not hold the United States accountable for damages
(56 percent of the total land usage is granted for exclusive use by the
United States).
Additional Factors for Alliance Longevity.
The preceding issues are important and highlight facets of the
relationship that will eventually require attention as the alliance
remakes itself.14 The discussion, however, has not advanced
substantially beyond this point. Analysts and well-wishers pay lip
service to the above recommendations, couching the entire exercise
in urgent phrases like “now is the time to reestablish ROK-U.S.
relations for the 21st century,” or calls for a “restructuring” of the
alliance “beyond the North Korean threat.”15 I raise two additional
avenues of inquiry to push the discussion further. First, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the resiliency of the alliance is overdetermined.
Despite all the efforts at re-thinking rationales and revising
components of the alliance to avert future erosion, objectively
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speaking, the conditions on and around the Korean peninsula are
ideal for continuation of the alliance in the short to medium term.
Second, because alliance well-wishers focus their attention only on
its rationales and components, and because this will, in fact, appear
successful, given the already favorable conditions for alliance
resiliency, what is being missed is an understanding of the alliance’s
normative base. This base is critical because it is linked to the true
test of the alliance’s resiliency, domestic support for activation of the
alliance commitment.
The Defense and Insurance Rationale.
In spite of all the trepidation about post-threat disintegration,
a number of factors favor U.S.-ROK alliance longevity. History
has shown that alliances are more likely to thrive when they face
a persistent threat, are defensive in nature, have limited “exit”
opportunities, have host-nation domestic support, and/or develop
institutional linkages.16 First, ceteris paribus, defensive alliances
last longer than offensive ones. Offensive partnerships tend to
be short in duration. They are motivated by joint acquisition of
a maximum gain after which the partnership speedily dissolves.
Defensive alliances are also motivated by a specific goal, but it
is loss-prevention rather than gains-acquisition. The former is
inherently a stronger rationale for alliance resiliency because the
benefits of continuing the relationship (i.e., insurance) outweigh
the costs.17 The U.S.-ROK alliance will clearly enjoy both of these
conditions for the forseeable future. A defensive alliance (with the
one exception of the rollback policy during part of the Korean War),
envisioning an “insurance policy” as its rationale is easy to imagine.
Moreover, any hard thinking about the modalities and requirements
of “insurance” has been postponed as North Korea’s combination of
intransigent behavior and periodic unexpected pliancy provides an
unquestionable rationale for the alliance now.18
Preventive Defense Rationale.
The more “institutionalized” an alliance, the greater the likelihood
of its survival. The prime example is NATO, which has evolved
into far more than an instrument of Western deterrence. It has
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spawned such a variety of subsidiary organizations and transatlantic
networks of former officials, intellectuals, journalists, and analysts
that its livelihood is ensured by the very symbols and institutions of
cooperation it has created.19 While similar institutions are lacking in
the U.S.-ROK case, the alliance has provided the only U.S. security
presence on the Asian mainland, and has become an embodiment of
U.S. influence and commitment as a Pacific power. It will still be in
the U.S. interest to discourage the rise of a hegemon in the region,
a goal that also suits Korea. Operationally, the alliance is integral
to the operations of the U.S.-Japan alliance for any contingency in
Northeast Asia. From the ROK perspective, the security relationship
buttresses the trade relationship and has provided other hard-toquantify but significant benefits in terms of regional political stability
and secure markets.20 In short, these factors provide a “preventive
defense” rationale for alliance longevity — the benefits substantially
outweigh the costs, and the costs of maintaining these arrangements
are substantially less than having to re-create them in the future.21
The Impact of Multilateralism.
Multilateral security designs are more likely to complement
than supplant the bilateral alliance. Multilateralism’s growth in the
region has been rapid, but while the ROK has been actively involved
in a number of initiatives,22 this does not suffice as its foreign policy
template. This was made starkly clear at the time of the Asian
financial crisis when the primary facilitator of the ROK’s economic
bailout was not the multilateral bodies, but the United States, based
on the security rationale. Multilateralism also tends to accord less
with Korea’s strategic culture which, throughout modern and premodern history, has tended to view security as best achieved either
through unilateralism and self-imposed isolation (e.g., the premodern “hermit kingdom”), or through intense bilateralism vis-àvis China and then, later, the United States.23 Multilateralism’s role,
much to the desire of both Washington and Seoul, will be alongside
the alliance, complementing it when necessary. Perhaps more
relevant for the alliance than multilateralism in the future are ad hoc
policy coalitions or “minilaterals.” More limited in membership
than broader multilateral groups and pragmatically designed to deal
with concrete problems, minilaterals offer a more opportune venue
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in which the bilateral alliance can operate.24
The Effect of Unification on Alliance Resiliency.
A common cause for alliance breakups after the threat is gone
are fears of abandonment at the government level and host-nation
opposition to the alliance among the general public. The common
assumption is that the U.S.-ROK alliance will suffer from these
debilitating dynamics after North Korea is gone, leading to a great
deal of mistrust and uncertainty between Seoul and Washington.
Regarding host-nation civil-military relations, most assume that
Korean domestic opposition to the alliance will be fierce.
However, a closer look at the prevailing conditions leads to a
different conclusion. Abandonment fears lead to alliance abrogation
only when alternative security or “exit” options exist (e.g., either
the abandonment-fearing ally seeks out new allies or internally
builds up). If such options are not available, abandonment fears can
counter-intuitively lead to a cohering of the alliance.25 Undoubtedly,
Korean unification will be accompanied by concerns in Seoul about
U.S. retrenchment; however, the likely response to this will be
reaffirming rather than junking the relationship. This is because the
alternatives are not attractive. Historical animosity toward Japan
and uncertainty regarding Chinese intentions rule out these parties
as security providers. The self-help option is expensive and not
feasible given relative power disparities in the region; moreover,
Seoul has always considered the United States to be the only honest
broker in the region. Unification is thus likely to bring continued
rather than waning enthusiasm for the relationship with the United
States.
Related arguments are relevant at the level of domestic politics.
By any reasonable calculation, unification will be an extremely
costly and difficult process for the Korean people.26 Economic and
social integration will be accompanied by a great deal of dislocation
in both the north and south. And as the German case showed, no
amount of policy foresight or economic pliancy can ensure a smooth
transition. The prospect of having to foot new security costs in
addition to unification-related ones will not be an attractive prospect.
In an ideal world, renewed nationalist pride would prompt Korea
to venture outside the protective umbrella of the United States. In
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a pragmatic one, however, the alliance offers Koreans an anchor of
stability in what is certain to be a time of great change.27
Thus, well-wishers will see their aspirations for a resilient U.S.Korea alliance validated. This will partially stem from the revisions
in regional security rationales in combination with adjustments in
cost-sharing, base location, command structures, and composition
of forces. In addition, as the preceding conceptual section shows,
certain objective conditions already weigh in favor of the alliance’s
residual continuity in the short-medium term. While this is a positive
outcome, its very success discourages any additional thinking about
a critically neglected variable for alliance resiliency, the normative
underpinnings.
The Normative Foundations of Alliance Resiliency.
The durability of an alliance is not defined merely by the
prolonging of its material structures. The ultimate measure of
resiliency is domestic willingness to fulfill alliance obligations in
time of need. This was a foregone conclusion during the Cold War
when the line between adversaries and allies was clear and battles in
the periphery were equated with those in the core. This is far from
the case in the post-Cold War era.
The American public has traditionally exhibited ambivalence
for international commitments. The Chicago Council of Foreign
Relations found, for example, that only 61 percent of the general
public support an activist U.S. role in world affairs in the postCold War era, a level of interest only marginally better than in
the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam war.28 “Public disinterest
in international affairs is pervasive, abetted by the drastically
shrinking media coverage of foreign events. Majorities of 55 to 66
percent of the public say that what happens in Western Europe,
Asia, Mexico, and Canada has little or no impact on their lives.”29
While 80 percent of the public considers protecting American jobs a
“very important” goal of the United States, only 44 percent believes
the same for “defending allies’ security.” Moreover, the polls
consistently found that Europe is perceived as a more important
theater than Asia.30 Thus, it is not U.S. physical engagement in Asia
but “psychological” engagement that constitutes the critical test of
alliance resiliency--Congress and the American people’s willingness
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to use the U.S. forces deployed in the region. As John Mueller has
argued, the United States is generally accepting of engagement and
the deployment of forces abroad in peacetime even if the costs are
substantial. However, what the public is not tolerant of is the loss
of American lives. Once U.S. soldiers start dying, the American
cost-calculation becomes extremely stringent, demanding clear and
unrefutable benefits for such sacrifices.31 This nicely sums up the
alliance resiliency dilemma in Asia: for a variety of reasons related
to markets, U.S. leadership, and convenience, support for the United
States to remain in Asia will persist up to the point where conflict
breaks out.
A key determinant of alliance resiliency is the degree to which
shared identities underpin interaction. By identity, we mean the
degree to which alliances are grounded in commonly held norms,
values, beliefs, and conceptions of how security is best achieved.32
[W]hen an alliance either reflects or creates a sense of common
identity . . . [t]hen the entire notion of an individual “national
interest” becomes less applicable. If elites and/or publics begin
to view their own society as inextricably part of a larger political
community, then members will find it difficult to conceive of
themselves as separate and will see their interests as identical
even if the external environment changes dramatically.33

Alliance identity can exist a priori based on similarities in regime
type, religion, or ethnicity (e.g., the Anglo-American alliance).
Common identities can also be constructed over time between unlike
regimes through a wide range of economic and social interactions,
development of elite networks, and high levels of communication.34
In the latter case, alliances become institutions of socialization where
constituencies in both countries develop common standards and
expectations of conduct. Most important, the type of commitment
that emerges from shared alliance identities is fundamentally
different from those that lack this component. The decision to help
the ally in the latter case is based on a cold calculation of the overlap
in interests. In the former case, the decision may have as much to
do with promoting certain commonly shared values (even if there is
comparatively less overlap in interests). At the extreme end, shared
identities may lead to an emotive attachment and loyalty to an ally
irrespective of the issue at-hand.35
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The Task for U.S.-ROK Alliance Resiliency:
Constructing a Shared Identity.
The importance of identity factors for post-Cold War alliance
resiliency does not bode well for the U.S.-ROK alliance. The alliance
had no a priori-shared identity, and instead was formed around
two utilitarian goals: deterring a second North Korean invasion
and safeguarding Japan.36 Korea does not register in the average
American mindset. When asked to quantify feelings of affinity
for countries on a scale of 0 to 100 (above 50 being a “warm”),
Americans rated South Korea, a longtime ally of the United States,
below “neutral” (48) and only two points above China. By contrast,
Britain and Canada were rated 69 and 73 respectively.37 In the most
telling sign of the absence of American “psychological” engagement
in Korea, a clear majority of the general public were against the use
of U.S. troops to repel a North Korean attack. This was in spite of the
nuclear crisis in 1994 and a prolonged period of exposure to Korea
stories in the media.38
These discrepancies should alarm alliance-watchers of a potential
disaster down the road. A reconstituted U.S.-Korea regionallyoriented alliance, while appearing outwardly resilient, would
probably garner even less American support than at present. The
inability of Americans to “identify” with Korea and Koreans could
ultimately make the alliance a hollow shell.
The pressing task is therefore not only to deal with pragmatic,
material alliance management issues, but also to lay the ideational
foundation for the alliance in the post-Cold War era. As noted
above, shared identities can be constructed even where they do not
exist a priori. Several steps appear necessary. First, U.S. officials
must make deliberate efforts to frame the relationship in normative
terms that resonate with the average American (i.e., not just with
specialists). Statements like this one by former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell are a step in the right direction:
. . . the security alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of
Korea is more than treaty commitment — it is a close, mutually
beneficial partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and
free markets. Our alliance is an essential element of the strategy
for achieving our long-standing security goal: a non-nuclear,
democratic, and peacefully reunified Korean peninsula.39
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Former Ambassador Bosworth’s statements offer similar attempts
at reconstructing the alliance in ideational terms:
The third element of our relationship is philosophical — our
shared commitment to democratic values and democratic
practice. As Korean democracy has developed strongly in recent
years, democracy has become in a real sense the cement of the
overall relationship.40

Moreover, such statements before wider foreign policy audiences
help construct an image of Korea as the successful embodiment of
market democratic ideals in a region where skepticism about such
ideals still remains. The November 1998 Clinton-Kim summit, while
framing the relationship in its traditional anti-North Korean context,
also put forth images of an alliance grounded in shared values of
liberal democracy and free markets.41 Similarly, President Bush in
March 2001 spoke of the alliance’s strength in deterring North Korea,
but also in terms of its deepening and “comprehensive” partnership
that ranges out to extraregional issues beyond the peninsula.42
While the former is important now, constructing the latter image is
critical for the long-term. In a similar vein, the establishment of the
Democracy Forum by the two presidents to promote and strengthen
democracy in East Asia also creates important symbols of Korea that
resonate with values rather than just security threats.
Second, there was no better opportunity for remaking the alliance
in normative terms than under the South Korean administration of
Kim Dae-jung. Kim was undoubtedly the most well-known Korean
chief executive in American elite and public circles in the post-war
era. His life history resonates with American ideals of freedom,
justice, and democracy. His suffering as a martyr for these causes
has been anointed by many American leaders. Critics of Kim found
these assessments troubling; however, Kim’s past gave him the
credibility, in American eyes, to promote the bilateral relationship as
a reaffirmation of mutually-shared values in a way that no previous
Korean leader could have.43 The opportunity was lost, however, and
the Bush administration must work with the new administration of
Roh Moo-Hyun. While early 2003 is a tense time on the Korean
peninsula, circumstances may actually prove conducive to
constructing a new shared identity for the alliance.
Third, the ROK could resuscitate certain images invoked during
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Ronald Reagan’s reaffirmation of the alliance in the 1980s. After a
period of difficult relations during the Carter administration, when
Washington criticized ROK human rights violations and called
for troop withdrawals, the ROK encountered a renewal of alliance
ties under Reagan. What is of use today from this period is not the
Cold War rhetoric but the images of Korea as a reliable and loyal
U.S. ally. More so than any other Asian power, the ROK directly
supported U.S. policies — a front line state throughout the Cold War
and a willing partner in Vietnam when the United States needed
allied support. The conceptual objective would be to cultivate an
American appreciation of the alliance per se, rather than as derivative
of Japanese security.
Finally, through activities outside the purview of the U.S.ROK alliance, Koreans can also demonstrate shared principles.
For example, the ROK has been an active participant in U.N.
peacekeeping operations (PKO) and other multilateral activities,
especially after being admitted to the U.N. in 1991. These sorts of
activities resonate with the American public. Polls find that only
19 percent of the public disapprove of U.S. participation in U.N.
peacekeeping, while over 50 percent actively support it.44
Conclusion.
The future resiliency of the U.S.-ROK alliance is far from
determined. This paper does not argue that efforts to rethink the
alliance’s rationale in the post-threat era are a valueless exercise.
Nor does it argue that alliance identity is the solution to every
problem. Diagnoses of the alliance tend to ignore redesigning its
rationale. This is unhealthy because what appears to be a resilient
and renovated alliance for the 21st century may in fact prove to be
hollow when Americans see no reason to fight for or in the name of
Korea. The chances of avoiding such an outcome are greater with
proactive efforts to remake the U.S.-Korea alliance on the basis of
shared norms and values.
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CHAPTER 3
COST SHARING FOR USFK IN TRANSITION:
WHITHER THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE?
Jin-Young Chung
Introduction.
United States Forces Korea (USFK) is a key component of the
bilateral security alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and the United States of America. For almost half a century,
USFK and the Mutual Defense Treaty have been very successful
in achieving key common interests, that is, deterring North Korea
and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and
in the Northeast Asian region. South Korea has benefited from
this security arrangement in various respects beyond its primary
objective of deterring invasion. ROK achievements in economic
development and democratization hardly would have been possible
without peace and stability in its security environment. The United
States has also benefited from the forward deployment of USFK in
protecting and strengthening U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.
However, the alliance and USFK have not been exempt from
turbulence. Sometimes bilateral relations have fallen into trouble
due to South Korea’s domestic politics, the two allies’ different
views on North Korea, or one party’s illegal lobbying or influence
peddling. The United States unilaterally decided to withdraw
U.S. ground forces or reduce their size significantly in spite of
South Korea’s strong opposition in 1971, 1977, and 1989. The very
success of the ROK-U.S. alliance has also sown the seeds of its
transformation. As South Korea has grown strong in economic and
defense capabilities, the initial imbalance between the two allies in
the allocation of defense burdens and decisionmaking power had
to be modified. Moreover, the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the
weakening of North Korea have fundamentally transformed the
external environment. The very fact that conflicts have occurred over
sharing the costs of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea reflects this
changing nature of the alliance.
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This essay is about cost-sharing debates between the ROK and
the United States, and their implications for the bilateral alliance. Our
arguments are three-fold. First, ROK-U.S. cost-sharing debates have
occurred in an inappropriate way so they tended to divide the two
allies. When the issue of cost sharing for USFK gained importance in
the security dialogues between the ROK and the United States in the
late 1980s, Americans were seriously considering the reduction of
USFK, while South Koreans began to doubt the American commitment
to the defense of their country. In other words, South Korea was
asked to increase its share of the burden for maintaining USFK just
when the United States was preparing for the reduction of its military
commitment. Accordingly, South Koreans tended to believe that the
United States was taking advantage of the troop withdrawal card for
the purpose of gaining more concessions from its ally.
Second, it is natural that there have been significant differences
over how to measure the two allies’ respective shares of USFK costs.
The issues of which costs to include and how to measure them
for calculating host nation support have been especially divisive.
Moreover, cost-sharing debates between the ROK and the United States
have gained importance in another, very unexpected way: They came
to provide each of the two allies with rare but fertile opportunities to
express discontents and demands vis-à-vis the partner on the current
state and future development of the alliance. As a very complicated
process, cost-sharing debates exhibited many subtle and difficult issues
involved in alliance politics.
Third, the question of fairness in cost-sharing debates can hardly
be resolved through the adoption of sophisticated indicators or
measurement techniques. Rather, it is primarily related to how to define
the nature and mission of the alliance itself in the changing internal and
external environment. Now it is time for the Republic of Korea and the
United States to evaluate the state of their bilateral alliance and find a
new vision for the future.
The rest of this essay is composed of four sections. The following
three sections are devoted to support of the three arguments mentioned
above. The last section is a conclusion.
ROK-U.S. Cost Sharing: Background and Trend.
The U.S. forces came to the Korean peninsula in 1945, together with
Soviet forces, to disarm the Japanese army and liberate the Japanese
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colony. Before the establishment of the South Korean government, the
United States governed the southern half of the peninsula through
a military government. U.S. forces left the country in keeping with
the U.S. policy decision to exclude the Korean peninsula from its
defense line in East Asia.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought U.S. forces
back to the peninsula as the core part of the United Nations forces
to rescue South Korea. After the cease fire agreement, the ROK and
the United States concluded the Mutual Defense Treaty and agreed
to station substantial U.S. forces in South Korea. This was the origin
of the current USFK (see Figure 1). During the early decades of
ROK-U.S. relations, the United States was the dominant partner
and provided substantial economic and military assistance. It was
believed that strengthening South Korea’s economic and defense
capabilities would make it a bulwark against Communist influence
on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Source: Lee Sang-Hoon, The Security Environment of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st
Century and the Role of the USFK (in Korean), Sungnam: The Sejong Institute, 2001,
p. 28.

Figure 1. The Number of U.S. Troops in South Korea.
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However, even during that period, South Korea was not a free
rider. South Korea provided free land for USFK bases and supported
manpower through the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
(KATUSA) program and its operation costs. South Korea also sent
combat troops to the Vietnam War. In the 1970s, U.S. demands
for South Korean contributions to USFK intensified.1 In 1974, for
instance, the United States asked South Korea to provide logistics
support, especially the costs for storage and maintenance of war
reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) and financial support for carrying
out combined defense improvement projects (CDIP). After 1976,
South Korea carried the burden of providing the operations cost of
the Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAGK). In 1983, South Korea also began to share the operational cost of
the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).
This trend of increasing cost sharing reflected, in part, South
Korea’s economic success.2 However, it was also during this period
that the United States unilaterally decided to reduce or pull out of the
USFK. President Richard M. Nixon declared his “Guam Doctrine”
and decided to reduce USFK by 20, 000 by June of 1971. President
Jimmy Carter announced his 3-stage plan in 1977 to withdraw USFK
ground combat forces by 1982. In this context, the United States
pressed South Korea to take more of the burdens of USFK, and
South Korea had little choice but to agree.3 From the South Korean
perspective, according to Professor Ryoo Jae-Gab, “it was utmost
important to keep U.S. forces in South Korea by all means.”4 South
Korea was willing to share the costs of the USFK in order to keep
U.S. forces.
U.S. demands for cost sharing greatly intensified in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.5 Two factors were especially responsible. First,
the burgeoning budget deficit was a serious concern in Congress.
Second, the collapse of the Soviet empire led the American people
to expect a “peace dividend” in the form of defense budget
cuts. Accordingly, those cuts became an important target for the
reduction of the budget deficit. The question was: how to cut the
defense budget? One easy solution was reduction of overseas
defense expenditures6 because the United States could blame allies
for not cooperating in sharing the defense burden and the post-Cold
War international environment made it possible to reduce overseas
military commitments. The United States could achieve its objective
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in two ways: reduce the absolute size of overseas forces or increase
the allies’ contributions to the costs of stationing U.S. forces.
South Korea and USFK were directly influenced by this. From
1986 on, South Korea was asked to directly contribute in cash to
share the costs of the USFK. After a tense bilateral negotiation,
South Korea began to pay direct support for USFK from 1989. In
early 1991, the ROK and United States concluded a multi-year costsharing agreement in the form of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for the 1991-95 period.
According to this agreement, South Korea was to increase its
contributions to a third of USFK’s won-based costs (WBC), which
meant U.S.$300 million in 1995 (see Figure 2).
While South Korea was pressed to increase its contributions for
USFK, the United States decided in 1989, once again unilaterally, to

Source: Ministry of National Defense, White Paper 1999 and 2000; Korea Times,
September 9, 2001. The preliminary data for the year 2002 is based on the ROKU.S. agreement at the 2001 Security Consultative Meeting. Korea Times, November
25, 2001.

Figure 2. South Korea’s Direct Payment for
USFK Stationing Costs (Unit: U.S. $ million).
cut U.S. Forces. According to a new 3-stage reduction plan, USFK
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was to be reduced by 7,000 for the first 3 years until 1992. The second
and third stage reductions were to be made after a review of the
previous achievements. However, the second stage reduction plan
was never implemented due to the North Korean nuclear issue. In
1995 the United States decided to maintain the current level of its
forces in the region. According to the Defense Department’s East
Asian Strategic Report, the United States has vital interests there
and will maintain the forces to defend them.7
Also in 1995 the ROK and the United States completed another
round of negotiations for a multi-year cost-sharing scheme. This
time, calculating South Korea’s contributions on the basis of the
WBC was dropped. Instead, South Korea was to increase its total
contributions by 10 percent per year for 3 years from the 1995 base,
or U.S.$300 million. In South Korea, this was welcomed, as it was
expected to reduce the rate of increase in the contributions.8 When
the East Asian financial crisis hit South Korea in 1997-98, the United
States allowed South Korea to pay a part of its contributions in
Korean Won instead of U.S. dollars, which meant some alleviation
of the Korean burden.
Since 1999 the ROK and the United States have negotiated South
Korea’s contributions for USFK each year. For 2000 and 2001, South
Korea agreed to increase its direct contributions to U.S.$391 million
and U.S.$444 million, respectively. Although the allies have found
a compromise solution so far, many factors have complicated the
negotiations.
U.S. demands for increased contributions have been made during
a declining U.S. commitment to Korean security. The United States
made unilateral decisions to reduce or withdraw its forces while
demanding more for maintenance of USFK. This was a very shortsighted policy for two important reasons. First, it aroused a very
negative feeling on the Korean side about cost sharing, making the
negotiations controversial and divisive. Second, U.S. policy put the
future of the alliance in a negative light, preventing the allies from
developing a new vision for the alliance. These are the main subjects
of the following two sections.
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Debates over Cost Sharing: A Korean Perspective.
If USFK produces a collective good, both South Korea and the
United States have to pay the costs for its production. Few people in
South Korea flatly deny the need for making a contribution to USFK.
However, there is much disagreement between South Korea and the
United States on how to measure the benefits and costs of USFK and
their allocation. Recent cost-sharing negotiations came to be an arena
in which each party could raise its demands and discontents with
great implications for the future of the alliance.9 In the following, we
pick four broad issues that have been considered most important
from the South Korean perspective.
South Korea’s Fair Share.
Many in South Korea think their country’s contributions are too
heavy.10 One of the main reasons is related to the measurement of
South Korea’s contributions, which we deal with in the next item.
Two other reasons are often mentioned. First, South Korea’s relative
burden is heavier than those of the other U.S. allies. According to
research by Dr. Nam Chang-hee, when he was working for the
Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, South Korea’s contributions
as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) and defense
expenditure far exceed those of Germany and Japan.11
Table 1 provides a comparison of contributions by Germany,
Japan, and South Korea. The data in Table 1 are based on the
U.S. Department of Defense report on the allied contributions.
In absolute terms, Japan is an outstanding contributor, the only
country that satisfied the U.S. congressional requirement that the
host country assume 75 percent or more of the costs of stationing
U.S. forces. We can explain this by two factors peculiar to Japan:
it has been constitutionally prohibited from maintaining its own
armed forces; and, compared to the size of the economy, Japan’s
defense expenditure has been very limited.12
In relative terms, however, South Korea’s contributions have
been heavier. South Korea spent far more resources for defense than
the other two countries. South Korea’s total support for USFK as a
percentage of its GDP and its direct support compared to its defense
budget have been heavier. This is why many Koreans believe that
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Host Country Support
($ million)
Direct Indirect Total
Germany

33.6

Number
of U.S.
Troops

Defense
Budget
($billion)

Defense / Total Cost / Total Cost / D.Cost /
GDP
GDP
Personnel Defense
(%)
(%)
($1,000)
(%)

1344.1

1377.7

68,196

32.89

1.55

0.06

20.2

0.10

Japan

3957.2 1223.9

5181.1

40,244

2.18

1.03

0.13

128.7

9.38

Korea

324.7

721.8

36,130

11.52

2.84

0.18

20.0

2.82

397.2

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common
Defense, March 2001 and March 2000.

Table 1. Comparative Cost Sharing, 1999.
their portion of the cost sharing is not fair.
Second, South Korea’s support has increased very rapidly.13
According to Nam Chang-Hee, while it increased by 32.3 percent
per year from 1994 to 1997, Japanese support increased only by
5.4 percent and German support decreased by 57.3 percent for the
same period.14 As we can see in Figure 2, South Korea’s support
increased continuously except in 1999, when the financial crisis hit.
Moreover, this occurred when the United States planned to reduce
the size of USFK, which made South Koreans feel that their share of
the costs was much heavier.
Measurement of South Korea’s Contributions.
South Korea’s continuous complaints about the United States
in the cost-sharing negotiations are related to the latter’s refusal
to include some of its contributions.15 Two important items are the
support of Korean forces to augment U.S. forces (KATUSA) and
the provision of land for USFK bases and facilities. Although the
KATUSA program supports USFK, the United States refuses to
include this cost as a contribution. On the provision of land, the
United States accepted only a very limited amount as a contribution.
As a result, the U.S. estimate of South Korea’s contributions has been
far lower than the Korean estimate.16
Table 2 compares those estimates for 1997. South Korea includes
all the items the United States includes and then adds others not in42

Korean Version

Direct
Support

Cash
Operation &
Maintenance

Indirect
Support

Direct
Support

9.8

Rent

2.7

2.7

Labor

186.5

191.3

20.5

Utilities

Facilities

3.4

Facilities

Subtotal

398.1

Facility Use such as
ranges, etc.

Manpower support
Subtotal

Grand Total

364.5

Logistics

Tax exemption

Rental
Support

American Version

Exclusively used
land and areas
surrounding USFK
facilities

153.8

Indirect
Support

59.9
240.2

2,195.4

118.3

42.9

60.6

Subtotal

350.4

372.9

Rent

277.6

277.6

Taxes

108.3

108.3

Miscellaneous

1,557.0

Subtotal

Grand Total

0

118.3

Miscellaneous

26.5

0

*

*

385.8

385.8

736.2

758.7

Source: Ministry of National Defense, White Paper 2000, Appendix 14; Department
of Defense, Responsibility Sharing Report, March 1999, p. D-9.

Table 2. Differences in Measurement of Korean
Contributions, 1997 (Unit: $U.S. million).
cluded in the U.S. estimate. As a result, there is a big difference,
about $1.4 billion, which means that South Korea’s contributions are
greatly underestimated by the United States.17
Limitations on South Korean Sovereignty and Autonomy.
Recently, South Koreans have become much more sensitive
about the unequal nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This sentiment
was aroused by increased USFK-related criminal activities such as
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servicemen’s crimes and environmental accidents and the South
Korean government’s inability to deal with these issues effectively
due to the restrictions of the SOFA. It was in this context that
South Korea tried to link the speedy revision of the SOFA with its
contributions to USFK.18
Another issue that has attracted much concern and raised
nationalist sentiment in South Korea is the restriction, through
a ROK-U.S. memorandum of understanding, of South Korea’s
freedom to develop medium-range missiles.19 South Koreans felt
frustrated over this especially because it contrasted with North
Korea’s ability to develop and export missiles. The public had great
difficulty understanding why the United States established such a
restriction. As long as USFK is perceived as a hindrance to South
Korea’s national sovereignty and autonomy, the government has
great difficulty in persuading its people to support it.
South Korea’s dependence on the United States for arms and
U.S. restrictions on Korean development and transfer of military
technology also have been the subjects of deep resentment. South
Korea has purchased most of its arms from the United States. Many
Koreans believe this has been the result of American lobbying and
pressure and reflects the asymmetric relationship between the
allies. Moreover, the United States has been very stringent on the
transfer of military technology to South Korea and on granting the
South Korean requests for the export of defense products to third
countries.20
Last, but certainly not least, South Koreans came to be concerned
about rising cost sharing without a commensurate increase in South
Korea’s responsibility and power. South Korea provided U.S.$500
million worth of support for the Gulf War and actively participated
in United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. South Korea also
took up 75 percent of the costs for the provision of two light water
reactors to North Korea in order to facilitate the implementation
of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. South Koreans want
responsibility and power-sharing in parallel with cost sharing visà-vis the United States. In fact, there has been a meaningful change:
a transfer of the peacetime operational control of ROK forces
committed to the Combined Forces Command to South Korea in
December 1991. Nevertheless, many South Koreans feel that they
pay the costs of the U.S.-led activities without participating in the
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decisionmaking process. Therefore, there are some who argue that
the government has to link these issues to the level of support for
USFK.21
The Nature of USFK.
Who benefits from USFK? The allocation of costs should be
related to the allocation of benefits. We inevitably confront this
question in the negotiations over cost sharing. In the ROK-U.S.
negotiations, this question is primarily related to the nature and
status of USFK. There has been a broad consensus between the
allies that the primary objective of USFK is deterrence against North
Korea. However, growing voices in South Korean society advocate
other views.22 Some argue that, as USFK basically supports U.S.
interests in Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula, there
is little need for South Korea to support its costs. Another view is
that South Korea no longer needs USFK because North Korea is so
weak that South Korea alone can handle it and because USFK is a
hindrance to reconciliation and reunification of the two Koreas.
Although these advocates are still a minority in South Korean
society, the government cannot dismiss them in its negotiations on
cost sharing.
ROK-U.S. Alliance in Transition: A New Vision?
Enduring conflicts over cost sharing have been mostly related
to fundamental questions about the alliance, about its mission and
vision for the future. After almost a half-century, the alliance has
had several important challenges. Without serious efforts to redefine
the long-term vision of the alliance, the two countries risk rising
differences between them and a gradual loosening of the alliance.
Let us discuss several sources of transformation the ROK-U.S.
alliance has met and several hurdles the two allies have to resolve.
Sources of Transformation.
The external and internal environment of the alliance has
undergone tremendous changes in the last half century, especially
the past decade. Let us mention briefly a few important factors
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that require that South Korea and the United States rethink their
alliance.
First, the collapse of the Cold War structure has had a great
impact on the foreign and security policies of each country and on
the alliance. South Korea has achieved diplomatic normalization with
North Korea’s two key former allies, Russia and China. The United
States does not have to worry about Soviet expansion in Northeast
Asia. These changes, togetits with the weakening of North Korea,
have reduced the relevance of the old mission of the alliance.
Second, the role of the United States as a single superpower in
the post-Cold War world has been greatly expanded. The United
States nowadays is involved in virtually every corner of the world as
a world policeman or balancer. This has important implications for
the alliance because the two countries must decide on the U.S. role
in the changed world.
Third, South Korea’s economic success and democratization have
also changed the bilateral relationship. In the early years, South
Korea was a recipient of U.S. economic and military aid. However,
the relationship has been changing towards a partnership as South
Korean economic capabilities have increased. This is reflected in the
security arrangement between them, with the United States playing
“a supporting rather than a leading role in deterrence against
the North.”23 South Korean democratization has added another
dimension to the alliance. South Korea’s domestic politics has had
important repercussions on the negotiation agenda and relative
power within the alliance.
Fourth, the weakening of North Korea and improvements in
inter-Korean relations have the potential to fundamentally transform
the nature of the alliance and the status of USFK. A quasi-collapse
of North Korea and/or establishment of peace on the peninsula will
make many in South Korea and the United States doubt the need
for USFK, let alone the alliance. If this is a possible scenario, the two
countries have to start serious discussions for the future of their
alliance.24
Fifth, China’s rise and the U.S.-China relationship will also have
a great impact on South Korea’s foreign policy and the alliance. Due
to geography and deepening economic relations with China, South
Korea has to be very sensitive to the rise of China. Someday, South
Korea may face a serious dilemma in choosing between the United
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States and China, if the U.S.-Chinese relationship deteriorates. This
is another reason for redefining the alliance.
Some Problems Ahead.
When the two allies try to redefine the future of their alliance,
they may face several important challenges. Without resolving them
the alliance cannot have a clear future. Let us discuss three of them
briefly.
The United States and Two Koreas.
It is quite natural that South Korea and the United States have
different interests in North Korea and different lenses through which
they see and understand North Korea. Developing a shared interest
and a common perspective on North Korea is a big challenge. If
the two countries are suspicious of each other’s intentions and
movement vis-à-vis North Korea, they may face serious troubles
in their alliance.25 It is imperative for the two countries, possibly
with Japan, to develop a close coordination of their North Korean
policies.
The Relationship between the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan
Alliances.
Some in South Korea believe that the ROK-U.S. alliance is
secondary to the U.S.-Japan alliance in the U.S. East Asian strategy.26
They believe that U.S. restrictions on South Korean missiles and
defense industries are related to U.S. relations with Japan having
primacy. When we consider the uneasy relationship between the
ROK and Japan, the merger of the two alliances into a multilateral
alliance is not practical, at least for the time being. However, any
redefinition of the ROK-U.S. alliance must deal with its relationship
with the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Out-of-the Korean Peninsula Issues.
As the role of the United States has risen globally, the question
arises as to whether the ROK-U.S. alliance will be used for out-of47

Korea purposes. As we can see with NATO, the expansion of U.S.
responsibilities is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the
role of NATO. Currently, the United States takes advantage of South
Korean bases for its global missions. The United States also prods
South Korea to take part in global activities such as U.N. peacekeeping
operations and the Gulf War. Therefore, the redefinition of the ROKU.S. alliance will certainly involve the question of how to use the
alliance for activities outside Korea.
Towards a New Vision?
Faced with deepening conflicts over cost sharing for USFK and
the increasing need to transform their relationship, South Korea and
the United States have to find a new vision for the alliance.27 From
a South Korean perspective, the alliance has greatly contributed
to peace and stability and can do so in the future. Therefore, it is
wise and rational for the two countries to maintain and develop the
alliance with some modifications.28
First, they have to identify a new vision based on their shared
interests and common purposes beyond deterrence. Table 3 provides
a rough summary of the costs and benefits for each country from a
Korean perspective. Many scholars in South Korea believe that
the two countries share an interest in Northeast Asian peace and
stability, so this should be included as a primary goal.

ROK

US

Benefits

- Deter North Korea
- Trip-wire for American Involvement
- Northeast Asian Stability
- Economic Benefits

- Protect Alliance with Korea
and Japan
- Forward Deployment in
Northeast Asia and Enhanced
U.S. Influence over the Region
- Contain Russia/China

Costs

- Loss of Political and Strategic Autonomy
- Instigate Northern Triangle comprising North Korea,
China, and Russia

- Economic Burden
- Risk of Automatic
Involvement in Korean Crisis

Table 3. Benefits and Costs of USFK to the ROK and United
States from a Korean Perspective.
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Second, USFK has to stay in South Korea even after peace or
unification. As we see in Table 4, the public attitude to USFK has
been quite favorable in South Korea. Although there has been a
significant decrease recently in the number of people who favor
USFK, the proportion is still significant, and very few South Koreans
want a complete withdrawal. The problem is that the United States
has often unilaterally decided to reduce or withdraw USFK.
September
1992

June 1995

September
1997

July 2000

(42.5)
4.9
37.6

41.5

(58.5)
5.9
54.6

27.1

Pull out gradually/in stages

44.9

45.6

30.3

63.2

Pull out shortly/complete
withdrawal

4.8

5.9

2.4

9.0

-

6.9

6.9

-

Stay
- Even after unification
- As long as South-North
confrontation continues

Don’t know

Source: Data for September 1992 and 1997, public opinion survey by the Joongang
Ilbo; data for June 1995, national attitude survey by the Sejong Institute; data for
July 2000, public opinion survey by the Korea Daily, July 18, 2000.

Table 4. Public Attitude towards USFK in South Korea.
Third, the Mutual Defense Treaty has to be revised to guarantee
automatic involvement of the ally in case the partner is invaded.
Articles 2 and 3 of the current Treaty reads: “The parties will consult
together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political
independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by
external armed attack,” and each of the Parties, “would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”
This has been understood in South Korea as not guaranteeing
automatic involvement of the United States.29 This limitation has
made South Koreans worry about their security and insist on the
presence of USFK. Now the bilateral relationship needs to go beyond
the immediate defense of South Korea. South Korea and the United
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States have to share a common destiny for the future, which can be
realized by the guarantee of each party’s automatic involvement if
the other is invaded.
Fourth, the asymmetric bilateral relationship has to be changed
into a partnership between equals. South Korea has been complaining
about inequalities in rights and duties within the alliance and various
restrictions on its sovereignty and autonomy. Cost sharing should be
accompanied by responsibility and power sharing. With one party
having a great many complaints against the other, the alliance cannot
have a safe foundation for the future.
Conclusion.
Cost sharing for USFK can be considered a minor issue in the
alliance. However, it has provided the two allies with a channel to
discuss and evaluate the current state of their alliance and its future.
Researchers can also take advantage of this small window to look
into many big problems the alliance has faced.
From the South Korean perspective, the ROK-U.S. cost-sharing
debates have occurred in an inappropriate way. The United States
wanted South Korea to pay more for the weakening USFK. The
withdrawal or reduction of USFK can be considered by South
Koreans as lack of commitment on the part of the United States.
The U.S. request for increased cost sharing was based on the purely
American logic and necessity and cannot be justified from the
Korean perspective.
South Korea could raise many of its discontents via the costsharing debates. The ROK has had a real interest in making the
alliance a partnership of equals. South Korea wanted responsibility
and power sharing in tandem with cost sharing. However, this cannot
be resolved merely through more sophisticated measurement. It is
inevitably and fundamentally related to redefinition of the alliance
for the future. Many factors have required modification of the
alliance. However, the allies have so far failed to deal with this issue.
In this essay, we identified four modifications which seem necessary
and important: a new vision, the continuation of USFK after peace,
guarantee of automatic involvement in case of war, and equal
partnership. It is now time for South Korea and the United States to
seriously think about the future of their alliance.
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CHAPTER 4
ASSESSING THE COSTS OF THE U.S.-KOREAN ALLIANCE:
AN AMERICAN VIEW
Tong Whan Park

Goals, Needs, and Costs of the Alliance.
There are many ways of evaluating the costs of a foreign policy
action. Especially for a long-term commitment like a formal alliance,
not only the costs but also the methods of its evaluation may become
the source of controversy. The U.S.-Korean alliance is no exception,
and it will be subjected to an even more careful scrutiny than before,
now that the international environment of Northeast Asia is entering
a new phase of uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused not only by such
idiosyncratic developments as the election of George W. Bush as
U.S. president and Kim Dae-jung’s overzealous engagement policy
toward Pyongyang, but also more structural transitions including
China’s rise in the global hierarchy. In such a fluid setting, is
America paying too much, or too little, to maintain its alliance with
South Korea? What should be the scales with which to measure the
appropriateness of the costs? If the United States is not content with
the current level of commitment — whether too high or too low
— how can it bring about changes?
When discussing the costs of the U.S.-Korean alliance, there
is a natural tendency to jump into bean counting in terms of the
dollars, personnel, and equipment required to maintain U.S. Forces
in Korea (USFK). But the most logical starting point in evaluating
the costs is to examine the goals of the alliance. Before concluding
whether one has “paid too much for the whistle,” one should ask
whether the purchase meets one’s desire. What, then, are the goals
of the alliance? More precisely, what does Washington want from
it? As stated in the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and manifested
in the numerous cases of combined defense against the common
threat, the alliance is primarily intended to protect the integrity of
South Korea.1 It provides deterrence to maintain the armistice on the
peninsula and, should deterrence fail, the war-fighting capacity to
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defeat North Korean aggression. Defeating Pyongyang’s aggression
does not necessarily mean winning the war to the extent of achieving
unification through military means. Instead, Washington maintains
its security relationship with Seoul for the purpose of preserving
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
When World War II ended, the United States could only divide
the Korean peninsula when confronted with stiff resistance from the
former Soviet Union. During the Cold War era, the United States
was in no position to alter the division in Korea for fear of escalation
into a global nuclear war. U.S. General Douglas MacArthur had
to be retired in the middle of the Korean War when he advocated
bombing Manchuria after the Chinese troops intervened in the
winter of 1950. Washington allegedly kept a close watch on Park
Chung-hee — lest he retaliate — when Pyongyang’s commandos
came within striking distance of the Blue House in 1968; and even
at the time of the Aungsan (Rangoon) massacre in 1983 and other
terrorist acts perpetrated by the North, the United States was
apparently concerned with the possibility of a northern expedition
by the angered South.
Although the global Cold War ended more than a decade ago, a
local version still goes on in Korea. Whereas it is mostly Pyongyang’s
calculated risk-taking that has delayed rapprochement in Korea,
Washington has not taken advantage of the openings provided
by Pyongyang — the windows of opportunity to call its bluff and
end the Korean War at long last. Even the plan to launch a surgical
strike on Yongbyon’s nuclear facilities in the summer of 1994 did
not materialize as soon as Pyongyang made a diplomatic overture
of accommodating Washington’s proposal to build two light-water
reactors.
Hence the bottom line is that the alliance and USFK are there to
maintain the military status quo on the Korean peninsula. Going one
step further, a Realpolitik supposition can be made that Pyongyang
may not object to this “peacekeeping” role for USFK.2 If so, the
costs of the alliance — the portion dealing with USFK in particular
— should be evaluated from the standpoint of “dual deterrence.”
After all, a stone that can kill two birds should be considered more
cost-effective.
The notion of dual deterrence raises the question of who needs
USFK more or most? During the Cold War era, and especially when
the South Korean economy was taking off under the protective
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umbrella of America’s hegemonic stability, Seoul was undoubtedly
the largest beneficiary of the alliance. At least that was the attitude
held by many South Koreans who had neither the time nor temerity
to calculate the benefits accruing to Washington from the invaluable
foothold on the Asian continent. Even today, the majority of those
in the establishment hold an extremely positive view about USFK
although they may differ from their predecessors about who gains
more from the alliance. The current generation of South Koreans
appears to believe that Seoul and Washington benefit equally from
USFK. When the Pyongyang regime is thrown in as the third player
who may profit from America’s military presence in the peninsula,
then a potentially important query emerges about how long North
Korea can be left to enjoy the status of a free rider. For some time to
come, it would be preposterous to ask Pyongyang to share the burden
of supporting USFK. And North Korea’s leaders will continue to
make an issue of the foreign troop presence for two reasons. One
is to engage the United States in bilateral dialogue while bypassing
South Korea. After all, which issue could be more central than USFK
in Pyongyang’s direct approach to Washington? The other is to hide
from the ordinary residents in the North that the government may
want to utilize the American troops as the guarantor of peace, and
thus protector of the regime. As inter-Korean relations improve,
however, the day will come when Pyongyang may have to help
defray the cost of protection — not with money but with its policy.
Absolute Versus Relative Costs of Maintaining USFK.
Goals and needs of the alliance partners set the parameters within
which the costs can be assessed. Especially at the level of subjective
appraisal, numbers may not mean much. Should one partner need
the alliance to guard its vital interest, the objective calculus of costs
could become irrelevant. Once the general parameters are set and
the pattern is established in managing the alliance, however, it is
critical to undertake a periodic review of the costs. By so doing, the
partners can fine-tune the alliance so that a radical and disruptive
correction may be prevented.
The U.S.-Korean alliance has gone through such adjustments
via close bilateral consultations and the main mechanism for that
process has been the annual Security Consultative Meetings (SCM)
held since 1968. Since the establishment of the Combined Forces
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Command (CFC) in 1978, the two allies have paid special attention
to the issue of cost sharing for the maintenance of USFK. Over time,
South Korea has increased its cash and non-cash contributions.
Based on what is called the Special Measures Agreement (SMA),
in particular, Seoul has increased its commitment in the areas of
labor, logistics, ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC), and Combined
Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP). In sum, it can be said that
the burdensharing has been managed in a manner quite satisfactory
to the American side, as expressed in the following assessment.
The Congressional goal for all cost sharing [SMA is one subset]
was for the ROK to pay 62.5% of U.S. non-personnel stationing
costs in Korea in 1999. The ROK actually paid $692 million out
of $1.84 billion non-personnel stationing costs, or 38%. However,
Korea still provided a substantial contribution compared to other
nations when factoring in differences in gross domestic product.
. . . The SMA is an important milestone in the alliance and serves
the interest of both the ROK and the U.S. It demonstrates the
commitment of a strong combined posture in which the ROK
cost sharing contributions directly finance a significant portion of
USFK’s non-personnel stationing costs.3

The United States appears satisfied with the current formula
of burdensharing and South Korea seems willing to accommodate
the wishes of its alliance partner. But is everything fine in the area
of cost sharing? While the setup meets the goals and needs of the
allies in actual costs disbursed, one should keep it mind that it is not
etched in stone. Today’s division of labor is the result of a long series
of negotiations and it is subject to change as the future unfolds.
Inasmuch as the alliance and cost sharing are influenced by shifts in
the domestic, peninsular, and international environment, it would be
an exercise in futility to analyze all the determinants. Nevertheless,
a modest beginning is needed in order to devise a framework with
which to prepare for future developments.
The framework proposed here is designed to push the calculus
of cost sharing a small step forward. It suggests that the allies look
beyond the absolute figures as done in a typical budgetary decisionmaking process. Specifically, it recommends that they expand
their horizon in two directions. One is to widen the concept of
costs beyond the U.S. dollars and Korean won. In addition to the
economic costs of the alliance and USFK, it is important to examine
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the military, political, and socio-cultural costs. The other is to try to
evaluate the costs in the relative sense—e.g., relative to the absence
of the alliance, other comparable arrangements, and the alliance
partner, South Korea. When these two dimensions are combined, an
illustrative chart can be constructed as shown in Table 1.
Although by no means exhaustive, the contents of Table 1
definitely support a broadly positive assessment about cost sharing.
Compared to the
absence of alliance

Relative to a
comparable
alliance (with
Japan)

Relative to the
alliance partner
(South Korea)

Military costs

Low.
Massive rapid deployment
is difficult in case of major
contingency.
North Korea must have
taken over the South.

Extremely low.
Japan is the hub
of America’s
extended
deterrence in
Northeast Asia.

Extremely low.
Korean armed
forces are the main
instrument of
combined defense.

Economic costs

Cumulated costs may be
high, but are still acceptable
compared to the costs of
massive rapid deployment.
Loss of the South cannot
be measured in monetary
terms.

Far less than
the costs of
maintaining
USFJ

Incalculably low
measured against
gross domestic
product

Political costs

Unthinkable.
Political value of South
Korea as an ally is priceless.

Less than the
WashingtonTokyo alliance.
South Korean
government has
been far more
dependent
on the United
States for
legitimacy and
support.

Low beyond
comparison.
South Korea has
owed its survival to
the alliance.

Socio-cultural costs

Somewhat low.
In case of the North
Korean takeover, the
unified Korea may have
followed Vietnam’s path of
eventually accommodating
the United States.

Less.
Lower level
of antiAmericanism in
South Korea.

Low.
Costs of absorbing
the American way of
life by the Koreans
have been higher
than the opposite.

Table 1. Relative Costs.
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The alliance and USFK are a good deal for South Korea, but an
even better bargain for the United States. Nobody can foretell how
long the current arrangement will last. As the internal and external
conditions of the alliance change, a framework like the one shown
here should hopefully serve as a guideline in future negotiations
between the two countries. Evidently, most of the observations
included in Table 1 must have been dealt with in previous bilateral
talks. Nevertheless, what the template offers is a systematic way in
which they can be factored in so that a better informed and more
balanced compromise may be reached in defense cost sharing
between the United States and South Korea.
USFK and the Inter-Korean Détente.
One variable that would affect the U.S.-Korean alliance most,
and hence the stationing of American troops on the peninsula, is the
inter-Korean détente. Put bluntly, what is to be done with USFK
if the two Koreas one morning decide to go ahead with de facto
unification? Even though such a scenario seems not even remotely
plausible in the near to medium term, it should be given serious
consideration. The mere appearance of the two Koreas moving in
that direction would have tremendous implications not only to the
defense burdensharing but also the presence of USFK itself.
Elsewhere, I have argued — and still hold — that, given the
geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of the Korean peninsula,
frictions could emerge between the inter-Korean process of
rapprochement and the regional order each of the four surrounding
powers wishes to see established.4 Of particular concern to the
surrounding powers could be the prospect of the Korean people
attempting to determine their own fate, which may not necessarily
serve the vested interests of the big powers. Among the four major
powers, the United States is in a position to wield the strongest
influence over the Korean peninsula. It remains the blood ally
of South Korea while it has become a “savior” for post-Cold War
North Korea. Who could have imagined in 1945, when World War
II ended, and 1953, when the Korean War halted, that Washington
one day would play Godfather to both Seoul and Pyongyang?
This sea change was, of course, the product of a global systemic
transformation from which a small power like Korea could not
escape. Likewise, one can suppose that another tectonic shift in the
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Northeast Asian international system may force the United States to
reconsider its two-Korea policy.
Combine such a regional outlook with President George W.
Bush’s determination to launch a missile defense (MD) program and
it becomes clear that the United States will not be eager to change the
status quo on the Korean peninsula. It does not hurt Washington’s
MD plans for Pyongyang to remain a rogue state. Even without
Pyongyang’s long-range missiles, the Bush administration must
have gone ahead with the MD program. But why not make the best
use of the North Korean missiles as a contributing factor?
Faced with America’s hard line policy, both Pyongyang and
Seoul are struggling to find a correct prescription for their respective
U.S. policies. The task seems somewhat easier for South Korea’s
decisionmakers, as they know that the United States will not be able
to give up its only military foothold in continental East Asia. Being
a nonresidential power, the United States needs its forces in Korea as
a clear manifestation that it is a player in the Asian theater. And the
costs of maintaining USFK are small compared to the alternatives
of not having them or relocating them somewhere in the United
States.
North Korea’s answer to Bush’s hard line approach has largely
been rejection and brinkmanship. The case in point is Pyongyang’s
irritation with the “conditions” implied in Washington’s decision
to reopen talks with Pyongyang in June 2001. The United States
insisted on its willingness to talk with North Korea without any
preconditions, but this did not mean that Washington would
commit itself to the kind of generous engagement policy pursued
by Seoul. Specifically, the United States wants to discuss the full
safeguard inspection of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons facilities, the
verification of its long-range missile capabilities, and conventional
arms control. Did Pyongyang want to roll back its ultimate goal
of improving relations with the United States? Most probably not.
Instead, Pyongyang seemed to be jockeying for position to play ball
with the Bush administration. Having for long taken advantage
of Clinton’s goodwill, North Korea might find it uneasy to revert
back to a confrontational mode. And Kim Jong-il must have learned
that it could be dangerous to collide with the United States head
on. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the United States, it is expected that Pyongyang would tread
somewhat cautiously so as not to arouse Washington’s ire.
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It is critical to note that the issue of USFK is in the dead center
of the triangular relationship among the United States and the two
Koreas. On one hand, USFK serves as a facilitator of the interKorean rapprochement. While USFK protects the South from the
danger of North Korea’s military takeover and the North from an
absorptive unification into South Korea, the two Koreas would enjoy
more decision latitude in undertaking bilateral interactions. As the
Koreans improve their relations and hence begin to shed the legacies
of the Cold War, it is possible that they may demand a change in the
makeup of USFK. As long as they require USFK for dual deterrence,
the Koreans will favor the presence of American troops. At the same
time, however, they will want to see some changes in the size and
mode of deployment. Hypothetically, one may see a proportional
downsizing in USFK commensurate with the improvement in interKorean relations.
Up to a certain point, the United States will most likely go along
with the wishes of the Koreans: a measured drawdown while not
losing a foothold on the continent will not be detrimental to the
U.S. interest. If and when the Koreans find their modus vivendi for
peaceful coexistence without the need for a peacekeeper in between,
what should the United States do? Although this question poses
challenges exceeding the issue of military cost sharing, the ultimate
solution may be found in the model of the Washington-Tokyo
alliance. The nature of the U.S.-Korean alliance and the mission of
USFK will have to be modified to serve the changes in the strategic
requirement of the two partners.
The September 11 Terrorism and the U.S.-Korean Alliance.
The September 11 terrorist attacks on America and the ensuing
retaliatory strikes led by the United States against the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan will in many ways affect the U.S.-Korean alliance
and its cost sharing. My discussion so far has largely been based on
the major trends in the United States and the two Koreas without
considering this horrendous act of war against the sole superpower
in the 21st century. The September 20, 2002, Quadrennial Defense
Review, mostly completed before the attacks but subsequently
altered, shows that the United States finds it necessary to change
its priorities in defense and military preparedness. Originally, the
Pentagon planners had proposed cutting the size of the military’s
62

1.4-million-member active duty force and moving resources away
from ground forces and into air power. But in its final form, the
review avoided calling for specific cuts, shifts in force structure, or
purchase of weapon systems. Instead, it asked for a greater role
for the National Guard and Reserves in protecting U.S. interests
at home, beefing up intelligence and surveillance efforts to fight
terrorism, and moving carrier battle groups, ground forces, surface
ships, and airplanes out of Europe and into the Persian Gulf and
Asia to protect evolving U.S. interests abroad.5
This marks a departure from the fundamental reassessment of
U.S. military capability that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
had promised when he came into office. While the original plan
could have led to a downsizing of USFK, the new policy put a stop,
at least temporarily, to any discussion of military withdrawal from
Korea. In addition, there will be heightened alert against North
Korea that is known to have committed terrorism and supplied
arms to the Middle East. When combined with Washington’s official
abandonment of the strategy of winning two wars, the value of the
U.S.-Korean alliance cannot but appreciate in the future. As a result,
U.S. forces in Korea are not likely to face a drawdown, but to be
reinforced, in necessary.
What will be the implications of this new development to the
Korean situation? The most immediate impact will be felt by North
Korea, whose leadership will have to think twice before continuing
its hitherto “successful” diplomacy of extortion—at least vis-à-vis
the United States. South Korea, too, will have to show prudence
in its aid to the North so as not to irritate the United States. It
will need to pay more attention to the question of reciprocity in
which Pyongyang’s “good behavior” is expected in return for the
assistance from the West. In particular, it will be imperative for the
Roh Moo-hyun administration to emphasize policy coordination
with Washington. Will the United States be able to go its way in
relation to the two Koreas? As long as the United States leads a
global war against terrorism — the campaign could indeed take a
long time — this global campaign may complicate its dealings with
both Seoul and Pyongyang.
Given such an outlook, the costs of common defense will almost
certainly rise and the alliance partners will need to increase their
respective shares of contribution. Breaking from the tradition,
however, they will conduct cost sharing negotiations in a more
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amicable environment. Instead of a zero-sum approach, both
Washington and Seoul are likely to see the alliance as a positivesum game in the post 9/11 world. For its part, Pyongyang may be
expected to refrain itself from demanding a wholesale withdrawal
of USFK. Until it becomes more self-reliant, North Korea will
need the dual deterrence provided by America’s strong military
presence in the peninsula. Moreover, Pyongyang will want to
avoid America’s punitive sanctions by dissociating itself from
terrorism. Paradoxically, the global crisis caused by the terrorist
attacks on America may strengthen the U.S.-Korean alliance and,
at least temporarily, help tame Pyongyang’s rogue behavior. In the
short-term future, the crisis is expected to bring more security to the
Korean peninsula.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. With the September 11 acts of terror against the United States, South Korea
is in a position to fulfill the other half of the mutual defense pact. Seoul would
assist Washington in combating global terrorism with military and non-military
support. In fact, we may see competition among America’s allies all over the
world to return the favor they received in the past. The Hankook Ilbo, Los Angeles
edition, September 24, 2001.
2. Since the June 2000 inter-Korean summitry, Kim Dae-jung repeatedly
mentioned in speeches that Kim Jong-il understood the protective role of the
American troops against potential threats from the three residential great powers.
Kim Dae-jung’s understanding is quite consistent with many informal signals
from Pyongyang in the last two decades. On his month-long visit to Russia in
August 2001, however, Kim Jong-il was able to place the issue of U.S. forces
in the joint declaration with Putin. Though the declaration did not demand
withdrawal of American troops, it put Seoul in a difficult position. With Kim
Jong-il apparently back to square one on this, Kim Dae-jung faced an uphill battle
in domestic politics. Did Kim Jong-il “abandon” Kim Dae-jung? Or did Kim Daejung misinterpret Kim Jong-il’s signals last year? I believe the truth is neither.
Being a realist, Kim Jong-il most probably sees the utility of the American troops
as a foreign legion, which serves two purposes. One is to deter South Korea from
attacking the North, while the other is to check the territorial and other ambitions
of China, Russia, and even Japan. Because he is schooled in Realpolitik, he should
also understand that the U.S. troops are an issue over which he has definite
leverage against Washington. The United States has been pushing Kim Jong-il
to the corner with the issues of nuclear weapons development and long-range
missiles. With the issue of foreign troops, however, Kim can be on the offensive.
Kim would thus vacillate between the two positions of recognizing the utility of
the U.S. troops and denouncing their presence.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE FUTURE OF KOREAN SECURITY
Kyudok Hong
Introduction.
With the inauguration of President George W. Bush on January
20, 2001, a new chapter opened in the ongoing effort of the United
States to coordinate policy toward North Korea with the Kim Daejung government. With the end of Cold War, the balance of power
on the Korean peninsula has unraveled, and the North has taken
increasingly risky and desperate steps to shore up prospects for
its survival, undermining the stability that the Cold War balance
of power on the peninsula maintained. The post-Cold War period
has also seen the emergence of a "U.S.-ROK-DPRK" triangle as U.S.
and ROK policy priorities toward North Korea diverge and separate
U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean dialogue channels develop. Adapting
to changing realities on the peninsula and coordinating management
of emerging differences in priorities between South Korea and the
United States on North Korea have become major challenges for
Seoul and Washington. This issue takes on an added importance
as the new administration in Washington attempts to imprint its
own ideological and theoretical preferences more assertively on the
current situation on the Korean peninsula. How this process unfolds
will have important implications for the future of the ROK-U.S.
alliance and for U.S. strategy and policy in Northeast Asia.
This chapter will focus on the role of the United Nations (U.N.)
in shaping peace and security on the Korean peninsula. One of
the crucial future challenges for the ROK-U.S. alliance is whether
and how to replace the current Armistice Agreement, sponsored
by the U.N., with a new peace system. As we are well aware, the
Armistice Agreement of 1953 set the terms of the truce and imposed
the structure of peace on the two Koreas. While the Armistice
Agreement was never intended to be permanent, it has survived and
succeeded in preventing another war. Yet, it is Pyongyang's position
that the United Nations Command (UNC) has to be dismantled and
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U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should be withdrawn before there can
be a new peace treaty between the United States and North Korea.
As President Kim Dae-jung illustrated in his speech at the Korea
Society in New York on September 8, 2000, more people in Korea
now openly discuss the possibility of establishing a peace system to
replace the 50-year-old Armistice Agreement,1 though South Korea
has never seriously addressed the fundamental question of whether
a new peace system will guarantee long-lasting peace and security.
In this chapter, I demonstrate the potential danger of discarding
the UNC and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace
treaty. Also, while some advocate that USFK be transformed into a
U.N. Peacekeeping Force (PKO) in the future since the inter-Korean
relationship has dramatically improved, I argue that we must be
very careful about this because U.N. peacekeeping operations have
not been all that successful in recent years. Moreover, while the
ROK government is enthusiastically involved in U.N. activities
in general and PKOs in particular, U.S.-U.N. relations have been
conflict-ridden.
The United Nations and the Korean War.
When the North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25,
1950, the U.N. Security Council convened immediately and adopted
Resolution 82:2
Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic
of Korea by forces from North Korea, Determines that this action
constitutes a breach of the peace, . . . Calls for the immediate
cessation of hostilities [and] calls upon the authorities of North
Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th
parallel.

Two days later, the Council passed another resolution with
regard to the U.N. collective action. Resolution 83 states that:3
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and
security, Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area.
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To make the military operation effective, on July 7, the Security
Council adopted another important Resolution 84:4
. . . Recommends that all members providing military forces and
assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council Resolutions
make such forces and other assistance available to a unified
command under the United States . . . Requests the United States
to designate the commander of such forces [and] Authorizes the
unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in
the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently
with the flags of various nations participating.

These resolutions vividly reflected the strong American will
to use the U.N. Security Council for an application of the U.N.
collective security system against an aggressor. North Korea was the
first military target in U.N. history. These resolutions showed to the
world that North Korea was an aggressor. North Korea still has to
live with the stigma. South Korea was saved from the surprise attack
with the help of the U.N., and the U.N. provided quick assistance on
the basis of the broad support of the international community.
Although the nature of the U.N. collective action was not clearly
identified in those resolutions, the Security Council seemed to have
followed the spirit of the U.N. Charter. The fact that more than 50
of the 60 member states expressed moral support and criticized the
North Korean invasion indicates the level of broad international
support in those days.
However, it should be noted that the quick consensus in the
Security Council was possible only under extremely unusual
circumstances. First, the adoption of the resolutions was made
without the concurrence of the Soviet Union, which certainly would
have blocked the resolutions by its veto but had been absent from
the Council since mid-January 1950 in protest over the Chinese
representation issue.5
Second, the consensus necessary to pass the resolutions was
consolidated by the strong initiation of U.S. military assistance to
South Korea. The rapid deployment of U.S. forces under President
Harry S. Truman's order was made possible by the availability
of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. This swift and unilateral
measure by the United States, immediately after the outbreak of
the war, demonstrated U.S. resolve and willingness to take major
responsibility in the Korean operation and thus induced other
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members to cooperate in expediting U.N. actions in an orderly
manner.
Third, the consensus in the Security Council for the Korean
War was helped by the presence of the U.N. Commission on Korea
(UNCOK).6 The UNCOK, established and stationed in Korea in
November 1947, was able to provide objective reports on the war
situation as requested by the Council. Therefore, U.N. measures,
including the determination of the North Korean "armed attack"
against South Korea, was made easier and less controversial among
the members.
In the course of the war, the U.N. resolutions consistently
provided a broad framework for political and moral support, as
well as a legal basis for U.N. actions. However, U.N. actions also
posed several questions, in terms of the ideal provisions of collective
security, envisioned in Chapter VII of the Charter.
First, the consensus behind the U.N. collective action was
seriously impaired by the strong opposition of the Soviet Union
and its communist allies. The Soviet Union considered the military
action against North Korea as a hostile move against its important
ally. Moscow claimed that the Security Council Resolutions were
null and void, first because they were passed without the Soviet
presence, thus violating the provision of Article 27 (3); and second,
because China was not represented by the "legitimate" government,
i.e. the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, the Soviet
objections were not accepted, since it had been the practice in the
Council that an abstention did not constitute a veto, and since other
members generally agreed with the U.S. view that the voluntary
absence of a permanent member in the Council is clearly analogous
to abstention.7 The Soviet Union and Poland also argued that the
Korean situation was a civil war in which intervention by the
U.N. was illegal.8 The consensus reached in mobilizing Security
Council power was constitutionally valid, but it was not a genuine
consensus based upon cooperation among the great powers. When
U.S. political and military leadership was vehemently challenged by
another permanent member, the legitimacy of the U.N. itself was
significantly weakened.
Next, the nature and conduct of the U.N. collective action
changed as a result of the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution. With the return of the Soviet Union to the Council on
August 1, East and West engaged in antagonistic confrontations and
70

made efforts to block each other's proposals and actions in support
of the two Koreas. To avoid the Soviet veto in the Council, the
United States found an ingenious avenue for continuing U.N. action
within the Charter by adopting the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution
in the General Assembly in November 3, 1950.9 From Washington’s
viewpoint, the General Assembly was a safe place where no veto
power of the permanent member could frustrate the American-led
majority.
Consequently, from late November on, the General Assembly
played a leading role in place of the Security Council. There
were no differences in the legal effects of the decisions of the two
organizations regarding the U.N. action in Korea. Nevertheless,
the ascendance of the Assembly regarding collective security was a
drastic departure from the spirit of the Charter.
When the U.N. forces began a steady advance northward after
breaking out of their defense perimeter around Pusan, and asked
whether their units should advance across the 38th parallel, the
General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the decision to cross the
38th parallel on October 7, 1950. The General Assembly recalled that
the essential objective of its previous resolutions in 1947-49 were the
establishment of a unified independent and democratic government
of Korea and requested the Secretary General to establish the United
Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(UNCURK).10
The U.N. operation expanded further northward, but after it
advanced deep into the North and neared the China border, the
prospects of a unified Korea were dashed by the massive Chinese
intervention in late October. The United States wanted the U.N.
to condemn Communist China as an aggressor and take stringent
measures, such as a naval blockade and economic sanctions.
However, U.S. allies like France and Great Britain were uneasy
about tough measures against China. They worried that adoption
of the U.S. proposal might unnecessarily provoke China and hinder
their efforts for peaceful settlements through negotiations.
Moreover, the war had increasingly involved new issues
like Chinese representation in the U.N., the security of Taiwan,
and representation in the armistice negotiations. Therefore, the
initial coalition became increasingly strained. However, when
the Chinese made a massive surprise attack on November 25 in
support of retreating North Koreans, the General Assembly adopted
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Resolution 498, on February 1, 1951, which condemned China as an
aggressor.11
By mid-May, the United States managed to win enough support
from its major allies to impose economic sanctions via General
Assembly Resolution 500. The resolution recommended that every
state embargo shipments to areas under control of China and
North Korea, including arms and ammunition and implements of
war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials
of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms,
ammunition, and implements of war.12 These sanctions were the first
in the history of the organization.
There is no denying that the United States achieved international
legitimacy under the Charter for punishing China as an aggressor.
However, the consensus achieved on economic measures was
incomplete. The Soviet bloc refused to vote; and Afghanistan,
Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, and Syria
abstained. To be sure, issues between the United States and its allies
were usually smoothed away in favor of the U.S. position. However,
there was a persistent call for peaceful settlement by its major allies
and anxiety over the possible expansion of the local war into a world
war, especially after China intervened.
The U.N. was not able to play a critical role during the final days
of the Korean War. The U.N. collective action had to be conducted
by a voluntary, ad hoc association of national forces due to the lack
of genuine U.N. forces. The United States was allowed to dominate
the process, since no other major power would sacrifice to protect
peace and security on the Korean peninsula.
The resolution that established the U.N. command was not clear
about the command structure. The United States took the position
that, within the limit of the Charter and the resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly, it had the responsibility
for military operations. Actually, the United States directed the
overall functioning of the UNC; the chain of command in effect ran
from the President of the United States through the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, to
General Douglas MacArthur, the first Commander-in-Chief of the
UNC (CINCUNC).
Formal channels of communication were maintained from the
UNC headquarters in Tokyo to the Secretary Council in the form
of bi-weekly reports. However, General MacArthur did not have
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to directly report to the Security Council or the Secretary-General.
Usually, his reports were sent to Washington first and then submitted
after revision and editing to the Security Council. It seems that the
United States was reluctant to work with and within the framework
of the Security Council, fearing U.N. interference with its freedom of
action. In short, the military operations of the U.N. were multilateral
in name but in reality integrated by the United States and then
endorsed by the U.N. The authority of the U.N., and especially the
Security Council, was limited by the extent to which Washington
wanted to direct the war.
To the extent that the United States viewed the aggression by
North Korea and China as a threat to international order, the interests
of the U.N. as a collective security body coincided with those of
the United States. Therefore, the U.N. could serve as an effective
instrument of U.S. policy of containment. The U.N. provided the
legitimacy for the U.S. military action but also an opportunity to
garner broader international support. The mobilization of the U.N.
also satisfied theAmerican people's desire that the United States be
just one of the major contributors. President Truman believed that it
was essential to have the moral sanction of the U.N. and made great
efforts to give the impression that the American action in Korea was
in response to the call from the U.N.
Future of the Armistice Agreement and the United Nations
Command.
The Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by
the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, the
Supreme Commander of the North Korea People's Army (KPA)
and the Commander of Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). It was
an irony that the UNC had to sign an armistice agreement with
the aggressors, North Korea and China, while excluding South
Korea, the victim of their aggression. Throughout the Cold War, the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea was a
symbol of the fault line between East and West, and the Armistice
Agreement confirmed the existence of the two de facto states while
structuring the relationship between them. With the end of the Cold
War, however, calls to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace
treaty to deal with the vastly changed circumstances have become
steadily louder in Korea.
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The Armistice Agreement has served its original purpose of
stopping armed clashes. Therefore, it would not be wise to scrap
the agreement unless the level of threats and insecurity drastically
declines on the peninsula. If the Armistice Agreement is discarded,
dangerous consequences will follow. Although the agreement has
not been a perfect instrument for peace, its absence may lead to
higher levels of tension.
According to Robert E. Bedeski, the 1953 Armistice Agreement
has had at least three major functions: enforcement, verification,
and communication.13 Enforcement has been the most important
function. Maintaining the nonmilitary character of the DMZ has
been carried out through patrols and surveillance by both sides.
Occasional incidents remind the world of continued tensions and
the need for vigilance. Violations such as unauthorized penetration
are reported and investigated, with the UNC Component of the
Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) largely responsible for
supervision.
Verification is a function that has not been fulfilled due to North
Korea's refusal to cooperate. The contracting parties are supposed to
monitor each other's activities through air and ground surveillance.
The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was designed
to physically inspect suspected violations of the agreement to halt
the introduction into Korea of additional arms and personnel, but
has been inactive since the early years of the Armistice Agreement.
Communication has been a most important function. Both the
MAC and NNSC have been channels of communication for the
former combatants. Antagonism between the adversaries on the
MAC has neutralized its effectiveness, but for a long period the two
structures have been lines of communication between communist
and U.N. forces.
As long as the mutual hostility and distrust of the Cold War
persisted, the Armistice Agreement could play only a limited role.
Although there were many efforts to build a peace settlement, none
were successful. In 1954 representatives of 19 nations gathered
in Geneva to craft a peace settlement formally, but unfortunately
they failed and the talks were adjourned without setting a further
schedule.
Prospects for a settlement suffered a further setback in the
1950s with the hobbling of the NNSC. Comprised of military
representatives from Switzerland and Sweden on the UNC side
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and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the KPA/CPV side, the NNSC
had been established as a part of the Armistice Agreement to
supervise, observe, inspect, and investigate suspected violations
of the Agreement outside the DMZ, especially the unauthorized
introduction into the peninsula of reinforcements. The North Korean
refusal, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, to allow access to
designated ports of entry in the North left the UNC no choice but to
respond in kind, leaving the NNSC with a largely symbolic role until
it came under even more determined assault by the North Korean
regime in the 1990s.14
Under the circumstance, we must be very careful when we try to
redesign the peace arrangements on the Korean peninsula. Although
Pyongyang has been calling for an inter-Korean peace accord to
replace the Armistice Agreement, North Korea has not taken any
concrete peace or confidence-building measure toward South
Korea. Instead, North Korea has tried hard to isolate South Korea
by proposing a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty since March 25, 1974. It was
apparently encouraged by the Paris Peace Accords, which ended the
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The United States rejected the offer
and refused to contact the North directly until the early 1990s, when
the nuclear issue came up. However, Pyongyang has continued to
seek a deal directly with Washington, arguing that North Korea and
the United States are the only legitimate parties.15
On January 10, 1984, North Korea, while continuing to deny the
legitimacy of the ROK, proposed tripartite talks between Pyongyang,
Washington, and Seoul with the goal of crafting a political settlement
based on the two pillars of a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty and a NorthSouth nonaggression pact. However, this proposal did not draw
serious attention from the alliance.
The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and
the warming of relations between Beijing and Seoul compelled
Pyongyang to engage Seoul directly in 1991. The two Koreas
finally signed the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression,
and Exchanges and Cooperation” (commonly known as the Basic
Agreement) and the accompanying "Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," both of which entered
into force on February 19, 1992. Pledging once again to exert joint
efforts to achieve peaceful unification, the two Koreas reaffirmed the
1972 Joint Communiqué's principles of unification and agreed not
to slander, vilify, undertake armed aggression against, or attempt
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to overthrow each other. Hotlines between the armed forces were
promised, as was the opening of direct air and sea routes, roads, and
rail links. The two sides further pledged a variety of cultural and
scientific exchanges, and an integrated and balanced development
of the national economy. Most importantly, the two sides agreed
to transform the Armistice into a solid peace and to abide by the
Armistice Agreement until peace had been realized.16
But North Korea’s peace offensive did not last long. The North
quickly backed away from implementing these new agreements.
Instead, leveraging the potential threat posed by its nuclear
program, Pyongyang launched a successful campaign to establish a
direct negotiating link with Washington, marginalizing South Korea
in the process and straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. At the height of
the nuclear crisis, Pyongyang also attacked the Armistice Agreement
in an effort to extract a bilateral DPRK-U.S. peace agreement. The
assault got an unexpected boost by two seemingly unrelated events:
a well-intentioned but misguided decision by the U.S. and ROK
governments to have CINCUNC appoint a South Korean general
officer as the UNCMAC Senior Member; and the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia following the
fall of the Berlin Wall.17
The appointment of a ROK officer was part of a larger policy shift
designed to move the United States from a leading to a supporting
role in its defense relationship with the ROK and to force the North
to deal directly with a member of the ROK military. The North
simply refused, boycotting all further attempts to convene MAC
meetings for the next 7 years, although the KPA continued to engage
their UNCMAC counterparts at the Secretary and language officer
levels. In 1993, with the Military Armistice Commission stalemated,
the North set out to emasculate the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission as well by forcing the recall of the Czech delegation on
grounds that the Czech Republic had no legal standing as a "neutral
nation" in the context of the Armistice Agreement.
One year later, in April 1994, as the confrontation over
Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons program was reaching
crisis proportions, North Korea announced its withdrawal from
the MAC, opened the "Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's
Army," and called on the United States to join in creating a new
peace mechanism to replace the obsolete MAC. Later, no doubt
encouraged by the outcome of its nuclear diplomacy with the United
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States, North Korea convinced China to withdraw its "Chinese
People's Volunteers" representatives from the Commission.
The MAC suffered another setback in December 1994, when
a U.S. Army helicopter strayed into North Korean airspace and
was shot down. In an effort to secure the release of the surviving
crewmember, the United States acceded to Pyongyang's demand
for a meeting of North Korean and U.S. general officers in the Joint
Security Area and dispatched a senior diplomat to Pyongyang for
subsequent negotiations.
In the end, the United States agreed to maintain a “proper
form” of military contact with the North. On what was a “proper”
form, however, they diverged. To the United States and ROK, the
proper form meant the MAC. North Korea expected bilateral U.S.DPRK military contact outside the MAC framework, excluding
South Korea. With the MAC seemingly on the critical list, the
North in early 1995 forced the Polish members of the NNSC to
withdraw from North Korean territory and broke off contact with
the Swiss and Swedish NNSC representatives. In a further violation
of the Armistice Agreement, Pyongyang banned entry into the
northern side of the Joint Security Area by NNSC and UNCMAC
personnel and called for general officer talks with the United States.
CINCUNC, increasingly concerned about the lack of a functioning
crisis management mechanism, sidestepped the politically sensitive
issue of the UNCMAC Senior Member by counter-proposing a
dialogue in which General Officers from the UNC and the DPRK
would participate within the framework of the MAC.18
The North refused and in early 1996 capped its assault on the
Armistice Agreement by resurrecting the twin elements of its
1984 tripartite proposal. Declaring that "an agreement on nonaggression has already been concluded between the North and the
South of Korea and a North-South joint military body has also been
established," Pyongyang proposed the establishment of a new peace
system in which the United States and the North would first sign a
tentative agreement to maintain the Armistice, and then organize and
operate a DPRK-U.S. joint military body in Panmunjom in place of
the MAC. This bilateral arrangement would maintain the Armistice
pending a permanent peace agreement between Pyongyang and
Washington.19
It is not difficult to understand why North Korea is determined
to eliminate the UNC. The U.N. resolution during the early stage
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of the Korean War was a stigma, as it explicitly defined North
Korea as an aggressor. Discarding the UNC is as good as removing
a criminal record, though not the original sin. Ignoring the fact
that then-CINCUNC General Mark W. Clark signed the Armistice
Agreement on behalf of all the UNC participating nations and
that no individual nation, including the United States, signed the
Agreement, Pyongyang further claims that, since the United States
and the DPRK signed the Armistice Agreement, they are the only
parties with standing to participate in a political settlement and sees
no role for the UNC.
Meanwhile, President Kim Dae-jung indicated his intention to
jump-start the reconciliation process by concluding a peace treaty
with the North, including the option to issue a peace declaration
when Kim Jong-il comes to Seoul for the next Summit round. But the
real question is whether and how to replace the current Armistice
Agreement with a new peace system. It is not clear under what
conditions the disestablishment of the UNC could take place and
whether there will be negative consequences
In my opinion, there is no reason to discard the UNC, since it does
no harm to the alliance and has symbolic value. Seventeen nations
fought under the United Nations flag, while five others provided
medical support, and the UNC is one of the two parties referenced in
the Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, the Agreement was signed
by CINCUNC. Therefore, the UNC banner still legitimizes stationing
U.S. and other UNC forces in Korea and joint defense efforts against
potential aggressors.
Discarding the UNC would provide the North with a kind of Papal
indulgence for its wrongdoings. The Security Council authorized a
unified command under the United States, and it is the United States
that created the UNC and directed its operations. If war breaks out
again, the United States is expected to do a similar job under the
U.N. flag. Unlike before, the UNC is not likely to exercise control
over U.S. and ROK forces, but it will certainly be a useful instrument
for the alliance to assemble more flags behind its efforts to defend
Korea. We had better hold onto the UNC banner unless Pyongyang
clearly changes its military posture, readiness, and strategy.
Furthermore, any proposed settlement must be a real peace based
on genuine confidence-building measures that provide transparency,
inspection and verification mechanisms. The Bush administration is
ready to resume talks with the North. U.N. participation in a peace
78

agreement should focus on stopping proliferation of Pyongyang's
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and on conventional arms
control. The current MAC and NNSC should be reorganized, given
genuine enforcement powers, allowed to use the latest verification
technology for inspections on both sides, and mandated to set a
schedule for conventional arms control.
The Possibility of U.N. Peacekeeping in Korea.
This year the ROK celebrates the 10th anniversary of its admission
to the U.N. Despite its brief membership, Seoul has actively
participated in U.N. PKO activities. South Korea dispatched a 250person engineering unit to Somalia in July 1993 to join the UNOSOM
II mission and also sent a unit of 198 military engineers to Angola
in the UNAVEM III mission. In September 1994, the ROK sent a 42member medical unit to Western Sahara in the MINURUSO mission.
In addition, South Korea sent its first infantry battalion to East Timor
in February 2000 to participate in the UNTAET mission.20 In spite of
this enthusiasm, there exists almost no serious discussion in Korea
about whether the U.N. peacekeepers can play a role if a war breaks
out again on the peninsula.
As mentioned above, some are floating the idea of transforming
the USFK into U.N. peacekeepers. However, this is not gaining any
momentum in South Korea, and here is why. First, North Korea
has indicated that it may accept U.S. forces if they change into U.N.
peacekeepers. However, according to the basic principles of U.N.
PKO, host nation approval is needed to send PKO troops; U.N.
peacekeepers have to leave if the host nation requests this. Therefore,
it is naive to believe that U.N. peacekeeping is the ideal alternative to
the Armistice system.
Second, recent U.N. PKOs were poor performances, especially
in Africa. The key problem is a lack of clear mandates, making
peacekeeping today akin to shooting at a moving target. Third,
U.N. PKOs are not actually trained for regular warfare. They are
not allowed to arm themselves to win wars. The use of weapons
has to be limited to the minimum necessary to protect their own
lives. There is almost no chance U.N. peacekeepers could manage a
massive attack from the North with the potential danger of weapons
of mass destruction. Fourth, the U.N. PKOs face serious financial
difficulties, and, therefore, it is highly unlikely to expect the U.N.
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to accept a major role as a belligerent, further worsening U.N.
finances. Finally, U.N. peacekeeping may open the door to Japanese
involvement in Korean conflicts, about which most Koreans have
strong reservations. After the tragic terrorist attacks in Washington,
DC, and New York on September 11, 2001, Japan moved quickly to
participate in America's military efforts to eliminate terrorist groups
and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Japan will not want to sit
idle in a conflict on the Korean peninsula. According to its own
principles for sending peacekeeping forces, Japan will only join U.N.
PKOs under consent from either the host country or parties to armed
conflict.21 However, it will be very difficult for Korea to turn down a
Japanese offer to assist the ROK-U.S. alliance in military operations
on the Korean peninsula while welcoming contributions from other
countries.
The ROK strongly wishes to increase its voice in the
decisionmaking process of U.N. PKOs. Korea tried to secure this
by advocating that troop-contributing countries (TCGs) play a role
in the Security Council's decisionmaking and be consulted more
closely. It also urged the U.N. to devise a system that caters to
the interests of countries making major contributions to the U.N.
peacekeeping budget. As an important contributor of troops and
financial resources, Korea is determined to actively participate in
related discussions, including in the Security Council and the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Yet, this does not mean the
ROK will be better off without USFK.
We cannot disregard the fact that the United States has not been an
ardent supporter of U.N. PKO missions. The Bush administration is
no exception. During the presidential campaign, the two candidates
demonstrated that they had no more interest in peacekeeping than
Congress. In their first debate, then Governor Bush twice declared,
with little attempt to hide his disdain for such efforts, that he would
allow no American troops to be used for nation building. In the second
debate, both he and Vice President Gore agreed that they would not
have used American troops to stop the genocide in Rwanda. On
many occasions, Bush and his advisors repeatedly stressed that U.S.
alliances need to be strengthened to meet the challenges of the 21st
century. However, they did not touch upon multilateral institutions
such as the U.N., and they gave the impression that the U.N. would
not play much of a role in U.S. foreign policy.
Policymakers in the White House and on Capitol Hill will surely
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prefer unilateral U.S. actions to multilateral ones. It is not surprising
that the U.S. Congress shows little sense of urgency in restoring the
U.S. relationship with the U.N.. Condoleezza Rice, now serving as
the National Security Advisor, once said that "foreign policy in a
Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist."22
However, she strongly emphasized that the policy will have to
proceed from the national interest, not the interests of an illusory
international community.23
Robert Zoellick also argues that one of the Clinton administration’s
flaws was to erode its credibility by offering words not backed by
proper actions.24 For an effective U.N., the major members must
recognize that their actions, rather than words, determine the
outcomes.25 As he correctly points out, many people in the Bush
administration believe that the U.S. share will have to be reduced.
When the U.N. finally agreed to cut U.S. dues, U.S. lawmakers,
including Senator Jesse Helms, welcomed the decision to reduce
American dues for the first time in more than a quarter-century. 26
Many experts argue that it is unrealistic to expect much
progress in U.S. policy toward the U.N. or multilateralism under
the Republican presidency. That does not necessarily mean that
Clinton as a Democratic president was a true believer in the U.N.
and multilateralism. Unfortunately, his commitment to "assertive
multilateralism" and honeymoon with the U.N. did not last long.
The Clinton administration quickly pulled out its forces from
peacekeeping in Somalia when U.S. Rangers were killed, and he
did not help prevent the slaughter in Rwanda in 1996. Clinton
looked upon the U.N. as an additional tool of American foreign
policy. He used it when it fit and ignored it when it did not. As the
sole superpower, the United States has little interest in agreements
that limit its freedom of action. This kind of exceptionalism is easily
found in the Bush administration's foreign policy behavior.27 The
administration will very likely follow Clinton in preserving peace
through cooperation with key allied nations.
However, we should keep in mind what President Clinton said
in his address to the U.N.: "we will act if we have to alone, but my
fellow Americans should not forget that our values and our interests
are also served by working with the U.N."28 In this context, the
Bush administration indicated it would make the overdue payment
of U.S.$582 million in both regular and peacekeeping arrears to
the U.N. as soon as possible.29 However, several conservative
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Republican House members, including Speaker J. Dennis Hastert
(R-IL), International Relations Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde
(R-IL), and Majority Whip Tom Delay (R-TX), threatened to hold up
the money unless Americans were exempted from the International
Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent tribunal being established in
the Hague to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.30
House leaders also wanted the administration to support
the stipulation that final U.S. payments were dependent on the
reinstatement of the United States on the U.N. Human Rights
Commission. The ejection had infuriated lawmakers, who froze the
final payment--brushing aside objections from the White house.31
To make matters worse, the Bush administration also decided to
withdraw the U.S. delegation from the U.N. conference on racism in
South Africa on September 3, 2001, to protest attempts by Arab and
Muslim nations to single out Israel as a racist state.32
The greatest international challenge facing the United States
is to devise a strategy to maintain its global leadership and make
the world a safer and better place for mankind. At the dawn of the
century, the U.N. also wishes to help the world to confront new
challenges and shape a new destiny. Success requires us to be creative
and committed. It also requires every state to recognize the U.S.
role in transforming the U.N. as politically effective and financially
efficient as possible. The U.N. needs strong support from the Bush
administration, and, at the same time, the Bush administration must
show strong enthusiasm for innovative measures to enhance the
U.N.’s capacity. An efficient U.N., with strong backing from the
United States, will play a meaningful role on security for South
Korea.
Conclusion.
A brief post-Cold War euphoria has already evaporated, and
the U.N. is now in a precarious state. Members were quick to assign
new tasks to the U.N. but not to upgrade its capabilities. As far as
peacekeeping is concerned, the U.N. performed poorly in many
recent missions, so it is very doubtful that it can play a crucial role
as a peacekeeper in Korea. Peace on the peninsula has been made
possible by the ROK-U.S. alliance, firmly rooted and prepared to
deter any threats from the North. Yet, North Korea is demanding
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that the UNC be discarded and the Armistice Agreement be replaced
by a new peace treaty.
This chapter has argued that the Command should not be
dismantled until North Korea fundamentally changes its military
strategy, forward-based offensive force structure, and its policy of
developing WMD. This chapter also points out that extreme caution
is required in redesigning the peace system. So far, there is no
compelling reason to discard the UNC. The UNC symbolizes that
North Korea was the aggressor, and it would be a serious mistake
to relieve Pyongyang of this stigma. Furthermore, the UNC will be
the ideal institution to build international support in case the North
invades the South again.
As we have seen, the U.N. was an important and effective tool
for the United States in the old days. Half-a-century later, many
have lost faith in the U.N. for various reasons. We have heard
enough about the U.N.'s ineffectiveness, waste, mismanagement,
and corruption. We must ask ourselves what we can expect the U.N.
to do. If member states wish to ratchet up the U.N.'s role, they must
also upgrade its capabilities.
More efficient and healthy U.N. PKOs will never be a liability for
the Bush administration. In fact, the U.S. military has become quietly
engaged with the U.N., in the belief that "gray area" conflicts--beyond
the scope of traditional peacekeeping but short of all-out warfare-must be addressed, and that, outside the NATO and East Asian
contexts, a collective response through the U.N. will often prove
the most viable and sustainable option. For the U.N. to become an
effective collective instrument in gray-area peace operations, major
doctrinal innovations are necessary, pre-deployment planning and
more standardized training must be instituted, and its capacity to
field command forces must be enhanced. This will never be done
without the Bush administration's strong support.
In reality, the United States remains the U.N.'s biggest debtor. It
was the United States that invented the U.N. half-a-century ago. Of
course, it has sometimes been a disappointment, or even resentment,
in being little use to its founding father. [Although we might note
that the 1990 Gulf War, like the Korean War, was conducted under
the aegis of U.N. resolutions, and the United States sought and
received U.N. Security Council support for pressure against Iraq in
2002. Ed.] Yet it is high time for the United States to help shape a
more efficient U.N.
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To summarize, the ROK was born with the help of the U.N.
U.S. leadership within and outside the U.N. has been the key to
the survival and security of South Korea. It is natural for Koreans
to believe that cooperation between the United States and the U.N.
will be the winning combination to deter aggression and protect
democracy and human rights in the whole world.
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CHAPTER 6
ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES:
MEETINGS, EXERCISES AND CFC’S ROLES
Jeongwon Yoon
INTRODUCTION
The ROK-U.S. Alliance successfully deterred North Korea from
initiating a war after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in
October 1953. This Alliance played a pivotal role in maintaining
peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to
regional stability in Northeast Asia.
The ROK-U.S. Alliance now rests on legal frameworks such
as the Mutual Defense Treaty (October 1953), Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA: July 1996), Wartime Host Nation Support
(WHNS: November 1991), Terms of Reference I (July 1978) and II
(October 1994), Strategic Directive No.1 (July 1978) & No.2 (October
1994), and over 300 bilateral military agreements between the two
allies.
The ROK-U.S. Alliance has altered its structure and activities
along with security environment changes at the global, East Asian,
or Korean level. The allies have retained their credible Alliance
system and strong combined defense capability.
This chapter focuses on ROK-U.S. Alliance activities in terms
of mutual meetings, combined exercises, and the roles of the
Combined Forces Command (CFC). It analyzes the ROK-U.S.
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the Military Committee
Meeting (MCM), and other security/military meetings, which have
contributed to the Alliance.
In relation to combined exercises, this chapter reviews the
Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise, the Team Spirit (TS) Exercise,
the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)
Exercise, the Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise, etc. The chapter also discusses
the roles of the CFC, centering on its establishment, structure,
mission, and function. The CFC is the centerpiece of the combined
defense system. However, the CFC needs to cope with some
challenges in the short, middle, and long term.
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ROK-U.S. SECURITY/MILITARY MEETINGS
The ROK and the United States have held a lot of meetings
at various levels to understand mutual security/military issues,
promote security/military cooperation, and resolve policy rifts.
These meetings have successfully consolidated the ROK-U.S.
Alliance system. However, some ideas can be suggested on how to
make these meetings better.
Security Consultative Meeting.
At their summit talks in April 1968 in Honolulu, the U.S. and ROK
Presidents decided to hold an annual meeting of defense ministers.
They felt it necessary to enhance bilateral security cooperation
through a high-level military meeting. The ROK and the United
States have continued to hold this meeting, with the title changed to
“ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting” (SCM) in 1971; they have
held 32 SCMs, alternating between the United States and ROK.
The main function of the SCM is consultation on and adjustment
of major security/military policies, and to convey strategic guidelines
to the ROK-U.S. Military Committee (MC). The SCM’s highlight is a
plenary meeting of defense ministers, supported by five workinglevel committees as shown in Figure 1. These five committees
hold meetings prior to the SCM where agendas are developed and
subjects for negotiation are examined.

Security
Consultative
Meeting

Policy
Review
Subcommittee
(PRS)

Security
Cooperation
Committee
(SCC)

Logistics
Cooperation
Committee
(LCC)

Defense
Technology and
Industrial CooperaCommittee
(DTICC)

Joint
Communique
Committee
(JCC)

Figure 1. SCM and Its Five Committees.
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The PRS discusses policy issues sensitive to the security interests of
both countries, advises ministerial talks through policy consultation
at the highest working-level, and deals with issues not related to
other committees. The SCC coordinates issues involving security
assistance. The LCC promotes defense industrial cooperation and the
exchange of technological data in military science. The JCC, in which
foreign affairs officials take part, prepares joint communiqués.
In the past, the significance of the SCM lay mainly in its declarative
role. However, in the late 1980s, the SCM evolved into a substantial
policy consultative meeting in that the two allies discussed key
security or military issues, drew up policy alternatives, and jointly
designed long-term directions for the Alliance’s progress.
The major issues of recent SCMs are shown in Table 1. According
to this table, the ROK and the United States have a common interest
in supporting Inter-Korean dialogues, the Inter-Korean Basic
Accord (1992), and the Inter-Korean Denuclearization Declaration
(1992). They also welcome four party talks or U.S.-North Korea
bilateral talks and negotiations. The two allies highly appreciate
their combined defense system for Korean security and East Asian
stability, and agree on the necessity to maintain their Alliance even
after Korean reunification.
The ROK and the United States are seriously concerned about
the threat from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
to the security of the ROK, the United States, and the region, and
mount common efforts to counter these threats. The two allies
support the maintenance of the U.S.-North Korea Geneva nuclear
accord. Moreover, they clearly oppose North Korea’s efforts to
nullify the Armistice Agreement (1953). They have resolved to keep
this agreement in place until a permanent peace system is established
between the two Koreas.
The ROK and the United States have been interested in revisions
of the SOFA and the resolution of South Korea’s missile issues. They
concluded a revision of the SOFA in January 2001. After a series of
bilateral missile talks, the United States finally allowed the ROK to
develop ballistic missiles with a 300km range and 500kg payload
and the ROK ultimately entered the missile technology control
regime (MTCR) in March 2001.
Currently, the SCM is an effective mechanism for tackling policy
discrepancies on pending issues. It is desirable for the SCM to discuss
frankly bilateral policy rifts and make efforts to get rid of them in a
89

No.

Date & Time

28

November 1, 1996
Washington, D.C.

Major Issues
- Support for four-party talks, Inter-Korean Denuclearization
Declaration (1992) and the Basic Accord (1992), and the Armistice
Agreement (1953)
- Support for the U.S. - NK Geneva nuclear accord (1994), and
concern about UK’S nuclear threats.
- Criticism of NK’s submarine infiltration on East Coast.
- Maintenance of ROK - U.S. combined defense system, continuous
modernization of the ROK military.
- Dialogue on mid- and long-term security cooperation between the
two allies.

29

December 9, 1997
Washington, DC

- USFK’s contribution to war deterrence in Korea and stability in
East Asia.
- Support for Inter-Korean dialogues to resolve Inter-Korean issues.
- Support for four-party talks.
- Maintenance of the Armistice Agreement until the realization of a
permanent peace system in Korea.
- Concerns about NK’s missiles and chemical and bioligical weapons.
- Necessity of anti-personnel mines for defense of Korea.
- Security threats stemming from NK’s economic crisis

30

January 15, 1999
Seoul, Korea

- Importance of Korean security for Asia-Pacific Prosperity and
U.S. security.
- Strong ROK - U.S. combined defense system for supoprting the
Sunshine Policy toward UK.
- Demand for of NK’s suspected underground nuclear facilities and
tunnels.
- Concerns about UK’s missiles and chemical and biological
weapons.
- Concern about the test firing of Taepodong-1 missle.
- Continuance of the ROK-U.S. alliance even after the reduction of
impending threats to Korean stability.
- Mutual Efforts to conclude revision of the SOFA.

31

November 23, 1999
Washington, D.C.

- Support for Inter-Korean dialigues.
- Welcoming U.S. - NK relation progress.
- Support for four-party talks and the Armistice agreement (1953).
- Support for smooth progress of the light water reactor (LWR)
project for NK.
- Welcoming NK’s Moratorium on further missile test firing.

Table 1. Major Issues
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- Continuance of the ROK - U.S. Alliance even after the reduction
of impending threats to Korean stability.
- Mutual efforts to conclude the revision of the SOFA.
- Necessity to resolve SK’s missile issues according to MTCR
criteria.
32

September 21, 2000
Seoul, Korea

- Support for Inter-Korean summit meeting and defense ministerial
meeting.
- Demand for NK’s full compliance with Inter-Korean Denuclearization Declaration (1992), the U.S. - NK Geneva nuclear accord
(1994), and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - related nuclear
safeguards.
- Threats of NK’s WMD to the security of the ROK, the United
States, and the region.
- Welcoming the first U.S. - NK foreign ministers meeting.
- Continuance of the Armistice Agreemant (1953).
- Strong ROK - U.S. combined defense system for supporting the
Sunshine Policy toward NK.
- Continuance of the ROK-U.S. Alliance even after the reduction of
the impending threats to Korean stability.

Table 1. Major Issues (concluded).
cooperative way. It is important to acknowledge that the ROK and
the United States respectively face new domestic as well as external
security situations in the post-Cold War era.
Military Committee Meeting.
The 10th SCM in 1977 decided to establish the ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command (CFC) with the Military Committee
(MC) as an operational supervisory organ of the CFC. The MC
as well as the CFC were officially set up in 1978. As a result, the
Military Committee Meeting (MCM) has been held annually since
1978 (except in 1980). The SCM provides the National Authorities
(NA) with strategic guidelines for the Military Committee.1 The
MC receives these guidelines from the NA and delivers strategic
directives and operational instructions to the Commander of the
CFC (CDRCFC).2 Ordinary Korean people do not recognize well
the presence and function of the MC, which leads them to believe
erroneously that the CFC is under the direct control of the U.S. JCS.
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The MC is co-hosted by the Chairmen of the ROK Joint Chiefs of
Staff (ROK CJCS) and the U.S. CJCS. The MCM consists of a plenary
meeting and standing meetings. The ROK CJCS and U.S. CJCS, two
delegates named respectively by each Chairman, and the CDRCFC
take part in the plenary meetings. The MCM’s plenary meeting is
usually held just before the SCM meeting, but it can be also held as
needed. The MCM reports its results to the SCM. The ROK CJCS
and the Senior U.S. Military Officer in Korea,3 as the representative
of the U.S. CJCS, hold the MCM’s standing meetings. During
those meetings, they coordinate current military issues of concern
to the CFC. The meetings are held whenever at least one of the
representatives calls for a meeting.
A lot of major military issues are dealt with at the MCMs, as shown
in Table 2. In recent times, the MCM has focused on devising common
perceptions of North Korea’s military threats, countering North
Korea’s biological/chemical weapons and missile threats, deterring
North Korea’s infiltration or armed provocations, maintaining the
ROK-U.S. Alliance, developing the ROK-U.S. combined defense
system and exercises, and resolving military issues. The MCM
plays a major role in coordinating military policies and delivering
operational directives and guidelines to the CFC. However, many
Koreans suspect that the MCM genuinely guarantees the ROK JCS
can affect wartime operational control of the CFC on an equal basis
as long as the commander of the CFC is American.
Trilateral Defense Consultation.
The ROK, the United States, and Japan annually hold a trilateral
defense consultation meeting of high-ranking defense officials to
maintain trilateral cooperation on their security/military policies
toward North Korea and to exchange military information
concerning their neighbors. The North Korean nuclear program
crisis led to this trilateral coordination. The consultation has been
held since August 1994, as shown in Table 3.
This involves both a trilateral plenary meeting among the three
countries and bilateral meetings between the ROK and the United
States, the ROK and Japan, or the United States and Japan. The
9th session in Tokyo decided to divide the trilateral discussions
into three different levels: Tri-A (Assistant-Secretary level), Tri-B
(Bureau Director-level), and SSG (Sub-Study Group: special experts
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level). The trilateral defense consultation focuses on coping with
regional instability as well as North Korea’s military threats. This
consultation is of importance in that it can improve the ROK-Japan
No.
18

Date & Place
October 30, 1996
Washington, DC

19

December 9, 1997
Washington, DC

20

January 14, 1999
Seoul, Korea

Major Issues
- ROK-U.S. Alliance’s contrubution to regional
stability.
- Necessity to respond to NK’s unpredictable and
unstable regime change.
- Enhancement of ROK-U.S. combined defense system, combined war preparedness, combined exercises,
interoperability, the RSOI, etc.
- Countermeasures against NK’s chemical weapon
threats.
- Logistics sufficiency of the CFC.
- War sustainability of the ROK armed forces.
- Anti-submarine and anti-artillery combined exercises.
- Combined responses to NK’s large-scale infiltration
or local armed provocations.
- Strengthening ROK-U.S. cooperation in crisis
management and military operations.
- Early deployment of U.S. augmentation forces.
- Enhancing combined exercises and operational
capabilities.
- Threats of NK’s asymmetrical military capabilities.
- U.S. military support in case of security crisis in
Korea.
- Development of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5027 to
cope with biological or chemical warfare.
- Primary support for the ROK in case of 2MTW
(Major Theater War) situations.
- Development of combined exercises.
- Coordination on the improvement of Combined
Psychological Warfare Command.

Table 2. Major Issues of Recent Plenary MCMs.
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No.

Month/Year

Place (Host Country)

Major Issues

1st

August 1994

Hawaii (U.S.)

2nd

June 1995

Washington, DC
(U.S.)

3rd

June 1996

Hawaii (ROK)

4th

March 1997

Seoul (Japan)

- NK’s threats and instability.

5th

April 1998

Seoul (U.S.)

- NK’s situation.

6th

October 1998

Seoul (Japan)

7th

February 1999

Seoul (U.S.)

- NK’s military threats, U.S.-Sino relations.
- NK’s situation, NK’s nuclear issues.
- NK’s situation.
- Regional multilateral security.

- Policies toward neighboring countries.
- NK’s situation.
- Responses to NK’s nuclear / missile issues.
- Responses to NK’s nuclear / missile issues.
- NK’s suspected underground nuclear tunnels and facilities.
8th

October 1999

Tokyo (Japan)

9th

May 2000

Cheju Island (ROK)

- Coordination for policies toward UK.
- Lessons from the Kosovo Incident.
- NK’s situation, Relations with China.
- U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review / National Missile
Defense / Theater Missile Defense (QDR/NMD/TMD).

10th

November 2000

Hawaii (U.S.)

- Coordination of policies toward NK.
- Conference on military responses in crises.

Table 3. A Brief History of Trilateral Defense Consultation.
military talks despite Korea’s lingering historical animosity against
Japanese colonial ruling over Korea.
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group Meeting.
The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)
meeting has been held several times a year since 1999 among highranking foreign affairs officials from the ROK, the United States,
and Japan. Usually, Assistant Secretary-level officials participate.
They devise cooperative policies toward North Korea, decide on
negotiation strategies and tactics, and report their conclusions to
their governments.
This meeting tends to deal with broader issues than the
trilateral defense consultation meeting. The Director of the Policy
Planning Bureau, as a representative of the ROK Defense Ministry,
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sometimes joins in. The TCOG also enhances the ROK-U.S. Alliance
by coordinating foreign policies. Nonetheless, the TCOG more
frequently has to solve policy differences between the ROK and the
United States, while the ROK pursues a more active engagement
policy toward North Korea than the United States expects.
Big-4 Meeting.
The meeting of ROK Defense and Foreign Ministers, the U.S.
Ambassador, and the Senior U.S. Military Officer in Korea is
called the “Big-4,” or “2 + 2,” meeting. It mainly discusses pending
military/security issues. It is an irregular, informal, and closed
meeting held once or twice a year since February 1990. It has dealt
with major issues such as the relocation of USFK military bases,
North Korea’s nuclear threats, ROK-U.S. defense burdensharing, the
holding of General officer-level meetings with North Korea, the fourparty talks, etc. It was being held on a monthly basis with a view to
tightening bilateral security cooperation after the inauguration of the
Bush administration. However, it has not met recently because the
ROK and the United States confronted different policy perspectives,
which could not be coordinated easily, on North Korea’s nuclear
threats and anti-Americanism among some Koreans.
Policy Recommendations.
Although these diverse meetings have made a great contribution
to the ROK-U.S. Alliance, there are several ways to improve the
MCM and SCM. First, it is important to put more emphasis on midand long-term security/military issues which will face the two allies
amid the far-reaching changes of the security environment in the
21st century.
Second, it is desirable to clearly divide the level of issues taken
up in the MCM from those in the SCM. The MCM should focus on
operational-level issues while the SCM deals with policy issues. At
present, there seems to be some fusion between the two bodies.
Third, it may be necessary to establish combined standing
offices for discussion in the MCM and SCM, which help prepare the
meetings, put the agreements into practice, and assess the results.
Fourth, it is desirable that the CFC actively join the process of
issue formation for the discussions in the MCM and SCM because
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the CFC is responsible for combined wartime defense and well
recognizes the problems involved. Moreover, it is best to hold these
meetings at times in combination with combined CFC exercises for
wartime.
In a changing security environment, the alliance meetings will
be desirable when they draw out future-oriented readjustment and
restructuring rather than adhering to status quo without flexibility.
ROK-U.S. COMBINED EXERCISES
The ROK-U.S. combined defense system has maintained highlevel military preparedness, through various combined exercises, in
order to deter a war and rapidly cope with any security crisis on the
Korean peninsula. On a regular basis, the ROK and the United States
have carried out the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise; the Reception,
Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercise; the
Foal Eagle (FE) exercise; the Team Spirit (TS) exercise; and others.
These exercises enabled the two allies to accumulate many lessons
on how to fight against armed provocations which North Korea
might initiate.
Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise.
The ROK began to conduct the annual Ulchi Exercise as a fullscale war exercise in 1969, after the failed attack by North Korean
infiltrators on the Blue House (president’s residence) in January 1968.
The USFK also started, in 1968, its annual Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL)
Exercise to upgrade its operational readiness. After a U.S. proposal
in 1973 to combine them, UFL has been conducted annually in late
summer since 1976. UFL has developed through adopting the War
Game model since 1988 and using the Computer-Based Simulation
(CBS) model since 1992. Since 1994 UFL has been undertaken, in
parallel with the crisis management exercise of the ROK government
which is called the Chungmu Plan.
Nowadays, UFL is an annual ROK-U.S. Command Post Exercise
(CPX). It focuses on reviewing the ROK government’s war guidance
and support plan, improving proficiency in military operation
procedures, reviewing the deployment of U.S. reinforcement forces
in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD),4 and training
corps-level and above staffs of the ROK-U.S. CFC on the operation
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plan. UFL consists of two parts. In the first part, government offices,
major ROK and U.S. commands, and even business companies
designated for mobilization, join to conduct an integration exercise
between the government and military sectors. The second part is
conducted with a focus on a military exercise.
The ROK JCS has conducted the Amrok River Exercise since
1996. This is the joint CPX of the ROK Armed Forces, carried out
before UFL. This exercise provides an opportunity to master the
war execution procedures and enhance operational command
capabilities. The experiences in Amrok River are helpful for adapting
the ROK Armed Forces in preparation for UFL.
Meanwhile, USFK conducts Summer-X, which makes the Eighth
U.S. Army and lower level unit officers familiar with the procedures
of theater operations on the peninsula. It is also a preparatory
exercise for UFL. A small number of Korean officers began to join
Summer-X after 1998.
UFL has increased the deterrent power of the ROK-U.S. CFC
by providing an opportunity to master governmental or military
watchover procedures in wartime and enhancing combined military
capabilities. UFL has strengthened wartime military capabilities such
as ROK mobilization, U.S. reinforcement, information warfare and
command, control, communications, computers, and information
(C4I) systems, countermeasures against WMD threats, flexible
deterrent options based on deep, close, and rear battles, and so on.
UFL’s intensity was weakened to some degree after the first
Inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000. The ROK government
did not want to damage Inter-Korean relationships that the summit
meeting brought about. North Korea criticized South Korea for
conducting UFL, arguing that it was contrary to the spirit of the
summit. Nonetheless, UFL is necessary because no significant
military confidence-building or arms control steps with North Korea
have emerged.
In the short term, UFL aims at ensuring immediate and sufficient
interoperability between the allies. However, in the long term, UFL
should be able to improve the scope of wartime operational control
of the ROK if the USFK plans to reconfigure itself by withdrawing
from Korea to a noticeable degree.
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Team Spirit Exercise.
Team Spirit (TS) was a large-scale field maneuver exercise aimed
at improving the Combined/Joint operation capabilities of USFK
and U.S. reinforcement forces. The ROK and the United States
agreed to conduct TS annually at the SCM of 1975, with the first TS
held in 1976. The ROK-U.S. CFC has been in charge of TS since 1979.
TS grew to nearly 200,000 ROK and U.S. participants commensurate
with increased perceptions of an increased North Korean threat.
U.S. participation included augmentation forces of all the services
tactically deployed to the ROK from other Pacific bases and the
continental United States.
However, TS was defensive in that it purported to deter North
Korean war provocations by strengthening the Alliance. TS was
mainly devised to estimate how the United States forces would
fight a war initiated by North Korea. North Korean delegates were
invited but none were ever sent. Instead, North Korea criticized TS
as an offensive nuclear war exercise and argued for its permanent
cancellation. In the early 1990s North Korea continued this
demand for an end to TS in return for stopping its nuclear weapon
programs.
In 1992, the ROK and the United States suspended TS on the
condition that North Korea accept Inter-Korean and international
inspections of its suspected nuclear facilities and sites. As North
Korea was not fully cooperative, TS was resumed in 1993. However,
it was suspended in 1994 to entice North Korea to abandon its
nuclear weapon options. In October 1994, the United States and
North Korea signed the Geneva nuclear accord, freezing the North’s
nuclear program. TS has not been undertaken since then. The
defense ministries of the ROK and the United States have made an
annual decision since 1996 on whether to resume it.
The suspension of TS contributed to resolving the North Korean
nuclear dispute and easing military tension on the peninsula.
However, the ROK and the United States lost an opportunity
to show their Alliance tightness and conduct a large-scale field
maneuver exercise in which U.S. forces actually participate. It is
unexpected that TS will resume unless North Korea abrogates the
Geneva nuclear accord.5
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Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)
Exercise.
Along with the strategic concept of Power Projection, U.S. forces
put an emphasis on the rapid deployment of sufficient forces for war.
In 1993, the Department of Defense pointed out that the ROK-U.S.
CFC lacked preparedness for deploying U.S. reinforcements. The
Operations Plan (OPLAN) did not fully reflect the steps necessary.
As TS was likely to be suspended because of the North Korean
nuclear dispute, the ROK and the United States agreed to conduct
an annual RSOI exercise.
The first RSOI was done just as a seminar in 1994. Thereafter, it
was conducted as a computer-simulated CPX under the control of
the CFC, aimed at exercising the reception, staging, movement to the
forward area, and integration of additional U.S. forces. Of course,
the RSOI includes a seminar where ROK and U.S. military leaders
discuss the implications for the OPLAN.
During the RSOI exercise, the participants review the content
and the procedure of the OPLAN TPFDD, examine the cooperation
procedures and requirements related to the WHNS, and test the
C4I and logistics support of the ROK Armed Forces for rear area
operations. The exercise probes force protection, tracking, and
movement during deployment of the incoming U.S. forces, and
enhances deterrence by displaying plans to actually deploy U.S.
reinforcements.
The RSOI partly replaces the suspended TS, which was an actual
field maneuver of USFK and U.S. augmentation forces. However,
its achievements are limited in that there is no real deployment of
forces.
Foal Eagle Exercise.
The ROK Armed Forces conducted a battalion-level special
forces exercise from 1961 on, and in 1975 the ROK and the United
States expanded this into a combined special forces exercise called
Foal Eagle (FE). FE has included a large-scale field maneuver since
1995 to compensate for suspension of TS. In 1997, FE included a
corps-level Field Training Exercise (FTX), but since 1998, it has been
a brigade-level combined FTX.
FE is composed of two parts. The first focuses on the procedures
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OPLAN of the Combined Special Forces Command, the combined/
joint rear area operations, and the RSOI of the Time Phased Force
Deployment Listed units. The second part includes a ROK corpslevel FTX, a ROK-U.S. combined brigade-level FTX with the
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), a combined
landing operation with Marines, and the FTXs of the Combined
Ground, Naval, or Air Forces Commands. Most of the ROK Armed
Forces take part in FE, even including the reserve forces and local
government offices. Eighth Army and USFK Special Forces also
are involved, along with a significant portion of the United States
augmentation forces.
FE examines special forces operations; rear area defenses; forceon-force field maneuvering; anti-air, -surface, and -submarine
operations by naval forces; close air-support; defensive and offensive
counter-air operations by air forces; and amphibious landings. FE
also reviews noncombatant evacuations, mass casualty exercises,
chemical decontamination exercises, and so on. In a sense, FE is
a comprehensive FTX that demonstrates the military resolve that
deters war on the peninsula.
Since 1996, the ROK JCS has carried out Hokuk (“Guarding the
Nation”) training, a large-scale joint field exercise among all the
services to make up for FE’s limits in training for defense of the
ROK. Each service also annually conducts a variety of maneuvering
exercises to improve operational readiness and combat capabilities.
Other Combined Exercises.
The ROK Navy participates in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
Exercise, which is conducted biennially (every even year) under
the United States Third Fleet. RIMPAC has been a multinational,
combined sea mobility exercise of the United States, Australia,
Canada, Chile, United Kingdom, and Japan since 1971. The ROK
Navy joined six times after 1990. The United States and Australia,
every odd year, carry out Tandem Thrust training, which focuses on
securing the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) around
the western rim of the Pacific, plus enhanced cooperative operations
in contingencies. The ROK Navy has joined this exercise since
1999. Moreover, the ROK, the United States, Australia, Japan, and
Singapore took part in the Pacific Reach Exercise, first conducted
with an eye to exercising submarine and other rescue activities in
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the western Pacific.
In close consultation with USFK, the ROK Army annually
conducts combined assault training; nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC); and counter-fire operations training. The ROK Air
Force also undertakes combined air defensive training and offensive
flight group training in various forms. ROK Special Forces take part
in a variety of combined exercises for developing guerilla warfare
tactics, anti-terrorism operations, seashore infiltration, maritime
special operations, airborne infiltration and escape tactics, explosive
ordnance disposal operation, and so on.
Policy Recommendations.
These combined exercises clearly strengthen the ROK-U.S.
Alliance and improve deterrence. The ROK and the United States
draw significant lessons and reflect them in combined operation
plans. These exercises will be the cornerstone of military victory in
any war with North Korea. However, it is important continuously to
improve these exercises. Here are some recommendations with this
in mind.
First, considering the short warning time in a North Korean
attack, it may be wise to conduct some of these combined exercises
on short notice. Moreover, it may be desirable sometimes to change
the seasons of major combined exercises, since North Korea could
attack at any time during the year.
Second, it is important to link ROK-U.S. combined exercises with
those of the ROK Armed Forces. It is also desirable to upgrade the
interoperability of ROK-U.S. command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I) and weapon systems. Efficient
communication between Korean and U.S. officers in a crisis is
indispensable.
Third, the existing exercises may not cover a full range of training
needed. It is important to add missing combined exercises in the
future, especially to prepare for North Korea’s WMD threats. Fourth,
the ROK and the United States may need to conduct multilateral
exercises at times on possible multinational force mobilization in
such cases as the Persian Gulf War or Kosovo. It is uncertain that all
U.S. augmentation forces will arrive in the ROK if the United States
is engaged in another major theater war. If so, multinational forces
and multinational military exercises can be valuable.
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Fifth, it is important not to limit the ROK-U.S. combined exercises
as long as North Korea does not carry out substantial military
confidence-building and arms control steps. In the absence of the
ROK’s thorough military preparedness, it would be impossible
to restrain North Korean aspirations for a communized Korean
peninsula through armed provocations.
ROK-U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND’S ROLES
The Establishment of the CFC.
A combined operational planning staff, developed in 1968
as an adjunct to the UNC/USFK/Eighth United States Army
Headquarters, evolved in 1971 into an integrated field army
headquarters. This was lodged in the ROK-U.S. CFC in 1978, when
the ROK and the United States sought a military mechanism to make
up for the proposed withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces
(which was later cancelled). The 11th SCM of July 27, 1978 agreed
on “Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK-U.S.
CFC,” which included the mission and the function of the CFC as
well as the MC. They provided a legal basis for the establishment of
the CFC.
The UNC had kept the responsibility for defending the ROK
and operational control over the ROK Armed Forces. However,
when the UNC handed over operational control, the CFC was put
in charge of defending the ROK. Thereafter, the commander of the
UNC supervised the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement,
with “directive authority” to assure allied compliance with the
Armistice Agreement, and continued to provide a framework for a
multinational response to North Korean aggression.
In July 28, 1978, the first MCM delivered Strategic Directive
No.1 to the CFC and ordered CDRCFC to be in charge of defending
the ROK. This directive included the command chains of the CFC
during the armistice period as well as war, and clarified details of
operational control within the CFC. The CFC was finally set up in
November 1978. The ROK could have influence on the operational
control of the CFC through the NCMA and the MC.
On October 6, 1994, the 16th MCM delivered Strategic Directive
No. 2, which limited the CDRCFC to wartime operational control
of ROK and U.S. military forces and provided the ROK CJCS with
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armistice period operational control over the ROK units. Accordingly,
on October 7, 1994, the 26th SCM agreed to revise the command
system of the CFC and provide CDRCFC with Combined Delegated
Authority (CODA), which gives him the necessary authority to
plan and prepare for combined military operations in wartime. On
December 1, 1994, the CFC handed over its peacetime operational
control to the ROK JCS. However, some nationalistic Koreans argue
for early handover of even wartime operational control to the ROK.
Some of them call for the reduction or withdrawal of the USFK from
their radical perspective. They are small in number, but active in
shouting.
The Structure of the CFC.
Nowadays, the CFC receives operational guidelines and
directives from the MC, which relies on strategic guidelines and
directives from the SCM or the NA. The CFC consists of the
CFC Headquarters, Combined Ground Component Command,
Combined Naval Component Command, Combined Air Component
Command, Combined Marine Forces Command, and Combined
Unconventional Warfare Task Force.
The CFC Headquarters is composed of ROK and U.S. officers
on an equal basis. The CFC is under a four-star U.S. commander,
with a four-star ROK Army deputy commander. Throughout the
command, if the chief of a staff section is Korean, the deputy is
American, and vice versa. This integrated structure exists within the
component commands as well as the headquarters. To accomplish
its mission, the CFC has wartime operational control over more than
600,000 active-duty military personnel of all services. In wartime,
augmentation would include ROK reservists and additional U.S.
forces.
The CFC may be desirable in terms of war preparedness and
efficacy of the two allies. However, the CFC seems to emphasize
the roles and capabilities of the USFK in contingency. Therefore,
some Korean critics are concerned about symbolic or substantial
infringement on their national sovereignty. North Korea refuses to
have inter-Korean military talks while it prefers to have U.S.-North
Korean peace talks, assuming a U.S. hegemonic role in the Korean
peace.
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Figure 2. The Structure of the CFC.
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Policy Recommendations.
The CFC has accomplished its goal to deter war on the Korean
peninsula. However, we can make some suggestions for the further
development of the CFC. First, the CFC must continue its flexible
adaptation to security environment changes. The ROK and the
United States have used the CFC mechanism to contain communist
forces in Northeast Asia. Now the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
has collapsed, and China has adopted a capitalist economic system.
The CFC, rather than expanding its role, may have to limit its
strategic role to deterring war in Korea.
Second, the CFC should prepare for changes in the status of
USFK, which may be motivated by conceptual changes in U.S.
security or military strategy. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the United
States pursued withdrawals of U.S. forces in accordance with
changes in its security or military strategies. The end of the Cold
War will necessarily influence U.S. security strategies and military
organizations, which can change the stationing of the USFK.
Third, the CFC should prepare for challenges from progress in
Inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The more successfully
the two Koreas develop exchanges and cooperation, the more the
CFC’s strategic value may be lessened.
Fourth, the CFC needs effective options for countering criticisms
of U.S. forces in South Korea. Although the anti-USFK mood is not
lethal yet, it has risen recently because of issues such as crime by
U.S. soldiers, environmental pollution near U.S. bases, restraints
on individual property rights from USFK training fields, the
maintenance of main commanding posts in central Seoul, etc. In
addition, U.S. domestic support for the USFK may fade, given
the ROK’s capacity to mount its own defense and anti-American
protests in Seoul.
Fifth, the CFC should continuously devise responses to North
Korea’s political propaganda against USFK and the CFC. North
Korea demands the abolishment of the CFC as well as the withdrawal
of the USFK, while refusing to promote sincere peace and stability
in Korea.
CONCLUSION
The ROK-U.S. Alliance has been successful in preventing
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aggression since the cease-fire that ended the Korean War. This
Alliance has relied on meetings such as the SCM, the MCM, the
Trilateral Defense Consultation, the TCOG, and the Big-4 meetings.
It has conducted a variety of combined exercises such as UFL, TS,
RSOI, FE, etc., for upgrading deterrence and fighting power. The
CFC has developed its structure, accomplished its mission, and
fulfilled its function.
The ROK and the United States basically agree on keeping their
Alliance and maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, even after unification.
They expect USFK to play a stabilizing role in Northeast Asia in
the 21st century. However, the ROK-U.S. Alliance will face various
challenges and its future will be affected by how it copes with them.
These challenges arise from domestic politics in the two Koreas,
inter-Korean relations, the Northeast Asian security environment,
U.S.-South Korea or U.S.-North Korea relations, and even U.S.
domestic politics and security strategies.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. The term “National Command and Military Authorities” (NCMA) refers to
the President, Secretary or Minister of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff of either of the two countries. In 2002 the U.S. Secretary of Defense decreed
that the term “National Command Authorities” (NCA) should no longer be used to
refer collectively to the U.S. President and Secretary of Defense. As of this writing,
the term “National Authorities” (NA) is being used in place of “NCMA” for U.S.
authorities.
2. From the establishment of the Combined Forces Command in 1978 until 2002,
its commander was known as “Commander in Chief, ROK/U.S. Combined Forces
Command (CINCCFC). In 2002, however, the U.S. Secretary of Defense forbade
the use of the term “Commander-in-Chief” for any person other than the President
of the United States. As of the time of this writing, the term being used for the
officer previously called CINCCFC is “Commander, Combined Forces Command”
(CDRCFC).
3. The Senior U.S. Military Officer in Korea is the highest level military
representative of the U.S. Government stationed in Korea. He is also the
Commander of the ROK/U.S. CFC, the Commander of the multinational United
Nations Command (CDRUNC) and the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea
(COMUSKOREA), which is a purely U.S. command.
4. The TPFDD includes all the data on deployment of U.S. forces and material
in support of the combined ROK-U.S. plan for the defense of Korea in the event of a
North Korean attack.
5. This was written before the events of late 2002 which have called the continued
viability of the nuclear accord into question.
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PART III: NORTH KOREA AND KEDO
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CHAPTER 7
IF NORTH KOREA WERE REALLY “REFORMING,”
HOW COULD WE TELL —
AND WHAT WOULD WE BE ABLE TO SEE?
Nicholas Eberstadt1
Structural Problems in the Study of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
In any assessment of the strategic situation in Northeast Asia,
an accurate evaluation of the outlook for North Korea is utterly
indispensable, for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
lies at the very heart of the “Korea problem” as that problem is
presently constituted. Yet while North Korean policies and practices
have accounted for most of the volatility within the Northeast Asian
region since the end of the Cold War, and may continue to do so over
the immediate future, North Korean external behavior unfortunately
is not easily understood or anticipated by foreign analysts. The
reasons for this are readily explicable. As a socialist dictatorship that
simultaneously embraces hereditary succession, the basic precepts
of North Korean governance are intuitively alien to viewers of a
liberal, Western sensibility. Further, for nearly decades Pyongyang
has striven assiduously — and with extraordinary success — to
suppress any and all information that might permit an independent
assessment of the regime’s performance. No less important, North
Korea is a state that cleaves unremittingly to a policy of strategic
deception (in bygone Soviet terminology, maskirovka).
Indeed, misleading potential adversaries about its intentions
and capabilities seems to lie at the very heart of North Korea’s
statecraft. As we now know, the preparations for North Korea’s
surprise attack against South Korea in June 1950 carefully were kept
secret, and Pyongyang even used diplomacy to help keep its target
off-guard, offering Seoul a new peace and unification initiative just
a week before it launched its assault.2 The outbreak of the Korean
War, however, is only the most famous of the DPRK’s exercises in
strategic deception. Strategic deception was a mainstay of North
Korean external policy during the Cold War and has been an integral
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part of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. For example,
in early 1992, as the “Joint Declaration on The Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula”3 that Pyongyang had just signed with Seoul was
supposed to be going into force, the DPRK submitted falsified data
to the United Nations (U.N.) International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) about the status of its nuclear development program;4 it was
the discovery and exposure of these falsifications that triggered the
international community’s North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94.
North Korea’s reputation for “unpredictability,” then, is in no small
measure testimony to the success of official government policy.
North Korea: Gathering Signs Of Change.
For all the difficulties in divining the significance of developments
in North Korea, signs of change on the North Korean stage have been
gathering since Kim Jong Il’s accession to the DPRK’s “highest post
of the state” in September 1998.5 The aforementioned Pyongyang
parleys of June 2000, for example, marked a dramatic departure from
North Korea’s previous posture toward inter-Korean summitry.6
Other noteworthy, and intriguing, divergences from past practices
or policies have been gradually accumulating. A partial inventory
of these would include:
• In North-South relations, Pyongyang’s November 1998
6-year, $942 million deal with the Hyundai business group
for tourism in the Kumgang Mountain area, under whose
terms over 400,000 outsiders have already visited the scenic
North Korean site;7 the commerce-oriented November 2000
Republic of Korea (ROK)-DPRK agreements on investment
protection, prevention of double taxation, resolution of
commercial disputes, and clearing settlement;8 and the nowunfolding project (reportedly approved directly by Kim Jong
Il) for a multi-billion dollar, 66-square-kilometer, Hyundaibuilt industrial park and residential development in the
vicinity of Kaesong, just above the DMZ.9
• In relations with the United States, the unprecedented
and cordial high-level meetings between Kim Jong Il and
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Pyongyang, and
in Washington between President William Clinton and
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Kim’s emissary National Defense Commission (NDC)
Vice Chairman Jo Myong Rok, in 2000 — and no less
unprecedented, the repeated reports that Kim Jong Il had
informed South Korean and American leaders that he was
reconciled to a continuing U.S. troop presence in the Korean
peninsula, even after reunification.10
• In international diplomacy, the establishment, between
early 2000 and summer 2001, of diplomatic relations with 11
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries and the European Union (EU) (and with
most of its erstwhile Korean war military opponents as
well!)11 — punctuated by DPRK declarations that “there is no
reason to hesitate about improving relations with capitalist
countries”12 and that “North Korea seeks friendly relations
with all countries.”13
• In international security policy, the DPRK’s bid and
accession, in the year 2000 to membership in the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF)
— the first such multilateral security dialogue that Pyongyang
had ever entered; and North Korea’s presentation at the 2001
ARF of an official paper titled “annual report on security
prospects”: a small but highly symbolic step toward making
the regime’s security calculations more transparent.
• Finally, there are the evident stirrings in the country’s
economic policy. In January 2001 came the striking
pronouncement in Nodong Sinmun, the DPRK’s party paper,
that
Things are not what they used to be in the 1960s. . . With the start
of the new age of the 2000s, an all-around re-examination should
be given to outworn patterns and practices. . . . We should bring
about technical modernization by b oldly doing away with what
needs to be abolished, instead of being shackled by ready-made
ideas or hanging on to the old and outdated conceptions.14

Following this call for “a new way of thinking,” the DPRK
revealed that Chairman Kim Jong Il had paid an “unofficial” 6-day
trip to China.15 During their stay in Shanghai, Kim Jong Il and his
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delegation apparently devoted much of their time to inspecting
profit-oriented, Chinese-, Japanese-, and American-owned factories
and reportedly twice toured the Shanghai stock exchange.16 Shortly
thereafter, the DPRK formally requested the U.N. Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) to teach some North Korean
college students about market systems and management,17 while
North Korean officials publicly voiced the hope that the DPRK
might join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.18
As for signs on the ground of “a new way of thinking”: in spring
2001 North Korea reportedly erected its first commercial billboard19
and scheduled its first fashion show to exhibit South Korean high
couture;20 perhaps more importantly, rumors were circulating
that the DPRK was poised to enact a China-style contract-farming
arrangement on a nationwide scale21 and to develop a domestic
internet infrastructure.22
Indispensible Facets of a Meaningful DPRK “Reform.”
Not so long ago, any and all of the markers listed above
might have seemed unthinkable for North Korea. Clearly, North
Korea is changing. But to appreciate the strategic significance of
these changes, we must ask: how profound are the changes now
underway, what accounts for them, and what do they augur for the
DPRK’s habitually adversarial relations with its neighbors and the
rest of the outside world?
The answers to all these questions, of course, turn on the
intentions of the North Korean leadership. Unfortunately, that
critical quantity remains obscure — for at least as yet, ruling circles
in Pyongyang are no more inclined now than ever in the past to
disclose their true thinking about the tactical and strategic issues
they face. Consequently, deductions abroad about the regime’s
outlook, motivations, and estimations are unavoidably based upon
inferences drawn from critically incomplete and often inconsistent
evidence.
Be that as it may, despite Pyongyang’s preternatural secrecy,
we can be reasonably confident that we already know what sorts of
changes in regime outlook would be necessary for a fundamental
recasting of the country’s international policy to be regarded as
feasible or desirable. That knowledge provides us with the rudiments
of a decryption key with which to uncode the diverse signs of change
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in North Korea today, so that we might distinguish the strategically
meaningful from the epiphenomenal.
As a necessary precondition for a more peaceable modus vivendi
with the international community, we may submit the DPRK would
have to embrace bold new answers to three old problems bearing
centrally upon the identity and character of the state:
1. The problem of “ideological and cultural infiltration.” North Korean
authorities coined the term “ideological and cultural infiltration” to
describe their perception of the impact on their country of exchanges
of people, ideas, and goods with the outside, “imperialist”dominated, world. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, North
Korean ideologists argued that the downfall of socialism in Eastern
Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was
due in large measure to “cultural and ideological infiltration,” and
DPRK leadership vowed to protect their system from this menace.23
If North Korean authorities decided, however, that “ideological
and cultural infiltration” was a manageable difficulty rather than
a regime-threatening menace, then experimentation with more
pragmatic economic policies — including some sort of economic
opening toward the outside world — would be a viable rather than
a subversive proposition. An opening to the world economy, for
its part, would raise the possibility that the DPRK could finance the
operations of its system from the sale of conventional goods and
services — rather than depend upon international military extortion
for financial survival.
2. The problem of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regime
survival. North Korea’s prolonged, fathomless investment in its
WMD programs and its accomplished recourse to nuclear diplomacy
over the past decade, strongly suggest that the DPRK leadership
regards mass destruction weaponry not only as an invaluable asset,
but perhaps also as an indispensable tool for guaranteeing regime
survival. (Official declarations in the past have hinted as much.24)
An independent state will never willingly trade away an instrument
it regards as vital to its survival — but if the DPRK leadership
regarded its WMD as valuable but not vital, it would presumably be
possible to negotiate an end to those programs in exchange for some
particular package of benefits.
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3. The problem of South Korea’s legitimacy. From its earliest days,
North Korea has insisted that the DPRK was the sole legitimate
government on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang, further, has
exacted terrible sacrifices from its people in its long and dogged
quest for unification of the peninsula on its own terms and its terms
alone. The quest for unconditional unification with the South, one
might argue, is deeply and inextricably fused into the constituting
rationale of the DPRK system that we know today. If, however, the
DPRK leadership convinced itself that the North Korean system
could survive indefinitely next to the ROK, and that purposes of
state were served by recognizing the legitimacy of the ROK, then
a revolution in inter-Korean relations would be possible: a genuine
Seoul-Pyongyang peace agreement (and presumably, a correlative
official declaration of some kind of “one nation, two states” policy
by which to justify the pact for the DPRK), a detente worthy of the
name, and a massive demobilization of military forces on the Korean
peninsula could all then be theoretically within grasp.
It will be evident upon reflection, incidentally, that arriving at
new answers to every one of these problems is contingent upon, and
reinforced by, arriving at new answers to each of the others.
Assessing Change In North Korea.
From a strategic perspective, signs of change in North Korea may
thus be deemed important and meaningful insofar as they portend
internal regime movement on three scores: economic opening, WMD
proliferation, and North-South struggle. Consequently, we must
ask: what would meaningful movement on these issues look like to
us, given the limited apertures that outsiders have for peering into
North Korea? And does available evidence suggest such movement
is currently taking place?
Economic Opening.
We must bear in mind the simple fact that even serious adjustments
in official economic policies and practices may not necessarily be
driven by “new thinking.” Such adjustments can also be forced
upon a regime by sheer exigency — and official claims of “turning
the corner” and “completing the Forced March” notwithstanding,
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the DPRK remains in a dire economic straits. According to the latest
assessment by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and the World Food Programme, for example, cereal production
for the DPRK for 2000/2001 is expected to be fully a third below
the level of 1995/9625 — when Pyongyang first launched its
international appeal for emergency food aid. The country’s export
capabilities are likewise in a state of virtual collapse: according to the
ROK Unification Ministry, North Korea’s export earnings in the first
half of the year 2001 amounted to barely $350 million26 — a sum that
would work out to well under $20 per capita.
Under such circumstances, tactical and opportunistic
improvisations may well be imperative for the survival of
what Pyongyang terms “our own style of socialism.” From an
analytic standpoint, attributing the DPRK’s observed economic
improvisations to a postulated change in outlook on the part of North
Korean leadership is to violate the very logic underlying “Ockham’s
razor” (e.g., “what can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in
vain with more”).
It is perfectly true that North Korean party journals have recently
averred that DPRK policy “by no means” insists upon a strategy of
“economic construction with the door closed.”27 But as those same
articles patiently emphasize, North Korea’s “door” is officially
open to “the accomplishments of modern science and technology”28
— nothing else. In particular, North Korean policy still categorically
opposes what it brands as “ideological and cultural infiltration,”
including “international, regional, and global cooperation and
exchanges.” “Lessons of history,” according a July 2001 Nodong
Sinmun, “show that once the door is open to the imperialists’
ideological and cultural infiltration, the revolution can be destroyed
at one stroke”; accordingly, “it is mandatory to completely block
the route through which their ideology and culture infiltrate.”29 So
deep is North Korea’s doctrinal antagonism to these tendencies,
indeed, that the DPRK Constitution specifically enjoins the state to
combat “cultural infiltration” (Article 41). And since international
economic integration is a prime vector for just such “cultural
infiltration,” North Korean doctrine remains implacably hostile to
“globalization,” a tendency Pyongyang continues to describe as “a
nefarious crime against humanity.”30
At this writing, North Korean economic praxis has faithfully
followed published doctrine regarding “ideological and cultural
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infiltration.” The 1998 Mt. Kumgang tourism deal — the largest
commercial venture Pyongyang has ever undertaken with a foreign
partner — entails almost no exposure to the outside world since the
tourists in question are ferried to and cordoned within a remote
military area, and cash payments for the visits are wired directly
to North Korean bank accounts. More recently, North Korea’s
posture on “ideological and cultural infiltration” has been revealed
by its behavior on the light water nuclear reactor project underway
in the country under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral institution
created under the 1994 “Agreed Framework.” In 1997, that project
had hired 200 North Korean workers to assist in construction
activities, alongside 700 South Korean engineers. Even this tiny
amount of contact with outsiders proved to be unacceptable to the
regime: in 2000, under the pretext of a “labor dispute,” the DPRK
withdrew half of its local workers from the construction site, and in
2001 had KEDO replace them with Uzbek nationals.31 KEDO is now
poised to replace the North Korean workforce in its entirety.32
Evocative as Kim Jong Il’s tour of Shanghai has been to many
students of North Korean affairs, there are reasons to doubt that
the visit portends a North Korean effort to replicate a China-style
economic opening. First, the visit served clearly identifiable North
Korean interests entirely separate from any possible urge to emulate
China.
For one thing, as a longstanding recipient of Chinese foreign aid,
it would certainly be in Pyongyang’s interest to make a symbolic
gesture sure to please its sponsors. For another, Pyongyang is fervently
committed to defense modernization, and the tour of diverse hightech plants and facilities by Kim Jong Il’s predominantly military
delegation33 self-evidently served preexisting martial objectives.
Foreign visits by high-level North Korean delegations typically serve
military purposes. Recall that NDC Vice Chairman Cho Myong Rok
began his October 2000 visit to the United States with a visit to Lucent
Technologies34 and other “IT” concerns — information technologies
are the basis of today’s emerging “revolution in military affairs”
(RMA) — and that Kim Jong Il inspected a tank factory and a former
Soviet inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development facility
on his July/August 2001 visit to Russia. North Korea’s interest in
a country’s military or dual/use technology does not necessarily
imply a corresponding interest in its economic system.
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Second, Kim Jong Il’s reported Shanghai-tour comments
concerning China’s achievements were actually quite circumspect
and noncommittal.35 In the Chinese press, Kim was quoted as
“stress[ing] that the big changes that had taken place . . . since . . . China
began the reform and opening up drive, proved that the policies of
reform and opening up adopted by the [Chinese Communist Party]
are correct”36 — for China. North Korea’s policies, by contrast,
were held to be correct for the DPRK, and the North Korean press
pointedly emphasized that China’s leadership had congratulated
“the Korean people” for “remarkable progress and achievements
in various domains including socialist construction . . . successfully
surmounting manifold difficulties under the leadership of . . . Kim
Jong Il.”37
Third, the particulars of China’s post-1978 economic policy would
seem poorly suited for the contemporary DPRK. The mismatch
involves both initial conditions and policy priorities:38
• Post-Maoist China was a predominantly rural,
agricultural society, whereas North Korea is already
urbanized and (mis)industrialized;
• China’s economy in the late 1970s enjoyed a measure of
macroeconomic stability obviously absent from North
Korea’s today;
• Though the renminbi in the late 1970s was a nonconvertible
currency, its role as medium of economic exchange was
vastly greater than that permitted the DPRK won today;
• China’s reallocation of resources included massive (if
temporary) demobilizations of military manpower and
cutbacks in the defense industries, while North Korea
continues to enshrine “military-first politics”;
• Not least importantly, China relied heavily upon ethnic
Chinese from the diaspora for the capital, technology,
and entrepreneurship that stimulated Chinese linkages
with the world economy; any call today for a similar
reliance by the DPRK on outside Koreans would be
labeled counter-revolutionary in Pyongyang.
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Given these nontrivial discrepancies and contradistinctions, an
attempt to implement China-style economic policies could easily
have economic and political repercussions that North Korean
leadership would regard as highly adverse. Choson Sinbo, the paper
of the pro-DPRK Korean community in Japan (Chochongnyon or
Chosen Soren), was therefore most likely correct when it asserted,
in the aftermath of Kim’s Shanghai tour, that “[H]is inspection was
aimed at seeking ‘reference,’ not at following a Chinese-style reform
and opening.”39
If North Korea were to experiment deliberately with a new
economic direction, one might expect the chosen path to comport less
with the recent “China model” than with “military as modernizer”
template familiar from the political economies of prewar Japan
and Park Chung Hee’s South Korea.40 Both of those “models,” it
may be recalled, relied upon an “economic opening,” and indeed
depended upon growing integration with outside economics for
their success.41
If Pyongyang were to embark upon a genuine move toward an
economic opening, what initial signs would outsiders be able to
see? Some of these might include: 1) meaningful departure from
old “economic” themes, and new dialogue about economic issues, in
DPRK propaganda and guidance organs; 2) doctrinal reorientation
regarding the treatment of profit-generating transactions in
official DPRK pronouncements — and especially profits involving
transactions with foreign concerns; 3) an attempt on the part of
the DPRK to settle its longstanding international “debt default”
problems;42 4) a parallel effort to remonetize the domestic North
Korean economy; 5) a move toward greater economic transparency,
i.e. the publication of economic and social statistics describing
the North Korean domestic situation; and 6) serious attempts to
promulgate a legal framework for potential foreign investors that
might assist in attracting profit-seeking overseas entrepreneurs
to North Korean soil. As yet, for better or worse, none of those
“indicator lights” appear to be flashing.
WMD Development.
Hopes that the DPRK’s commitment to its decades-old drive for

118

WMD might be wavering — and that the Pyongyang leadership
might ultimately be convinced to forswear the project altogether
— are buoyed by the following facts:
•

On the nuclear front, the “Agreed Framework” has resulted
in a shutdown of North Korea’s only identified reactor/
reprocessing facility, and the United States has not confirmed
any suspicious nuclear activities in the DPRK since the
signing of the document in 1994. [This was written befor
the events of late 2002 indicated that North Korea has been
pursuing an enriched uranium weapons program. Ed.]

•

On the missile front, in September 1999 the DPRK acquiesced
in the previously mentioned rocket-launch moratorium in
talks with the United States; in July 2000 Kim Jong Il privately
advised visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin that North
Korea would scrap its missile program if other countries
would launch DPRK satellites into space;43 in October 2000,
Kim Jong Il personally assured visiting U.S. Secretary of
State Albright that there would be no more North Korean
“satellite” launches;44 in late 2000, Clinton administration
officials engaged in extensive missile talks with North Korean
counterparts, and the U.S. point person in the discussions
concluded “an agreement was within reach;”45 in May 2001,
Kim Jong Il told a visiting EU delegation headed by Swedish
Prime Minister Goran Persson that North Korea’s missilelaunch moratorium would be extended to the year 2003;46
and in August 2001, in a visit to Moscow, Kim Jong Il issued
a joint declaration with President Putin in which North
Korea reaffirmed its pledge to refrain from missile tests until
2003.47

Weighing against these promising signs, however, are a host of
indications that the DPRK continues to place an extraordinarily high
value on its present capabilities and future potential as a producer
of weapons of mass destruction. While it may not be possible for
outsiders to determine categorically whether North Korea’s posture
in its international diplomacy concerning DPRK WMD programs
reflects deep strategic design or instead mere tactical bargaining,
Pyongyang has been stubbornly unwilling to date to provide
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the international community with credible assurances that it has
abandoned the path toward proliferation.
On the nuclear issue, to begin, North Korea has, for nearly 7 years
and under a succession of objections and excuses, adamantly refused
to permit the unrestricted inspections of its Yongbyon facilities
by the IAEA specifically envisioned in the “Agreed Framework”48
document. (Those inspections are supposed to determine how much
bomb-quality plutonium North Korea generated before the “Agreed
Framework” — and by extension, whether the DPRK may already
possess nuclear weaponry.) Further, Pyongyang has, in the course
of its wide-ranging negotiations with the United States, repeatedly
threatened to restart its frozen Yongbyon nuclear program,49 the
most recent of these warnings having been issued in June 2001.50
[The North Korean leadership has made similar threats in late 2002
and 2003, after KEDO ended the supply of heavy fuel oil. Ed.]
Despite America’s certification that Washington has not detected
any illicit DPRK nuclear activities, North Korea has also deliberately
encouraged, and skillfully profited from, the international
perception that it could not be trusted to abide by its promised freeze
of its nuclear program: in March 1999, it extracted what it called a
“visit fee” of over 500,000 tons of cereals from the United States for
permission for a U.S. team to inspect an enormous underground
facility at Kumchang-ri whose construction suggested surreptitious
nuclear development efforts were underway, and whose purpose
Pyongyang would not forthrightly explain.51
Finally, there is the unanswered question of why the DPRK has
insisted, in the crafting of the “Agreed Framework” and ever since,
in the replacement of its plutonium-generating Yongbyon plant with
new, KEDO-supplied, plutonium-generating light-water nuclear
reactors. Pyongyang officially acknowledges that it is suffering
from pervasive electricity shortages,52 and the new reactors, which
will not be completed for at least 7 more years,53 will not be able
to provide power to the North Korean economy until the DPRK’s
electrical grid is renovated and upgraded.54 Why a project incapable
of meeting the country’s pressing and immediate economic needs,
but prospectively capable of eventually supplying fissile material to
the regime, should meet Pyongyang’s strategic objectives has yet to
be explained by North Korean leadership.
On the missile issue, North Korea’s pledge of a launch
moratorium until the year 2003 offers rather less than meets the eye.
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In the 5 years between May 1993 and August 1998, recall that the
DPRK launched no rockets — yet thanks to clandestine development
projects, Pyongyang successfully leapfrogged from its single stage,
liquid-fuel No Dong missile to the improved multi-stage, solid-fuel,
ballistic Taepo Dong model.55
Since September 1999 — in the period of the self-declared
DPRK moratorium on test-launches — Pyongyang has carefully
underscored that it is not bound to halt rocket and satellite research
and development (since these are “sovereign rights”56); and indeed,
in July 2001 American intelligence reportedly detected tests of new
North Korean rocket engines.57 North Korea has also consistently
reaffirmed as its sovereign prerogative the right to sell abroad any
missiles that it might be able to manufacture, and through 2001 was
reportedly exporting missile components and technology to Iran
and other interested buyers.58
As for the claims by outgoing Clinton administration officials
that “a deal was within reach” on North Korean missiles at the
end of their tenure, the incoming Bush administration (which is
now privy to the confidential details of those past PyongyangWashington deliberations) has publicly demurred: in the words of
one Bush administration National Security Council (NSC) official,
“We’ve looked at the [record] . . . There was nothing close to an
agreement. There was no verification element in anything the
previous administration had discussed.”59
Finally, there is the curious detail of North Korea’s relentless
denunciation of America’s proposed national missile defense (NMD)
plan.60 It is true that Washington’s prospective program for NMD
has been sharply criticized by both Moscow and Beijing — but both
Russia and China are countries with acknowledged nuclear and
ballistic inventories, whose credibility would be directly affected by
the success of the envisioned American program. Wherefore then
Pyongyang’s bitter opposition to American missile defense?
To this date, there is little evidence that North Korea has, at
any point in its more than 5 decades of existence, ever voluntarily
abjured any new instrument of military force that might possibly lie
within its grasp. (Today, indeed, such a renunciation would seem
fundamentally inconsistent with the state’s established policies of
Kangsong Taeguk and “military-first politics.”) Moreover, North
Korea’s commitment to developing WMD was implicitly reaffirmed
in June 2001 in a full front-page Nodong Sinmun editorial, which
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exhorted that “We should hold fast to the military-first politics
and build up our military strength in every possible way.”61 [emphasis
added.]
If North Korea were to head on a different road regarding
proliferation, the first clear sign of a change in attitude would be
a new stance toward outside verification of North Korean WMD
activities. For the time being, however, Pyongyang maintains
that U.S. calls for verification conceal “a dark ulterior motive to
thoroughly investigate our national defense and military bases . . .
[a plot to] completely dig out our interior organs [sic] . . .”62 and that
“the issue [of verification] can never be on the agenda for DPRK-U.S.
talks”63.
North-South Relations.
The DPRK’s diplomatic behavior toward Seoul since early
2000 — the Pyongyang Summit and North-South Declaration; the
subsequent high-level deliberations between the two sides; Kim
Jong Il’s promise to visit the South “at the appropriate time”; the
North’s willingness to accept food aid and economic subsidies
from the South Korean government — all may seem to suggest that
Pyongyang implicitly has come to recognize the ROK’s right to exist
as a state. Unfortunately, other evidence suggests the matter is not
so straightforward.
Although the North Korean government unarguably toned down
its anti-Seoul invective in the wake of the Pyongyang summit, the
DPRK’s longstanding official estimate of the legitimacy of the South
Korean state remained unaltered. This fact was underscored by the
pronouncements of the “National Democratic Front of South Korea”
(NDFSK) — the only entity representing the South to be accorded
a mission in Pyongyang at this time. (The NDFSK is purportedly
a South Korea-based organization, but is actually a creation of the
DPRK, operating in and broadcasting for North Korea.)
Two months after the Pyongyang summit, a statement by the
NDFSK explained the group’s purpose: “to put an end to the U.S.
colonial rule over South Korea and establish a regime based on
national independence and . . . democracy . . .”64 That formulation
unmistakably characterized the ROK as an American colony,
possessed of neither national independence nor a democratic
system. The assessment has since been reinforced and clarified by
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NDFSK calls for South Korea’s “emancipation” from “the 50-oddyear U.S. colonial rule”65 and admonitions that South Koreans “will
forever undergo disgrace as colonial slaves of foreign forces” if they
do not “rise in anti-U.S. resistance” and “abolish pro-U.S. submissive
diplomacy.” 66
The NDFSK is ostensibly unconnected to the North Korean
government. But official statements by the DPRK media convey
the very same message. A February 2001 statement, for example,
referred to South Korea’s legislature as the “national assembly” —
sneer quotes and lower case letters in the original.67 And in August
2001, Minju Choson, the DPRK’s party journal, made Pyongyang’s
view of the ROK crystal clear. The essay decried the present ROK
government as the descendant of “the Korean government-general
of the Japanese imperialists,” which “the U.S. imperialist . . . renamed
the ‘U.S. military government’”; it further intoned that the United
States “enforced a ‘military rule’ in South Korea” and “illegally . . .
set up a pro-American ‘separate government’ there”:68 that is to say,
the state currently governed by the Kim Dae Jung administration.69
Is it possible that these recent media pronouncements misstate
official DPRK policy? While this contingency cannot be dismissed,
the chances of such a media error are exceedingly unlikely. More
than possibly any other Communist state, the DPRK has made a fetish
of subjecting its media outlets to party discipline; Kim Jong Il’s own
extensive background in propaganda and “guidance” underscores
the attention that is devoted by Pyongyang to every word it prints
or broadcasts. That recent reading of the South Korean system,
furthermore, is consistent with both North Korea’s basic ideological
documents and the present declarations of the DPRK’s top officials.
The current preamble of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) charter,
for example, states that “The present task of the WPK is to ensure . . .
the accomplishment of the revolutionary goals of national liberation
and the people’s democracy in the entire area of the country”:70 that
is to say, in South Korea.71
North Korean “Reform” and the U.S.-ROK Military Alliance.
The corollary of the DPRK’s estimate of the legitimacy of the
South Korean state is Pyongyang’s posture toward the ROK’s
military alliance with the United States. According to President Kim
Dae Jung, at the Pyongyang summit “North Korea has consented
123

to the South’s view that U.S. troops should continue to stay on the
Korean peninsula.”72 President Kim has recounted his June 2000
conversation with Kim Jong Il over the future of American forces
in the peninsula on a number of occasions; his account seems to
be corroborated by China’s Beijing Review, which has intimated
that North Korean officials told Chinese sources that Pyongyang
might reconcile itself to a long-term U.S. troop presence under
certain specific conditions.73 Yet these fascinating emanations are
to date wholly at odds with the stated position of the North Korean
government, and indeed with Kim Jong Il’s own published postPyongyang summit comments, all of which maintain that the United
States is responsible for the division of Korea, that the U.S. alliance
with South Korea is totally unacceptable, and that U.S. troops should
withdraw from the ROK and the Korean peninsula.
In the months since the Pyongyang summit, Kim Jong Il has
given two interviews in which he discussed American forces on the
Korean peninsula: one to a Korean-American reporter (June 2000),
the other to Moscow’s Itar-Tass news agency (July 2001). In the
former, he is quoted as saying:
President Kim Dae Jung’s image had not been so good among our
people. For instance, he has advocated continued U.S. military
presence in our country even after the unification has been
realized . . . We have urged U.S. forces to leave Korea. However,
I don’t expect them to leave soon. The Americans, more than
anybody else . . . are responsible for the partitioning of Korea
into two halves. They are accordingly obligated to facilitate its
reunification.74

In the Itar-Tass interview, Kim’s view is more succinct: “The
whole world knows that the United States has forcibly occupied half
of our country’s land and is constantly threatening us.”75 Neither of
these pronouncements sounds like an invitation to American forces
for an indefinite stay on the Korean peninsula.
The DPRK’s post-Pyongyang summit declamations about U.S.
forces in Korea are entirely consonant with Kim’s words, and
elaborate upon his expressed viewpoint. Especially interesting is
the sounding of Nodong Sinmun on June 16, 2000 — the day after the
Pyongyang summit concluded. In that presentation, it is emphasized
that,
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Korea’s division is what outside forces imposed upon the country.
If they had not occupied Korea, there would have been no division
of the county. . . . The major outside power responsible for the
division of the country is the United States. . . . U.S. imperialists
[are] the mastermind of national division and the key obstructer
of national unification. . . . Withdrawal of U.S. troops — that
should be the first step for the United States to take to help Korea’s
reunification . . . 76

In the following months, the drumbeat of criticism against the U.S.
military alliance with South Korea continued to reverberate. By one
count, between the June 15, 2000, Pyongyang summit and August 1,
2001, North Korea’s state news agency, KCNA, vented 61 criticisms
of the American troop presence in the South.77 Though many of these
forays did not specifically call for a U.S. pullout, a large number of
KCNA items — and many more from other North Korean outlets
— explicitly did. Thus, in various pronouncements, U.S. troop
pullout was held to be a “stumbling block to reunification” (Radio
Pyongyang, March 200178); a “prerequisite for disarmament” (Nodong
Sinmun, April 200179); “a precondition for arms reduction” (Nodong
Sinmun, May 200180); and even “the master key to reconciliation,
cooperation, and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula” (KCNA,
April 200181). In March 2001, Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Station
insisted “the United States . . . give up its domination and invasive
policy over the South”;82 in July 2001, Nodong Sinmun demanded
“the unconditional withdrawal of the U.S. imperialist aggression
troops from South Korea.”83
Any lingering doubts about the DPRK’s official position on
U.S. troops in South Korea should have been satisfied by the joint
declaration with the Russian government on the occasion of Kim
Jong Il’s Moscow August 2001 meeting with Vladimir Putin. In that
document, the DPRK avowed “The pullout of the U.S. forces from
South Korea is a pressing issue which brooks no delay.”84
Pyongyang has indicated, incidentally, that it would not be
satisfied simply with a U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea:
since it holds that “the U.S. insistence on its military presence in
the region is designed to establish military domination over the
Asia-Pacific” and “is aimed to use Japan as a shock brigade in
Asian aggression” (Minju Choson, February 200185), a U.S. military
pullout from Japan is also a requirement for peace and stability in
the region.
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In the North Korean lexicon, an “independent” South Korea is
defined as a South Korea no longer stationing American forces, or
bound to the United States by a military alliance. It is therefore highly
significant that the first point in the June 15, 2000, “North-South
Declaration” signed by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang
should read “The North and the South agreed to solve the question of
the country’s reunification independently by the concerted efforts of
the Korean nation responsible for it.”86 After the Pyongyang summit,
it became known that President Kim had not consulted the United
States about this particular linguistic innovation in his “Sunshine
Policy.”87 President Kim Dae Jung further revealed that he “had
agreed to include the North Korean phrase [in the declaration] in
return for Kim Jong Il’s agreement to a new government framework
[for eventual reunification’],”88 and gamely explained that his own
interpretation of the phrase “independent” was that “the two Koreas
will work together maintaining friendly relations with surrounding
nations.”89
In context of the joint declaration, however, what mattered was
not President Kim’s personal definition of the word “independent.”
Following the summit, North Korea repeatedly insisted that the
spirit of the joint declaration be “recognized” and the objectives
“implemented.” The meaning of the joint summit declaration,
Pyongyang stressed, was that “reunification will be realized only
when the two Koreas gather together to resolve matters without any
other foreign powers involved in the process.”90 Pyongyang further
averred that “our paramount, longstanding desire is to reunify the
country at an early date,” but “as long as U.S. interference continues,
we cannot resolve the issue of reunification on our own.”91
North Korean officials have further explained that the key
obstacle to the progress of the North-South declaration is the United
States, which is “refusing the North-South Joint Declaration and
hindering its implementation.”92 For although (as North Korean
media phrases it) the “North-South relationship . . . has entered the
track of harmony . . . with the historic . . . announcement of June 15
North-South Joint Declaration . . . [the United States] block[s] our
nation’s independent reunification.”93 By Pyongyang’s particular
construction, of course, any American effort to preserve or uphold
the U.S.-ROK military alliance would amount to hindering the
implementation of the joint declaration.
If North Korea were to evidence a new attitude toward the
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legitimacy of the ROK, the indications of this change would be direct
and unmistakable: its highest figures and its official media would
simply disclose that they were prepared to accept the existence of the
South Korean state, that they recognized the ROK’s right to conduct
its own foreign policy, and they respected (while respectfully
disagreeing with) Seoul’s decision to maintain a military alliance
with the United States. No such disclosures, of course, have been
offered to date. To the contrary: as the evidence adduced already
should underline, Pyongyang has steadily attempted to use the
South’s “Sunshine Policy” to drive a wedge between the United
States and the ROK.
By Pyongyang’s reckoning, its policies since the June 2000 summit
have been successful indeed: as one North Korean broadcast in July
2001 enthused, “Today is a rare day when everything is proceeding
in accordance with our wishes . . .”94
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CHAPTER 8
PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH KOREA
AND POLARIZATION OF ROK SOCIETY

Taewoo Kim
The Sunshine Policy has made many changes in both Koreas.
Republic of Korea (ROK) President Dae-jung Kim and North Korean
leader Jong-il Kim (Kim Jong-Il), Chairman of the omnipotent
National Defense Commission (NDC), stepped into the international
spotlight when they met in Pyongyang for a summit in June 2000.
Since the summit, Seoul has tried hard to keep the momentum going
and seemed successful with a variety of follow-up events, such as
ministerial meetings, reunions of separated families, and groundbreaking for reconstruction of the inter-Korean railway. The summit
and a Jong-il Kim diplomatic blitz, including the meeting with U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and resumption of diplomatic
ties with European countries, transformed his image from morally
bankrupt and mentally unstable to pragmatic, a man with whom
Korean peace and stability could be discussed. The excitement
reached a peak when the Norwegian Nobel Committee made
ROK President Kim the millennium's first Peace Prize laureate for
his peace initiative. South Koreans, overwhelmed by the euphoria
surrounding the summit meeting and rosy articles in the newspapers,
developed high expectations of North Korean changes.
The Sunshine Policy started with two assumptions: the two
Koreas should not continue their Cold War confrontation infinitely,
and the North Korean regime is reasonable enough to accept
changes in the quality of life for its people and appreciate the
North’s common ethnicity with the South. Most South Koreans
agree on the first assumption. In this sense, a historically significant
initiative was provided by President Kim. The second assumption
was controversial for some South Koreans, but they kept silent in
hopes they were wrong. If North Korea had accepted indisputably
real changes and stumbling blocks had not emerged, the momentum
might have continued. Fortunately or unfortunately, Pyongyang's
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response to Seoul's lavish assistance stopped short of the expectations
of ordinary South Koreans, prompting debates over whether the
North was really changing. To make things worse, an economic
downturn cast clouds over the future of the Sunshine Policy, since
the inter-Korean detente was being propelled largely by a flow of
money to the North. For the architects of the Sunshine Policy, the
inauguration of President George W. Bush may have been another
turnaround. The accidental U.S.-DPRK rapprochement at the last
moment of Clinton’s term, symbolized by the October 9-12 visit
to Washington of Vice Marshal Myong-rok Cho, Vice Chairman of
the NDC, on October 9-12 dissipated quickly as Bush rejected any
illusion-chasing and demanded verified changes by the North.
The 3 years of the Sunshine Policy has left much confusion in
South Korea on how to perceive North Korea and what to expect from
it. It has brought about acute ideological confrontation among South
Koreans and polarized the society into conservatives and liberals.
This division was further sharpened by the sudden emergence of
government-subsidized nongovernment organizations (NGOs), socalled civic organizations, that ruthlessly promote liberal arguments.
The civic organizations became invincible and overwhelming so
quickly that they intervened with impunity in almost all important
national policies. Conservative policies, officials, politicians,
scholars, newspapers, etc., were under fire, and those who opposed
the Sunshine Policy were vilified as anti-unification or anti-reform
forces. Conservatives began to fight back with conservative activist
organizations, which are rather unfamiliar to South Koreans. An
example is the Free Citizens' Alliance of Korea (Jayoosiminyondae)
established by conservative intellectuals in 2001. Now the two
camps contend on almost all North Korea-related issues.
Today some South Koreans say that what we see now is a serious
polarization of society which we witnessed in the past only after the
national liberation in 1945. It is not North Korea, but South Korea
that is undergoing drastic changes. It is ironic that Seoul endeavored
for years to change North Korea but has precipitated confusion
within itself and brought its own society to a crossroad of change.
It is premature to say whether South-South ideological conflict is
an overdue pain on the way to a true pluralist democracy or the
nation is simply mired in nonproductive bickering. Nevertheless,
there are reasons to fear a lousy war of attrition marring the nation’s
policy making and undermining national strength. The purpose of
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this chapter is to help American colleagues better understand the
contentions and controversies prompted by different perceptions
of North Korea within South Korea. To this end, this chapter
concentrates on policy issues that drive the heated debates in hopes
that Americans can judge how good or bad the polarization is and
what impact it could have on ROK-U.S. relations and their North
Korea policies.
Sunshine Policy.
Before delving into major policy issues, we examine two schools
of thought in South Korea that differ on North Korean matters.
“Liberals” are generally those who look to one face of North
Korea, ethnic homogeneity. They are usually supporters of carrots,
engagement, a soft landing, etc. They play down the North Korean
military threat and believe that a humanitarian response to North
Korea will lead to inter-Korean reconciliation and eventual peaceful
unification. In contrast, “conservatives” perceive North Korea as
both a counterpart for coexistence and unification and the main
enemy that still poses a threat. While not opposing North-bound
economic cooperation per se, they tend to want reciprocity in return
in the form of North Korean reforms and changes. They want to
continue an unswerving defense posture while the Sunshine Policy
is implemented, as they are not convinced that the North will opt for
real reconciliation and coexistence.
Nothing draws a clearer line between conservatives and liberals
than their reactions to aid to North Korea. Liberals support the
Sunshine Policy with perceptions that North Korea has changed
and will change. On conservative criticism that the fundamentals of
the North Korean system remain unchanged, liberals recommend
more patience and a proactive attitude. They point to the disparity
in personal income between the two Koreas and maintain that ROK
assistance and technological guidance will reduce unification costs
in the future.1
Conservatives perceive North Korea as unchangeable. They
think the Sunshine Policy was successful only in coaxing the North
to the table, no more than that. It has resulted in the sagging of
South Korean national wealth while making the North militarily
more robust, as Pyongyang refuses to discuss even the most modest
military tension reduction or confidence-building measures. The
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National Assembly passage on September 4 of a no-confidence
bill against Unification Minister Dong-won Lim, architect as well
as preacher of the Sunshine Policy, demonstrates the increasing
vehemence of conservative counterattacks. Conservatives demand
that the government retard North-bound assistance and rethink the
Sunshine Policy.
Uncertainty about the South Korean economy is what
conservatives refer to most. By the end of 2000, South Korea had
clearly made a remarkable comeback from the financial disaster
of the late 1990s. However, by 2001, the grim side was becoming
increasingly impressive. Hit by rare synchronous slumps of the
U.S., European, and Japanese economies, both exports and domestic
consumption plunged, slowing economic growth to a worrisome
level. Businesses cut back capital spending, eroding the nation’s
growth potential. On top of these difficulties was the insolvency crisis
of the Hyundai Group, the nation’s second largest conglomerate that
spearheaded inter-Korean economic cooperation. The financially
troubled Hyundai Asan, the group’s North Korea business arm, has
spent over $600 million for the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and
has so far incurred some $327 million in losses. The rescue measure
that added the Korea National Tourist Corporation, a governmentowned corporation, as another investor is controversial since it
means pouring taxpayers’ money into the unprofitable project
more directly. Conservatives ask whether this is the proper time to
continue one-way inter-Korean economic cooperation.
The frustrations of the companies that invested in North Korea
and came back bare-handed adds to the disenchantment with North
Korea. The companies, beguiled by the North’s potential as a base
for export manufacturing, low wages, and geographical proximity,
experienced dismay at the North’s bizarre business attitude. They
were embarrassed by the unofficial costs that surpassed common
sense and by fear that the South’s investments could be confiscated
or nationalized at any time. Failure of the northern venture surely
contributed to the collapse of Daewoo and the breakup of Hyundai.
The popularity of Mt. Kumgang tourism declined quickly due to
high fees and tight surveillance imposed by the North. In 2001, South
Korean tourists visiting the mountain declined 33 percent from the
previous year. Ordinary South Koreans are increasingly enraged by
the North’s ingratitude and arrogance.
Conservatives, disillusioned after watching the Sunshine Policy
140

for years, have other reasons to doubt that major North Korean
changes are possible. A major structural barrier to reform is political,
since no one can disavow what the real father Il-sung Kim (Kim Il
Sung) did. The industrial structure is not conducive to reforms,
either.2
So far there have been two kinds of approaches to reform within
the old socialist block: the unsuccessful big bang in Eastern Europe
and the successful gradual approach in China and Vietnam, where
more than 70 percent of their labor forces were in agriculture and
where many of these people were later transferred into the nascent
non-state-owned light manufacturing sector. North Korea resembles
the East European countries, with a much smaller agricultural sector
and almost no privately-owned industries. It would be a vexing
enterprise to follow in China’s footsteps or to imitate the East
European model.
A more structural barrier comes from the nature of the North
Korean society, which can be best described by the three Cs: class,
control, and cult.3 For conservatives the question is: will Jong-il Kim
give up the cult of himself, and will the privileged elite surrender
its lifetime prerogatives? Hwang Jang-yop, former international
secretary of the Korean Labour Party, predicts firmly that Jong-il
Kim will never change his policy.4
The reunion of separated families, which liberals claim as an
outstanding success story, is not without demur. While South
Korea approaches this as a humanitarian issue, it has always been a
political business for the North. Conservatives maintain that several
reunions of only 100 families when over one million first-generation
separated families are alive will simply add to their agonies.5 North
Korea continues to reject the South’s proposal for free exchange of
visits and mail and confirmation of the whereabouts of separated
kin.
Really, success of the Sunshine Policy is a function of whether
Jong-il Kim will truly open up his country and pursue reforms. The
outcome cannot be ascertained yet. What is painfully true is that the
verbal fighting between proponents and opponents of the policy
in the South is increasing. Those who are pessimistic about the
possibility of North Korean reforms ask if North Korea really wants
to reform, while the optimists continue to ask: how can we expect
them to change without believing in them? A conservative scholar
deplores this, arguing that if the government sticks to the Sunshine
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Policy under the name of policy consistency, our overall North
Korea policy will be caught in a labyrinth, since our live-first-andreceive-later policy has only strengthened the totalitarian regime in
Pyongyang.6
The North Korean Threat and the USFK.
A few years ago, South Koreans hailed rather vaguely the sudden
blossoming of inter-Korean detente but soon began to agonize over
its conflicts with the ROK-U.S. alliance and question the presence of
U.S. troops. This provided liberal activists with momentum to call
for withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). A newly emerging
question regarding ROK-U.S. relations is: is it possible for South
Korea to become a real friend with North Korea and still keep a
robust ROK-U.S. alliance? This is why some analysts predicted
early in the Sunshine Policy that it could cause friction. 7 The liberalconservative polarization is very real in this area and the disputes
revolve around two major issues: perception of the North Korean
threat and the role of USFK.
Liberal activists, led by civic organizations, maintain, particularly
after the June summit, that North Korea has neither the capability
nor intention of engaging in military provocation and that USFK is
not necessary.8 The numerical superiority of the North Korean forces
is pointless, as it is more than offset by the qualitative edge of South
Korean forces. They cite the defense budgets, $3 billion vs. $15 billion
in favor of the South. Some scholars with a liberal view point out
that South Korean military forces have already achieved reasonable
sufficiency in deterrence and defense against the North, since
North Korean combat power is less than 40 percent of the South’s
in comparing defense expenditure and investment. 9 On the role of
USFK, liberal activists argue that U.S. forces were responsible for
the division of the peninsula and continue to adversely affect interKorean reconciliation. They sometimes cite the unfair privileges of
USFK and the inequality of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
as reasons for calling for a withdrawal.10
They demand heavy punishment of U.S. officers who released
toxic substances into the Han River or demonstrate to stop shooting
by U.S. air forces at the Maehyang-ri firing range. The SOFA is
sometimes called a document demonstrating the arrogance of
a superpower in its inequality, prejudice and discrimination.
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Liberals find Washington’s get-tough North Korea policy now
a stumbling block to inter-Korean reconciliation. In this context,
liberal commentators argue that Seoul should secure the return visit
of Jong-Il Kim and an inter-Korean Peace Declaration as quickly as
possible before the United States acquires reasons to block it.11
The fact that North Korea has slowed the initial burst of postsummit inter-Korean dialogue is what liberals now often refer to.
For example, on March 13, 2001, just few hours before its scheduled
opening, North Korea called off the fifth inter-Korean cabinetlevel meeting. Soon after, North Korea did the same for the Red
Cross talks. Some analysts believe that these decisions reflected
North Korean displeasure with the tough U.S. stance against the
Communist nation revealed in the ROK-U.S. summit. The fifth
meeting finally was held on September 16, 2001, 9 months after the
fourth meeting.
To conservatives, the North Korean military threat has never
ended, based on the North’s capabilities and intentions. The former
is obvious despite contrary arguments. In addition to its numerical
superiority, its forces, 70 percent of which are forward-deployed
within 100 km of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), are in good shape
for attacks: with 2,000 self-propelled and towed artillery units that
could maintain a barrage of 500,000 rounds an hour, 100,000 men in
Special Operation Forces, etc. Threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) cannot be calculated in figures. North Korea’s nuclear
bomb-in-the-basement, i.e., parts of bombs ready to be assembled or
sensitive material immediately useable for bomb production which
Pyongyang may have produced before 1992, still remains shrouded
in secrecy as the Agreed Framework stopped short of illuminating
the North’s past nuclear activities.
The North’s formidable missile forces include Frog, Scud,
Rodong, and Daepodong missiles, while South Korea had long been
prohibited by the ROK-U.S. Missile Note prohibiting South Korean
missiles of 180 km or longer ranges.12 Though on January 17, 2001,
the government disclosed new missile guidelines after 5-year-long
negotiations, those guidelines still limit the maximum range of South
Korean missiles to 300 km or the missile technology control regime
(MTCR) ceiling. South Korea has no meaningful attack missiles
— most are surface-to-air, not capable of defending against North
Korea attack missiles. The biochemical threat is even more dreadful.
North Korea is believed to possess 2,500 tons of chemical weapons
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while vigorously developing biological weapons. It ironically true
that a poverty-stricken North Korea, with its WMD and peculiar
force structure, is capable of inflicting more damage to ROK-U.S.
combined forces than before.13
Conservatives ask questions regarding the North’s intentions.
How should South Korea interpret military exercises in the summer
of 2000, right after the Pyongyang summit? What about the recent
deployment of long-range 240 mm multiple rocket launcher systems,
emplacement of anti-tank barriers, beefing-up of coastal defenses,
procurement of fighter aircraft, improvement of camouflage and
concealment, etc.?14 On the North Korean WMD, despite liberal
arguments that they are purely defensive and should not be a
stumbling block to the Sunshine Policy, conservatives ask: who
can guarantee non-use? What if the North uses them for blackmail
diplomacy or low-intensity provocations?
Conservatives believe that South Korea needs USFK and a strong
alliance, not only because of the threat from the North but also
because of their positive roles: U.S. participation in the 1950 Korean
War saved the nation from communism and USFK contributed
stability to South Korean society during the 1960s and 1970s, when
North Korea sent guerrilla forces. On top of this, the future role of
USFK will be determined by all-important international variables,
including the strategic stances of major countries. If Russia beefs up
its nuclear weapons deployment and refurbishes its Pacific Fleet to
regain its voice as a military superpower, if China continues military
modernization and pursues regional hegemony, and if Japan
enlarges its military might and roles with ambition to be a politicalmilitary superpower, the U.S. military presence in Asia will become
all the more necessary as a peace enforcer. There are other scenarios,
too. A significant reduction in the U.S. military presence, including
removal of the nuclear umbrella, can create a security vacuum
which prompts competition to fill it. This would call on Russia
and China to play more roles, cornering South Korea and Japan
in a difficult position. Anyway, it is illogical to assert that USFK is
an anti-unification element when the future role of U.S. forces is to
be adjusted according to the international order emerging in this
region. To conservatives, anti-USFK arguments citing the SOFA
are illogical because issues like the SOFA, the Nokeun-ri (Nogunri)
incident, the dumping of toxic substances in the Han River, etc., are
not fundamental questions but side issues subject to improvement
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through mutual consultation. Regarding the Bush administration’s
skepticism about the North, conservatives accept it as opportune
whistle-blowing.
To conservatives, gradual collapse of the South’s security system
would be the most worrisome outcome of a unilateral appeasement
policy. Seoul’s lukewarm response to the North’s submarine
infiltration in June 1998, its launch of a Daepodong missile in August
1998, and many other small-scale provocations have resulted in
confusion among ROK soldiers on the concept of the main enemy,
and may result eventually in total disarray of our defense posture.
There are many more incidents that enrage conservatives. On
September 19, 2001, some 20 North Korean soldiers crossed the
DMZ about 40 meters inside the southern part. On the next day 12
soldiers advanced 30 meters into the southern part. They retreated
after South Korean guards fired warning shots. Military authorities
delayed announcement of the incursions for 1 week. Earlier, in June,
2001, four North Korean cargo ships violated the South’s Northern
Limit Line (NLL) and the South’s territorial waters through the
Cheju Strait. This time, too, the government response was generous.
The South Korean Navy tried to persuade, not order, them to move
back. The great general Jong-il Kim developed this sea route.Later,
the government expressed its intent to permit passage of North
Korean vessels through the strait if the North asked in advance
while the Defense Ministry, citing Navy difficulties in covering
all the 218-mile-long NLL in the East Sea, announced that it was
considering reducing the length of the East Sea NLL to allow for
more effective surveillance of the security-sensitive area.15 Liberal
scholars insist that the incident was a simple passage, not a violation,
since North Korea has never accepted the legality of the NLL.16 Of
course, conservatives interpret the incident as a preplanned North
Korean attempt to establish a new status quo by disregarding lines
they respected for 50 years. Such alarmist perspectives are refuted by
liberal scholars: they claim that anti-unification political forces and
media are demanding hard-line policies that can pour cold water on
the Korean peace process.
Unification Constitution.
The June 152000, joint statement signed by leaders of the two
Koreas gave new impetus to debate on a unification constitution.
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In Clause 1, the leaders agreed to pursue independently peaceful
unification‚ and in Clause 2, they agreed on the similarity between
the North’s low stage federation plan and the South’s confederation
plan. The document provided liberal scholars and NGOs seeking a
unification constitution with momentum. To them, the document
is tantamount to a binding agreement, since the two leaders
representing each nation signed it, and it should be followed by
an effort to institutionalize what was agreed on. This kind of logic
inevitably leads to debate on a possible unification constitution.17
How nice it would be if the merits of both constitutions are
combined and people of both sides can benefit. Liberals always
point to joint management of the cultural sites spread all over the
peninsula as an area where the two Koreas can work on a single
legal system.18 Nevertheless, the constitution should eventually
deal with political systems and a zero-sum confrontation on this is
unavoidable. A third type of political system, if any, will not only
intermingle the two systems, which the two Koreas cannot tolerate,
but would be dangerous if it means a collapse of the security
system before the trustworthiness of North Korea is ensured. This
is why conservatives consider it a bad idea to think about political
integration without a peace settlement.19
Other conservatives maintain that peace must precede
unification, since the joint statement reflects two different dreams,
as each Korea wants to integrate the other into its own political
system.20 Others point to dangers inherent in Clause 2, since it can
provide justification for the North to insist on withdrawal of USFK
and abolition of the National Security Law.21
Missile Defense.
Now the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program is quickly
becoming a hot issue as the government stance is being attacked
on two fronts. So far the government has maintained a “strategic
ambiguity” on the issue. This is understandable, given the narrow
leeway South Korea has. Ovious support of it may embarrass China
and Russia, which Seoul expects to help open the North while clear
opposition would upset an ally on which the nation depends heavily.
But such ambiguity is problematic to both sides.
To the civic activists, BMD is the result of a conspiracy between
conservative hard-line politicians in Washington and the huge
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U.S. military-industrial complex. The North Korean threat is just
invented, they claim. The program is not only dangerous, as it
prompts a nuclear arms race in a new technological area, but also
immoral, as the United States is pursuing a hegemonic nuclear order
to which China and Russia are already hypersensitive. The program
will endanger the Sunshine Policy, since it will enrage China and
Russia as well as North Korea, so South Korea should oppose it in an
unambiguous manner.22
The ambiguity is problematic to conservatives, too. Though they
accept the hegemonic elements inherent in the BMD program, they
also see the positive side. The BMD program is a complement to South
Korean security, which the nation needs in the process of unification.
They ask two questions. Does South Korean opposition to the BMD
program guarantee North Korean changes? What can South Korea
gain by opposing a top priority objective of its superpower ally?
Problems of Polarization.
Verbal battles over differences in perception of North Korea
are proliferating too widely into almost all major policy issues.
On education, the government wants to teach students that they
have to embrace North Korea before thinking of it as an enemy.23
This is strongly supported by liberal NGOs. The Korean Teachers
Union (Jeongyojo) pursues enlargement of teachers' “right in
school management,” while liberal activists seek new laws for
“democratization of universities” which, if enacted, will sharply
reduce the rights of boards of directors. To some conservatives,
school principals and university presidents being neutralized is
an anarchic attempt to disregard the existing order and control
educational institutions in a people’s court manner.
In the legal world, the Constitution Law Advocates (Hunbyon),
a society of conservative lawyers, and the Lawyers for Democratic
Society (Minbyon), a group of liberal lawyers, vie over almost all
critical legal issues related to North Korea policy, including the
National Security Law. Liberals argue that the law should be
abolished, since it has been heavily abused in the past by dictatorial
governments in supppressing political opponents. A liberal
columnist defines the law as “evidence of madness that negates the
dignity of human beings and freedom of thought and conscience.”24
But most conservatives believe it is one thing to do something to
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prevent abuse or misuse of the law but quite another to give up
the legal apparatus that has protected the nation from communist
espionage.25
Press reform is the hottest topic in the liberal-conservative
debate, particularly after the owners of the three conservative
newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, ChoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-a Ilbo, were
arrested on August 16, 2001, on charges of tax evasion and
embezzlement after a large scale investigation. To liberal NGOs like
the People's Coalition for Media Reform (Unronkaehyukyondae) and
reformist scholars like professor Dong-Chun Kim of Sungkonghoe
University, the conservative newspapers deserve to be targets of
reforms since they are ideologically prejudiced against liberal policy
toward North Korea, and the corrupt owners cannot be an exception
in punishing tax evasion or other wrongdoing. In a Korea Press
Foundation seminar on June 22-24, 2001, liberal organizations and
participants like the People's Coalition for Media Reform, National
Union of Media Workers, Professor Dong-Chun Kim, Un-Hyung
Chung from Korea Daily, etc. unanimously supported governmentinitiated reforms for the conservative newspapers. But conservative
organizations like Free Citizens Alliance of Korea, and conservative
politicians argue that the government is muzzling newspapers
critical of its North Korea policy through an unprecedented tax
probe, and that other liberal newspapers and television broadcasting
companies are joining in the pressure on freedom of the press. This
media infighting is a very unfamiliar phenomenon to South Koreans.
(Hankyoreh and government-owned Korea Daily are representative
newspapers feuding with conservative newspapers.)
The liberal-conservative dichotomy is vivid even on what lesson
South Korea should take from the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attack in New York. Liberals tend to bury North Korean terrorist acts
like the bombing against the South Korean presidential entourage
visiting in Rangoon and the bombing of Korean Airlines 858 during
the 1980s, and want the United States to exclude North Korea from
its list of rogue states. For them, the September 11 terrorist attack
has nothing to do with the inter-Korean dialogue. Conservative
commentators point out that North Korea remains on the list of
terrorism-supporting countries, and that South Korea should seek a
North Korean apology for what it did in the past, and its promise not
to repeat this, before going further in inter-Korean dialogue.26 The
two sides differ greatly over the war on terror. A liberal politician
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argues, for example, that the American war may be driven by hardline politicians in Washington colluding with the military-industrial
complex.27
Ceremonial events in Pyongyang on the anniversary of Korean
liberation from Japanese rule revealed striking evidence of differences
in perception of North Korea and the side effects they can precipitate.
On August 21, 2001, at Gimpo Airport, liberal students shouting
anti-American slogans cheered the 337-strong Southern delegation
of civic leaders and religious and labor activists coming back from
Pyongyang after attending week-long inter-Korean Liberation Day
events. Professor Jeong-gu Kang, a sociology professor at Dongkuk
University and other senior members of the Unification Alliance
were “heros.”28 Professor Kang signed a guest book when he visited
the birthplace of Il-sung Kim and wrote a memo on achieving
unification by inheriting the Mangyungdae spirit.29
Some of the delegation participated in the opening and closing
ceremonies in front of the Monument of the Three Unification
Charters, a symbol of the North Korean unification proposal,
despite having submitted written promises not to attend ceremonies
in front of it before they left for Pyongyang. With the liberal students
were war veterans and conservative activists denouncing Professor
Kang’s acts. Some skirmishes and a violent confrontation followed
between the two groups.
Conservatives’ questions concerned how and why the Unification
Ministry permitted the delegation to go when North Korea was
highly likely to politically exploit it. In the past, North Korea has
repeatedly requested a political meeting of various social and political
forces, but Seoul rejected these meetings because there was only one
political force and one voice in North Korea, and therefore such a
meeting was likely to be used to deepen chasms in South Korean
society. But the Sunshine Policy brought about drastic changes.
On the anniversary of the foundation of the Korean Labor Party in
October 2000, South Korea dispatched observers. In May 2001, South
Korean labor representatives participated in an inter-Korean event
held in Pyongyang. In June and July 2001, a unification seminar and
farmers’ event were held in Mt. Kumgang. Conservatives fear that
the South may be walking into a trap. A conservative commentator
claims that the Seoul government should be held responsible for
letting the Pyongyang event be exploited by the North.30
Right after this, the Grand National Party demanded the
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resignation of Unification Minister Dong-won Lim, as did the United
Liberal Democrats (ULD), a party that had been allied to the ruling
MDP. To conservative politicians, what happened in Pyongyang
were not disconcerting or inconsiderate acts but preplanned ones,
suggesting that some civic leaders participating in the events had
been communicating with the North. This time, differences over
how to perceive North Korea not only provoked conflict but put an
end to the MDP-ULD coalition.31
In every mature society, schools of thought freely revealed seek
the common good through reasonable debate. In this sense, the
ideological conflicts can be seen as moving the nation toward a true
pluralist democracy. But there are reasons to hesitate about this
conclusion. First, both sides tend to go so far in violent verbal attacks
and mutual slandering that they are becoming a threat to the social
fabric. Some liberal civic organizations continue to depict opponents
as anti-unification, anti-reform forces, while some conservatives
find reformists ideologically unacceptable. Second, some liberal
civic activists tend to ignore the existing legal order. On August 30,
2001, the Constitutional Court of Korea judged that the intervention
into the 2000 parliamentary election by the civic organizations was
illegal.32
Third, the tricky problem is how to separate impure elements
who want to disrupt South Korean society from pure liberal activists.
All are championing anti-Americanism and calling opponents antiunification or reactionary, purposefully heating up conservativeliberal debates. It is really tricky to differentiate them from the wellmeaning liberals and difficult to contend with them in their nicelooking terminological cloaks stressing democracy, anti-dictatorship,
unification, reform, and citizenship. This impunes on the honor of
those who really sacrificed themselves for democracy or citizens’
welfare. The side effects are enormous. Some university students
now believe that the Korean War was a northward aggression,
and that the terrorist attack on the Blue House in the 1960s and the
explosion of a Korean Airliner in the 1980s are inventions of the
Seoul government. This defames the lives of 37,000 U.S. soldiers
lost during the Korean War and undermines the deterrence role of
USFK.
Fourth, differences in perceptions of North Korea has created
splits not only within ROK society, but between South Korea and the
United States. Signs of this were revealed in the ROK-U.S. summit
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in March 2001. At the summit, President Bush, to prevent the United
States and its ally from being out-slickered by double-dealing North
Korea, rebuffed the idea of helping North Korea without verifiable
changes. Of course, differences of opinion between countries
happen every day. But in the ROK-U.S. case, the differences tend to
become too sensitive to the extent that they mar being reasonable in
policymaking. For example, anti-American voices of South Korean
activists might be taken as what most South Koreans think. When
the government and the liberal activists seek an early resumption
of U.S.-DPRK missile negotiations, the Bush administration may see
Seoul as acting like a spokesman for an untrustworthy North Korea.
Now conservatives ask whether the alliance is okay.
Concluding Remarks.
Ironically, South Korean society, not the North, is poised on the
threshold of significant transformation after 3 years of the Sunshine
Policy. Of course, more chances should be given to the Sunshine
Policy. But it is equally important is to redress the scars left in
its wake. For South Korea, both inter-Korean reconciliation and
stability of South Korean society are national objectives. Success
in one and a catastrophe in the other is not a real success. A most
daunting challenge for South Korea, therefore, is how to nurture a
political force that holds off the liberal-conservative confrontation
and quells the chaos. Given the current political map and the vigour
of the liberal NGOs, it is very unclear if and when such political force
can emerge. However, this does not mean that nothing can be done.
For conservatives, it is necessary to accept the fact that South
Korea may continue to play a role as a launching pad for North Korea
to step out towards the world and find a bail-out for its economy.
They have to listen harder, whether or not they agree with them,
before dismissing liberal arguments as ideologically unacceptable.
For liberals, it is important to listen more to conservative criticisms
before urging people to believe in North Korea and join the march
toward unification. Above all, the so-called civic organizations
should cease their insolent behavior in intervening in every
policy issue with impunity. They have to come back to being
organizations for citizens and self-reliant financially. It is awkward,
for example, that the Federation for Environmental Movement
(Whankyungyonhap) intervenes in such nonenvironmental issues
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as unification, the roles of hospitals and pharmacies, economic
reform, ownership of companies, or the general election. If it wants
to continue to pursue an ideological objective, it may have to change
into a political party and compete squarely with other political
forces. If ill-motivated activists believe that whether they can prevail
depends on the popular support they can muster and that they must
unleash everything they have, ROK society may be hopeless. Endless
bickering may be inevitable.
For the Seoul government that made a daring choice with
the Sunshine Policy, it is important to spend more time heeding
conservative worries about whether or not the North is agreeable. It
needs to listen to the numerous commentators, scholars, and opinion
leaders skeptical of the North’s trustworthiness and anxious over
the antagonism within South Korean society: the new Cold War in
the South between the conservatives and liberals.33 It is mistaken to
attempt to invent majority support through mobilizing activists.34
What is needed is consensus among differing political forces to not
demand black-white distinctions.35 The Sunshine Policy pushed
stability-in-tension into instability-in-tension while it strengthened
the North’s military capability and staggered the South’s security
awareness. 36
Lack of transparency in the policymaking process has polarized
the nation's public opinion to a serious degree.37 We have to heal the
liberal-conservative confrontation before dealing with the North.38
The South, rather than asking the United States to accept the North,
must let the North know that military tension reduction is the key to
its relations with the South and the United States.39
Politicians particularly need to listen to the Group for Grooming
a Mature Society, some 115 prominent senior citizens which, in its
joint statement on August 15, 2001, deplored the rampant distrust
and hostilities and requested that political forces prepare fora for
truly democratic dialogues. Anyway, the government must deal
effectively with domestic opposition and American skepticism if it is
to make the Sunshine Policy more sustainable and legitimate.
No less important is to maintain and develop better relations
with allies. Radical voices should not be able to obstruct a balanced
conservative-liberal debate and allow allies to understand them as
representing the people. It should not let calls for withdrawal of
USFK weaken a robust alliance still needed by South Korea. Beautiful
rhetoric without dealing with frictions over how to perceive North
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Korea let bilateral relations be ambushed by various developments.
If impure elements and communist sympathizers camouflaged as
liberals further spread anti-Americanism, and if Washington fails
to understand the will of the silent majority and sees the radicals as
representing public opinion, this may bring about a scenario akin to
what happened in the Philippines.
U.S. policymakers must understand the die-hard dream of
South Koreans, whether conservative or liberal, for peace and
unification. South Koreans hope that this will be the bottom line
in Washington’s policy. It is also important to note that most South
Koreans prefer peace when peace and unification come into conflict.
Similarly, the majority of South Korean citizens recognize the role
of USFK and appreciate the alliance. Some U.S. analysts warn that
the United States may reduce or withdraw USFK if requested by the
government or public opinion. Above all, American public opinion
may not tolerate overt South Korean public attacks on or hostile
rhetorics toward U.S. forces.40
It is vitally important to differentiate the silent majority’s views
from demagogic anti-American arguments fomented by radicals. A
simple repetition of the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance may be
pointless at a time when the alliance is already a contentious issue.
If continuation of the ROK-U.S. alliance is no longer automatic, it
should be protected differently.
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CHAPTER 9
THE FUTURE OF THE
KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION (KEDO)
Haksoon Paik
[Editor’s Note: Professor Paik’s chapter was written at the end
of 2001 when the Agreed Framework appeared to be generally
on track. In late 2002, the North Korean leadership admitted to
pursuing a uranium-based nuclear program and claimed that it
had the right to develop nuclear weapons. The Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) participating nations
saw this as a violation of the agreement and on November 14, 2002,
suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil. On November 29, 2002, the
International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors called
upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to accept a
team to clarify its uranium enrichment program. On December 12,
2002, the North Koreans announced that they intended to restart the
plutonium-based reactors that had caused the concern that prompted
the Agreed Framework negotiations in 1994. On January 10, 2003,
North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and in late February 2003, it reportedly
reactivated the plutonium-based nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
As this book goes to press, the future of the Agreed Framework
and KEDO appears dim. Nonetheless, Professor Paik’s chapter is
a valuable description of the KEDO mechanism and, in spite of the
current difficulties, the organization may yet provide a model for
future relations with North Korea if the issues of trust and confidence
can be resolved.]
Introduction.
KEDO was formed in March 1995 in order to provide light-water
reactors (LWRs) and heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the DPRK as specified
in the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.1 KEDO carries out its
mission under the circumstances in which the Executive Board
members exercise their power and resources strategically to obtain
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the best outcome for their interests.
KEDO has not been able to meet the target date of 2003 in
providing the LWRs to the DPRK. It had not been able to begin
“excavation work” for the first units of the LWRs until September
14, 2001,2 a clear indication of the delay of providing the LWRs to the
DPRK. Only 9.03 percent of the entire LWR project was completed
at the end of 2000, and only 12.3 percent completed at the end of June
2001.3
The excavation work, however, signifies that the LWR project
“has entered the stage where the construction of the LWRs will
never stop unless obstacles are formed grave enough to cause a
serious change in inter-Korean relations or in the international
politics of Korea.”4 Speaking in July 2001, U.S. Special Enjoy Charles
L. Pritchard said the project was expected to “reach a major turning
point next year when the ‘first concrete’ is poured.”5
This chapter will first review and assess what KEDO has achieved
and failed to achieve, focusing on the three declared missions of
KEDO, then identify the major issues and problems it faces, and
finally discuss the prospects for KEDO and the LWR project.
Three Missions of KEDO: An Assessment.
KEDO has three missions: first, to contribute to the strengthening
of the international nonproliferation regime while improving the
prospects for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and beyond; second, to assist in implementation of the Agreed
Framework by financing and constructing two LWRs in the DPRK
and by providing the DPRK with up to half-a-million tons per year
of HFO until the first unit of the LWRs is completed; and, third, to
serve as an example of how a cooperative and targeted international
diplomatic effort can lead to the resolution of regional security or
political crises.6 An assessment of these three declared missions is
in order.
Strengthening the NPT Regime and Peace and Stability in Korea.
Has KEDO strengthened the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
(NPT) regime and improved the prospects for lasting peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond? The result at the
end of 2001 was satisfactory; even though the DPRK had not yet
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come into full compliance on the Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In 1995, the parties to the NPT “faced the critical decision
of whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or for a fixed period
or periods,” and “a majority of parties supported the indefinite
extension” of the NPT.7 The Agreed Framework and the birth of
KEDO decisively contributed to the indefinite extension of the NPT
regime by making the DPRK cancel its withdrawal from the NPT
and by freezing the DPRK’s construction of the Yongbyon and
Taechon facilities, thereby appearing to freeze its nuclear weapons
development program.8
KEDO also paved the way for a solution to the DPRK’s weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and its delivery system. The Japanese
Ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.) claimed in September
2000 that KEDO had played a central role “in making the Korean
Peninsula a safer place in the context of nuclear nonproliferation”
and “as such, its efforts have significant implications not only for
regional security but also for global security.”9
Without KEDO, the positive achievements on the Korean
Peninsula in the first year of the new millennium would not have
been possible. KEDO played an instrumental role in “set[ting] the
pace for an evolutionary rather than destructive process of dealing
with North Korea” and in helping North Korea in “gain[ing] a
degree of confidence in dealing with both the United States and
South Korea, to the extent of venturing an inter-Korean summit
meeting.”10 In other words, the DPRK came to regard “KEDO as a
test of whether it could deal with the outside world, and have found
that they can.”11
In the late 1990s, the Agreed Framework and KEDO ushered in a
process of reconciliation and cooperation between North and South
Korea and between North Korea and the United States. Improvement
in inter-Korean relations culminated with the historic inter-Korean
summit talks in June 2000, and the serious dialogues and negotiations
conducted between the United States and North Korea produced the
“Perry process” and exchange visits to each other’s capital by highranking North Korean and U.S. officials--Special Envoy Jo Myong
Rok’s visit to Washington, DC, and Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, both in October 2000.12
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Implementing the Agreed Framework.
The second stated mission of KEDO, to assist in implementation
of the Agreed Framework by financing and constructing LWRs in
North Korea and by providing North Korea with HFO, had been
half achieved by the end of 2001. The construction of the LWRs was
much delayed, and in early 2002 it became clear KEDO could not
meet the target date of 2003 for completing the LWR project.
The supply of HFO to the DPRK also had many difficulties, due
mainly to the opposition of the Republican majority in Congress, so
KEDO often failed to deliver the HFO in a timely and predictable
manner. (The KEDO Executive Board announced on November
14, 2002, that, due to North Korea’s acknowledgement that it
was pursuing a uranium-based nuclear weapons program, it was
suspending HFO shipments beginning with December shipment.
Ed.) It was noteworthy, however, that once President George W.
Bush came to power, the U.S. House of Representatives did not
strongly resist passage of the KEDO bill for 2002.13
Three things loom large when we compare the KEDO bill for 2002
with the previous ones. First, there was a dramatic increase in the
budget for 2002 from a maximum of $35 million for 1999, 2000, and
2001, to $95 million for 2002.14 This increase was partly explained by
soaring prices in the international oil market, but a more convincing
explanation would be the support of the Republican majority in the
House of Representatives for the Bush administration. Second, the
number of days allowed by the bill in which the President has to
certify some specified conditions and report to Congress in order to
have funds made available for KEDO was shortened from 30 days
for 2000 and 2001 to 15 days for 2002. The smaller the number, the
faster funds could be made available for KEDO. Third, the number
of provisos attached to the KEDO bill was reduced noticeably from
12 for 2000, to 8 for 2001, and finally to 3 for 2002. Also the strictness
and complexity of the provisos were loosened and straightened
out. In other words, past Congressional opposition to the Agreed
Framework and the Clinton administration’s engagement policy
toward North Korea was in part responsible for KEDO’s failure to
implement the Agreed Framework on a full scale and in a timely
manner during those years.15
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Serving as an Example of Resolving Regional Crisis.
Whether the third mission of KEDO, serving as an example of
resolving regional crisis, was fulfilled remains largely to be proven.
From a theoretical point of view, KEDO symbolized a combination
of idealism and realism, that is, cooperation and conflict and
coordination among nation-states. KEDO is an international
organization that purports to achieve the goal of freezing and
ultimately dismantling the North Korean nuclear program by
bringing in and coordinating multiple countries with conflicting
interests.16
KEDO, with such theoretical underpinnings, may serve as a
precedent or model for solving future problems in the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia,17 such as the problems related to
ballistic missiles and other WMD that have global implications.
KEDO can also be a role model for regional crisis resolution in
economic crises as well as security or political crises. For instance,
KEDO could serve as a model for the so-called “Korean Peninsula
Agricultural Development Organization” (KADO), a conceivable
future organization for agricultural restructuring, investment, and
recovery in North Korea, or for the “Korean Peninsula Industrial
Development Organization” (KIDO), another comparable
organization for North Korean industries.18
Stephen Bosworth, former Executive Director of KEDO, doubted
that “KEDO would be replicated if a new nuclear proliferation threat
were to emerge,” arguing that “the circumstances that brought KEDO
into existence may be unique to Northeast Asia.” But he agreed that
“the concept of bringing together a small number of countries most
directly affected by a security threat is one that we may wish to use
again.” According to him, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight
Group (TCOG) among the United States, Japan, and Korea “has
no secretariat or common funding, but it does, in some respects,
build on the KEDO model.”19 In fact, KEDO was “a product of
this trilateral cooperation,” and it is the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo
trilateral cooperation that continues to be “the driving force” of the
KEDO process.20
What is the overall assessment of KEDO? KEDO was initially
successful in strengthening the NPT regime and contributing to
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. But the mission of
implementing the Agreed Framework has not been fulfilled, in
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part due to the delay in providing the LWR project to North Korea
[and because of North Korean actions violating at least the spirit of
the agreement. Ed.]. The third mission, to serve as an example of
regional crisis resolution could be applicable to other cases, but this
remains to be seen.
Major Issues and Problems for KEDO.
President Bush’s announcement of a new policy toward the
DPRK on June 6, 2001, indicated that a broad agenda including
three items should be discussed seriously with the DPRK: improved
implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North
Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s
ballistic missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a
less threatening conventional military posture.21 The first and third
of these are new items that the Clinton administration did not put
forward as something that should be achieved in relations with
North Korea.
The issue of “improved implementation of the Agreed
Framework” has much to do with several salient problems: whether
to revise the Agreed Framework; how to bring North Korea into full
compliance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA; whether
to replace the LWRs with non-nuclear power plants; how to deal
with North Korea’s demand for compensation for the electricity
loss to be incurred from 2003 by the delay in the construction of the
LWRs; how to build up trust between the United States and North
Korea; how to upgrade North Korea’s power grid for the safety of
the LWRs; how to meet international nuclear safety standards by
North Korea; and, finally, how to improve North Korea’s business
practices with regard to the LWR project.
Whether to Revise the Agreed Framework. KEDO faces many
problems — political, security, legal, financial, and technical. After
several months’ review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK, the Bush
administration put forward a new “comprehensive approach”
towards North Korea on June 6, 2001, and emphasized the “improved
implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s
nuclear activities”22 as one of the three aims in negotiations. Should
the Agreed Framework be revised to accommodate the demands of
the Bush administration?
Some argued that the Agreed Framework is “not, however, a
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treaty or even an agreement in any binding sense,” and regarded it
as simply “a set of guidelines to align the behavior of the two state
parties.”23 Thus, they argued, nothing in the Agreed Framework
can prevent the United States and DPRK from “reformulating and
updating it to account for new circumstances affecting the vital
interests of both parties.”24 They even saw it as “inevitable” that “the
new U.S. Administration and the DPRK will need to come to terms
on a new, modernized Agreement that serves the current needs
of both parties.”25 As a way of updating the Agreed Framework
by coming to new terms, they suggested “offering a package of
infrastructure assistance to the DPRK in exchange for changes in
HFO deliveries.”26
The problem, however, was that even Charles Pritchard, U.S.
Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK, had to admit that
“abandoning or unilaterally gutting the Agreed Framework risks
serious setbacks in U.S.-DPRK and DPRK-Republic of Korea (ROK)
relations, and would be seen as a major breach of trust by the
DPRK.”27 North Korea interpreted the U.S. claim for the revision
of the Agreed Framework quite straightforwardly “as an attempt
to evade its responsibility for the delay of the LWR project” and as
“an indication of its intention to lead it to its breakdown, given the
central point in the framework is the DPRK nuclear freeze versus the
U.S. LWR supply.”28
North Korea’s Noncompliance of Nonproliferation Obligations. One of
the most serious problems KEDO faces is that North Korea had not
yet fully complied with the Safeguards Agreement of the IAEA. Both
the IAEA and KEDO demanded that the DPRK accept the special
inspections of the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness
of the DPRK’s initial report on its nuclear material. North Korea’s
cooperation was crucial to the successful implementation of the
Agreed Framework and a prerequisite for completing the LWRs
without any serious delay.29
Since the entire verification process may take “three to four years,”
the IAEA argued, verification should have begun immediately with
the full cooperation of the DPRK if the LWR project was to proceed
smoothly.30 The IAEA and the KEDO Executive Board member
states worried about a potentially disturbing situation in the future
where “the IAEA reports either a failure to account for all the nuclear
material or further discrepancies between the initial report and the
result of inspections are found.”31
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The Agreed Framework was targeted at securing the transparency
of current and future activities related to the North Korean nuclear
weapons development program. The transparency of the past
nuclear-related activities was to be secured later when North Korea
comes into “full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with
the IAEA(INFCIRC/403),32 including taking all steps that may be
deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the
Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness
of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK,”
“when a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but
before delivery of key nuclear components.”33 That is, the Agreed
Framework “envisages specific functions for the IAEA, notably to
monitor a ‘freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and
related facilities,’ to continue with verification activities at facilities
not covered by the freeze and to take measures required with a view
to verifying, at a later date, the accuracy and completeness of the
DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.”34
One thing to note is that the DPRK decision in the Agreed
Framework to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities is “a voluntary measure beyond what is required by the
[NP]T and the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement,”35 but “IAEA
monitoring activities with respect to such a voluntary measure are
within the scope of verification activities under the IAEA-DPRK
Safeguards Agreement.”36 Thus, the facilities and installations
that were included in the declared nuclear facilities by North
Korea but were not covered by the freeze were also to be subject to
safeguards.37
North Korea acceded to the NPT in December 1985, but until
January 1992 did not sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA,
INFCIRC/403, which should have been signed within 18 months
after entering the NPT.38 The Safeguards Agreement entered into
force on April 10, 1992. North Korea submitted an “initial report”
on nuclear material on May 4, 1992, and ad hoc inspections began
in the same month to verify the correctness of it and assess its
completeness.
Through six rounds of ad hoc inspections from May 1992 to
February 1993, the IAEA found discrepancies between North
Korea’s initial declaration and the inspection outcomes. The IAEA
demanded special inspections of two suspect sites in Yongbyon, but
North Korea refused to allow them on the pretext that the two sites
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were military facilities.
There have been 15 rounds of technical discussion between the
IAEA and the DPRK up to the end of 2001 — two to three times
a year — but the DPRK never came into full compliance with the
Safeguards Agreement. As of the 45th General Conference of the
IAEA in September 2001, the IAEA was “unable to verify fully
the DPRK’s initial 1992 declaration of its nuclear programme, . . .
unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material
required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons
or nuclear explosive devices.”39
Why has the DPRK refused the IAEA’s demand for special
inspections? It has to be pointed out that there is a fundamental
difference of view between the IAEA and the DPRK “regarding
the current status of the Safeguards Agreement”: North Korea
regards “acceptance of measures required to enable the Agency to
monitor the freeze as not being under the Safeguards Agreement
but as falling solely within the context of the ‘Agreed Framework’,”
and has further indicated that, “until such time as it comes into
full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency can
carry out ad hoc and routine inspections only at the facilities not
covered by the freeze.”40 Therefore, North Korea accepts the IAEA’s
activities “solely within the context of the Agreed Framework,” not
within the context of the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
However, the IAEA emphasizes that a bilateral agreement like the
Agreed Framework “could not replace, supersede or detract from
the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK” under
the NPT.41
The Agreed Framework itself, is responsible for North Korea’s
noncompliance of nonproliferation obligations in many important
ways. For example, there is no stipulation in the Agreed Framework
for exactly “when the IAEA should begin its verification process.”42
Moreover, the Agreed Framework does not specify “exactly where
the fuel rods have to be shipped out of the country” as well as “when
the IAEA effort to discover North Korea’s nuclear history — or
Pyongyang’s cooperation — must begin” and so on.43
It is noteworthy that, despite North Korea’s noncompliance with
the Safeguards Agreement, concerned countries like the United
States, South Korea, and Japan seemed to accept North Korea’s
refusal as something that could not be helped. It appeared that
“as long as the DPRK maintains the nuclear freeze and the IAEA
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confirms this, none seems to be willing to challenge the DPRK at
this stage.”44 In other words, they appeared to be “ready to wait
until full and unlimited inspections are possible.”45 Otherwise, they
would have had to negotiate with North Korea. Merely mounting
pressure to make it give in would not work in the absence of any
practical means with which to force North Korea to abide by the
Safeguards Agreement.
North Korea claimed that the special inspection demands were an
excuse and a tactic to blame the delay of the LWR project on North
Korea.46 Against IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei’s
attack in his “Statement to the Forty-fifth Regular Session of the IAEA
General Conference 2001” on North Korea’s failure to implement
the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA faithfully, North Korea
argued that “this can not be construed otherwise than reckless acts
of the riffraff to shift the responsibility for the non-compliance with
the agreed framework on to the DPRK, defying international justice
and impartiality, pursuant to the U.S. policy.”47 North Korea claimed
that IAEA’s demand for special inspections was “an act of putting a
brake on implementation of the Agreed Framework”48 and even “a
grave challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK.”49
Whether to Replace the LWRs with Non-nuclear Alternatives. During
the review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, an option of replacing
the LWRs with thermal power plants was raised by the people
who were against the provision of the reactors.50 Some members
of Congress51 and nonproliferation experts in Washington, DC,
argued for a non-nuclear or partially-nuclear alternative to the LWR
project. They cited several reasons: the LWRs’ potential to produce
weapons-grade plutonium, lack of a reliable power grid in North
Korea, increased cost of supplying HFO due to the increase in oil
prices, and North Korea’s demand for compensation of the loss of
electricity to be incurred after 2003.
As to whether the LWRs are or are not “proliferation resistant,”
there was a serious debate between Henry Sokolski, Executive
Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Desaix
Anderson, then Executive Director of KEDO.52 Sokolski argued that
the two LWRs to be supplied to North Korea will produce material
for twice as many bombs as the reactors North Korea had under
construction because the LWRs are “much bigger — nearly ten
times the power output of all the reactors it was planning to build.”
And “not only is all the plutonium usable for bombs, but the two
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proposed reactors will, in fact, produce so-called ‘weapons-grade’
material during initial commercial operation.”53
Desaix Anderson contends that this is “nonsense which ignores
totally the context in which the LWR’s are being built and will
operate.”54 He argues that “the term ‘proliferation resistant’ is meant
to convey that production of weapons grade plutonium from an LWR
is technologically and economically very difficult when compared to
alternatives,” even though “it theoretically possible to do so.”55 It is
known that there are about 400 LWRs around the world, but there
has been no country that has extracted weapons grade plutonium by
reprocessing the spent fuel.56
In contrast to the fact that North Korea’s graphite-moderated
reactors were “designed for the specific purpose of creating
weapons grade plutonium,” with electricity production being just
a useful “byproduct,” LWRs are “designed to maximize electricity
production at the most economical price,” production of small
quantities of plutonium being an “undesirable but unavoidable
byproduct.”57 Furthermore, since LWRs “can only be refueled when
they are shut down,” removing spent fuel to a reprocessing facility
and subsequent plutonium extraction are “easily detectable.”58
Furthermore, key components of the LWRs were not to be
delivered to North Korea until “a significant portion of the LWR
project is completed, but prior to the delivery of key, nuclear related
components,” and the LWRs “will be completed and operated
under IAEA monitoring.”59 It is also noteworthy that “if requested
by KEDO, the DPRK shall relinquish any ownership rights over the
LWR spent fuel and agree to the transfer of the spent fuel out of its
territory as soon as technically possible after the fuel is discharged,
through appropriate commercial contracts.”60 In addition, digital
cameras were to be installed and in operation for the surveillance of
any diversion of spent fuel or plutonium around the clock.
There are several other reasons why it would not be easy to
revise the Agreed Framework and replace the LWR project with
other non-nuclear alternatives. First, it will not be easy to revise
the legal, institutional, and financial arrangements of the Agreed
Framework and supply agreement of the LWR project. Not only
the Agreed Framework and the LWR supply agreement, but loan
agreements, a Turnkey Contract (TKC) of the LWR project, and
others would have to be revised. It also would take too much time
mobilizing engineering and construction contractors and equipment
169

suppliers as well as renegotiating the whole process of replacing the
LWR project.
Second, replacement of the LWRs with thermal power plants
would not save much time. Too much time had already been spent
on the LWR project, and it would not make sense to cancel a project
estimated to “have a four year head start on any alternative and
alternative facilities. . . .”61 It takes about 60 months or 5 years to
build a thermal power plant, and it would have taken about that
long to go from the Agreed Framework to the TKC.
Third, too much money had already been spent, and there was no
point of giving up the financial resources invested. If ten 200MW(e)
coal-fueled power plants were to be built, it would cost about $4.0
billion, $600 million less than the $4.6 billion for the LWR project.
But it would not be a big savings if we take into account the money
that had been spent already on the LWR project. Moreover, it would
“cost about one billion dollars for construction already done and for
costs to shut down the project.”62
Fourth, North Korea cannot afford gas– or oil-fueled or coalfired power plants. These alternatives would “cost less perhaps to
operate in the short run, but all would be much more expensive for
the DPRK in the long run because of much higher fuel costs.”63 If
North Korea could import gas or oil, this would be a relatively fast
alternative. However, if North Korea has to connect pipelines to the
gas field in Siberia, it will take many years and billions of dollars.64
Another option, “providing coal-fired power plants or providing
a transmission line to carry 500 MW of power from South to North
Korea would be an “impossible quick fix.”65 If North Korea cannot
receive as much as 10-20 years’ fuel from outside for free or at a
highly discounted price, the thermal power plants would not be a
sustainable option.66
For these reasons, I agree with Desaix Anderson that there was
“no quicker and cheaper alternative” to the LWRs.67 It is possible
that North Korea will want thermal power plants to solve the
urgent energy shortage problem as an independent transaction, but
it is not likely to accept the offer of replacing the LWRs with other
non-nuclear alternatives because North Koreans have argued that
this would undermine the Agreed Framework itself. For different
reasons, however, the United States opposed providing electricity
to North Korea through independent deals, worrying that “any
provision of additional electricity to North Korea that is not linked
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in some manner to the Agreed Framework risks undermining the
implementation of the Agreed Framework, as it would remove
Pyongyang’s incentives to cooperate with the IAEA.”68
North Korea’s Demand for Compensation for loss of Electricity.
When the Bush administration demanded new concessions in its
policy towards North Korea, North Korea immediately argued
that what should be discussed seriously was the practical issues
for implementation of the Agreed Framework and the October
2000 U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué. North Korea also argued that
“the most urgent problem to be solved” was “the compensation for
electricity loss to be incurred by North Korea due to the delay of
the LWR project,”69 because the “electricity problem [was] the most
basic problem for revitalizing the North Korean economy, and [was]
an important matter related to the survival of North Korea.”70 The
DPRK realistically regarded the target date of 2003 as impossible to
meet.71
By September 2001, North Korea had received half-a-million tons
of HFO annually as an interim energy alternative as compensation
for “the energy foregone due to the freeze of the graphitemoderated reactors, pending completion of the first LWR unit.”72
The facilities covered by the freeze included the Yongbyon 5 MW(e)
Experimental Nuclear Power Plant, the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod
Fabrication Plant, the Radiochemical Laboratory of the Institute of
Radiochemistry of Yongbyon, the Yongbyon 50 MW(e) Nuclear
Power Plant, and the Taechon 200 MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant, both
under construction.73 The total amount of power that was frozen
was 250 MW(e), if 5 MW(e) produced by the Experimental Nuclear
Power Plant is subtracted.
North Korea has argued that if it had been able to develop its
own independent nuclear power industry not bound by the Agreed
Framework, it would not have suffered an energy shortage.74 The
problem was an expected annual loss of 2,000 MW(e) from 2003 to
2008 or 2009 due to the delay of the LWR project.75 North Korea
repeatedly demanded compensation for this electricity loss.76
North Korea laid out its proposal in talks held in New York
in March 2000: “compensation for electricity loss should be made
by electricity” and “other member countries of KEDO could
contribute to this effort if the U.S. is in a real difficult position to
make that compensation.”77 North Korea argued that, if there
were no compensation, it would not be able to maintain the freeze
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of its nuclear weapons development program and to continue to
implement the Agreed Framework.78 It threatened to reoperate the
graphite-moderated reactors.79
The United States and KEDO counter-argued that North Korea
was also responsible for delay in the LWR construction and that they
could not compensate for the loss of electricity because the year 2003
was simply a target date, not a legally-binding one, and there was no
provision for compensation specified in the Agreed Framework.80
North Korea maintained that the United States promised the
LWRs based on North Korea’s freeze of the graphite-moderated
reactors under construction and on its abandonment of constructing
future nuclear power plants.81 North Korea contended that “the
central point of the framework is the DPRK pledge on nuclear freeze
versus the U.S. pledge on the provision of LWRs.”82 Therefore, it
was crystal clear, in the eyes of the North Koreans, that providing
the LWRs was the core of the Agreed Framework83 and that North
Korea could link its cooperation with the IAEA with progress in
implementation of the Agreed Framework.
Building Up Trust between the United States and the DPRK. What
was the underlying cause for North Korea’s consistent refusal to
come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations?
North Korea refused to do so because it did not trust the United
States. It believed that building trust should be based on the faithful
implementation of the Agreed Framework and the LWR project by
the United States and KEDO.84 North Korea argued that “if the U.S.
had remained sincere in implementing the Agreed Framework, it
would have been implemented to such a level as to enable the DPRK
and the IAEA to start negotiations on verifying the accuracy and
perfectness of the initial report on nuclear substance.”85 The United
States was not given the “benefit of doubt.”
Therefore, there would be no full compliance with the Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA until North Korea was certain that the
LWR project was sure to be constructed and delivered. If North
Korea should accept the IAEA’s special inspections before the
completion of a significant portion of the LWR project and delivery
of key nuclear components to North Korea, and if the United States
should defect from the Agreed Framework and the LWR project,
then North Korea would not be able to defend its interests. For North
Korea, purposeful nuclear ambiguity served best in assuring that the
United States and KEDO carried out the promises they made.
172

In this context, North Korea argued that the key issue in the
Agreed Framework was to remove misunderstanding and distrust
and build confidence. The freeze on the graphite-moderated reactors
and their related facilities, in the eyes of the North Koreans, would
“address the U.S. security concerns, while the U.S. LWR supply
would help remove the DPRK mistrust of the U.S. and promote
confidence building between the two nations.”86 The Agreed
Framework was a compromise solution, with both sides taking
defensive postures in the absence of trust. The very nature of the
relationship between the United States and North Korea “resulted
in the stipulation of the DPRK nuclear freeze and the U.S. LWR
provision as simultaneous actions” in the Agreed Framework.87
North Korea’s disillusionment with the United States was gravely
felt when it claimed that the U.S. President had broken the promise
he made in his letter of assurance dated October 20, 1994. President
Clinton’s letter to Chairman Kim Jong Il went: “In the event that this
reactor project is not completed for the reasons beyond the control
of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to
the extent necessary, such a project from the U.S., subject to the U.S.
Congress.”88 One could argue that there was some truth in North
Korea’s contention that “the U.S. administration should have taken
other steps earlier in an effort to meet the date of completion in the
year 2003 true to the assurance made by the President.”89
By mid-2001, North Korea had expressed suspicions about
“whether the U.S. is truly committed to the supply of LWRs or
seeking some kind of filthy political purposes.” It said it was
suspicious about the “deliberate delay” of the LWR project, plus
sensationalization of the missile issue and the underground suspect
site at Kumchang-ni, which North Korea claimed had “nothing to
do with the LWR project.”90
Upgrading North Korea’s Power Grid. As a technical matter, a
nuclear reactor needs outside power ten times greater than the
electricity it generates. Whether North Korea’s power grid can
supply reliable offsite power to protect against accidents is a matter
of great concern. In late 2000, the Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO) asked North Korea to provide grid data and found the
data seriously flawed.91
Henry Sokolski has argued that reliable offsite power cannot
be supplied in North Korea “even if North Korea’s transmission
system is upgraded, because the total generation capacity of
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North Korea’s grid is simply too small.”92 In contrast, Desaix
Anderson argued that the DPRK “has developed long-term plans
for upgrading its electricity sector, which include increasing its
overall power generation capacity.” He was optimistic about the
safety of the LWRs, “because the DPRK must meet off-site power
system interface requirements, based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission standards, before KEDO will supply nuclear fuel and
conduct commissioning tests.”93 Sokolski expressed serious doubt
about Anderson’s assessment and prediction.94
In September 2000, David Von Hippel, Peter Hayes, and
Timothy Savage pointed out that “the DPRK energy infrastructure
is disintegrating in many ways,” and argued that “the national
electrical grid is essentially non-existent, operating, at best, as a
collection of unreliable regional grids using poorly-maintained
equipment that is 50 years out of date to begin with.”95 Therefore,
North Korea’s electricity grid had to be “substantially rebuilt, . . . if
the nuclear reactors provided as part of the Agreed Framework are
to operate as intended.”96 According to them, the most cost-effective
investments would be “in refurbishing existing plants, not building
new plants that the North Koreans will not be able to operate.”97
Some people argued for partial replacement of the LWRs.
However, replacing one unit with thermal power plants would have
meant that the other unit would “still require rehabilitation of the
grid, a nuclear liability legal regime, a nuclear safety system, etc.,”
and these requirements are “the same for one or two reactors.”98
Von Hippel, Hayes, and Savage argued that “replacing one of the
reactors with a thermal power plant [was] an equally impractical
solution,” and that “instead, the U.S. could consider offering a
package of infrastructure assistance to the DPRK in exchange for
changes in HFO deliveries.”99 They suggestd that the United States
“explore with the DPRK alternative services — grid refurbishment,
power plant and boiler rehabilitation, fuel supply infrastructure
rebuilding, and alternative electricity sources and energy-efficiency
improvements — that the United States could provide with a portion
of the funds now earmarked for HFO purchases.”100
North Korea was solely responsible for upgrading its national
power grid for the LWR project. Considering North Korea’s economic
difficulties, the question was: who would finance upgrading North
Korea’s power grid how soon and to what extent?
North Korea’s Duty to Meet Nuclear Safety Standards. Two issues
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were involved in North Korea’s obligation to meet nuclear safety
standards: nuclear safety and liability, and the nuclear cooperative
agreement with the United States. Whether North Korea could meet
“international standards of nuclear and conventional safety” drew
attention, particularly because General Electric (GE) withdrew from
the LWR project due to lack of confidence in and uncertainty about
North Korea’s nuclear liability and safety regimes.101 It was this
safety issue that led to the debate on nuclear liability insurance for
the LWR project between Desaix Anderson and Henry Sokolski.102
The other was the nuclear regulatory issue. North Korea had
to conclude a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation
with the United States prior to the delivery by U.S. firms of any key
nuclear components to North Korea.103 The U.S. Atomic Energy
Act “requires American firms to acquire a nuclear export license
before shipping any nuclear components abroad,”104 and before
giving an export license to any firm, the President must “certify
that the recipient has not violated IAEA safeguards.” The DPRK’s
noncompliance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, for
instance, would “give the President or the U.S. Congress another
opportunity to veto the Agreed Framework.”105 The North Korea
Threat Reduction Act of 1999, which stipulated severe “restrictions
on nuclear cooperation with North Korea,”106 may turn out to be a
precursor for future tough U.S. regulations.
Improving Business Practices of North Korea. North Korea’s full
cooperation for construction of the LWRs was needed if KEDO was
to succeed. It should be pointed out that North Korea has often
failed “to cooperate by adhering to self-imposed regulations and
principles to the detriment to the project.”107 In addition, North
Korea’s “attitude towards international agreements and commercial
contracts, or more precisely, its arbitrary interpretation of and lax
sense of obligations to these agreements” can cause problems in the
future just as it has in the past. Furthermore, for North Koreans,
“concluding, interpreting and implementing agreements are three
entirely separate issues,” as shown by North Korea’s demand for
wage increases for its unskilled workers beginning in mid-1999 and
its withdrawal of half the workers from Kumho in April 2000.108
North Korea refused to provide additional workers to KEDO, and
the wage issue threatened construction schedule delays and cost
increases.109
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The Future of KEDO: Prospects.
As discussed above, KEDO has many problems. The issues and
problems in any combination could disrupt KEDO and the LWR
project. As the Independent Task Force on Korea of the Council
on Foreign Relations pointed out, the Agreed Framework “was
structured to defer the most difficult aspects of the agreement until
its later stages,” and “another standoff could well happen, as in
1994.”110
No doubt, there are problems, as discussed, such as North
Korea’s possible failure to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations111
and to be ready for the delivery of the LWRs due to its incapability
to solve technical and financial problems112 in a national power grid
system, nuclear liability and safety requirements, and so on. North
Korea’s full cooperation in transportation and telecommunication113
with KEDO also would be required for full-scale construction work
for the LWRs in Kumho, excavation work having started in 2001.114
North Korea had good reasons to render full support for KEDO,
one being that KEDO was “in the vanguard of the outside world’s
contact and cooperation with the DPRK.”115 KEDO served as a good
working model for international cooperation with North Korea and
as an intermediary between North Korea and the outside world.116
The LWR project helped expose North Korea and the outside world
to each other, promoting “buffered engagement” and opening a
window of opportunity for better relations.117
The LWR project was the first large-scale foreign investment
and Western-style construction project in North Korea, and could
provide a model for future construction projects. North Korean
officials and workers were to obtain Western know-how on all
phases of the project, which could then be applied to other parts
of the economy, promoting its modernization and other changes.118
This could contribute to reform in North Korea.
However, many problems have serious impact on KEDO. KEDO
has been vulnerable to shifts in inter-Korean and international
politics since KEDO “does not exist in a political vacuum.”119 A list
of events, most of which were not expected in advance, testified to
this: a North Korean submarine’s incursion in the East Sea in 1996,
North Korea’s test launch of a ballistic missile over Japan in 1998,
North Korea’s demand for more than 500 percent increase of wages
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for the unskilled North Korean workers at the LWR construction
site in Kumho, North Korea, and its withdrawal of half of the North
Korean-supplied work force from Kumho in 2000. [The North
Korean admission that it had pursued a uranium-based weapons
development program even while claiming to comply with the
Agreed Framework, KEDO’s subsequent cancellation of HPO
shipments, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, and North
Kora’s unfreezing and reactivation of the plutonium-based nuclear
reactor in Yongbyon were the most significant “unanticipated”
problems to date. Ed.]
Besides financial problems over the long run, the two most salient
problems [until October 2002] were North Korea’s ballistic missiles
and North Korea’s attitude toward terrorism. As far as the missiles
were concerned, North Korea continued a moratorium on test
launches, and the missile problem was one of the top priorities in the
U.S.-DPRK negotiation agenda. North Korea expressed willingness
to come up with an “unprecedented” offer in the negotiations at the
end of the Clinton administration.120
North Korea is still on the U.S. State Department’s list of states
sponsoring terrorism, even though it has not engaged in any terrorist
acts for the past several years and has agreed that “international
terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace,
and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms, including
terrorist acts involving chemical, biological, or nuclear devices or
materials.”121A Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on September 12,
2001, one day after the unprecedented terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon, that “as a UN member, the DPRK is
opposed to all forms of terrorism and whatever support to it and this
stance will remain unchanged,” and described the terrorist attack on
America as a “very regretful and tragic incident.”122 A North Korean
representative also delivered an anti-terrorism speech at the U.N.
General Assembly on October 5.123
By late 2001, it appeared that North Korea would make serious
efforts to get itself removed from the list as soon as possible, while
the United States tried to draw North Korea out into the international
community, thereby promoting inter-Korean reconciliation, getting
rid of North Korea’s WMD and its delivery systems, and taking
measures to prevent North Korea from sponsoring terrorism.
Lastly, in order for KEDO to succeed, strong and active support,
both financial and political, of the governments involved in KEDO
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would be required.124 South Korea pledged to pay 70 percent of
the actual cost and was mainly in charge of building the LWR
project; the strong commitment of the United States, Japan, and
the European Union to take care of the LWR project was equally
important. The Executive Board member countries have disparate
and distinctive political interests and decisionmaking processes,
and coordination among them on the LWR Project was not always
easy.125 The EU joined KEDO as a Board member in September 1997
and enjoyed an equal role in decisionmaking and voting with the
original members. As the Executive Board grew, the consensus and
compromises needed among the members became more difficult to
obtain, making the decisionmaking process remarkably complex
and time-consuming.
What are the prospects? Compared to the early years when KEDO
was “hobbled by inadequate and irregular funding,”126 KEDO’s
prospects for success seemed bright in late 2001.127 The question
remains, “how to build on and expand the KEDO successes.”128
By the end of 2001, inter-Korean and international politics in
and around the Korean Peninsula had made some progress toward
reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas and a
post-Cold War rapprochement in East Asia. Chairman Kim Jong
Il of North Korea appeared to have completed his coordination of
policies toward the United States and South Korea with Russia and
China through his visit to Moscow and President Jiang’s visit to
Pyongyang.
On the other hand, the United States had substantially completed
its East Asia strategy and North Korea policy review. The
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was completed and submitted
on September 30, 2001. President Bush visited China for the APEC
summit meeting in Shanghai, China, in October 2001. At the APEC
summit meeting, the United States checked, through China, on
whether North Korea was ready for dialogue with the United States
and South Korea. If things had gone smoothly, the United States
seemed prepared to conduct negotiations with North Korea for a
concrete discussion of issues of mutual concern.
Whether Chairman Kim will pay a return visit to Seoul remained
uncertain at that time. The two Koreas held their fifth round of
ministerial-level talks. North Korea’s resumption of inter-Korean
dialogue at various levels seemed to indicate that North Korea
was serious about continuing inter-Korean reconciliation and
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cooperation.
While it was concentrating on inter-Korean dialogue and
cooperation, North Korea said it would wait for “serious discussions”
on the issues with the United States. It seemed as though U.S.-DPRK
negotiations would resume with serious and robust discussions
to follow, due to the increased need to engage each other after
September 11, 2001. An improved political environment would have
helped KEDO and the LWR project. As long as the United States
and North Korea do not trust each other, things could go wrong.
And this will have a negative impact on KEDO and the LWR project.
[When U.S. representative James Kelly finally visited Pyongyang in
October 2002, however, he charged the DPRK with carrying out a
secret uranium-based weapons development program. The North
Korean leadership seemed to admit to this, and a period of heated
rhetoric followed, with a KEDO decision in November 2002 to halt
HFO shipments. The future of KEDO now seems far gloomier, but
the organization may still prove to serve a useful purpose and, as
a potential mechanism for dealing with intractable issues, is well
worth study and analysis. Ed.]
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CHAPTER 10
KOREA-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS
IN THE ERA OF REGIONALISM
Miongsei Kang
With the goal of providing an account of the recent development
of Korean-U.S. trade relations, this chapter utilizes regionalism,
which increasingly characterizes world trade patterns. The United
States is a core member of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), one of the most influential trade blocs along with the
European Union (EU). The emergence of regionalism will have a
great impact on the trade flows of East Asia. In defensive responses
to regionalist initiatives from Europe and the United States, East
Asia is more likely to institutionalize an economic cooperation that
has been largely informal and unbinding. As a trade-dependent
country, Korea now confronts a regional challenge. The United
States took the lead in its regionalist move in reaction to a “Fortress
Europe,” away from its traditional commitment to a multilateral
trading system. The goals in this chapter are to establish what has
happened to Korea-U.S. trade flows and analyze what it means for
the future. Section 1 provides an overview of the development of
Korea-U.S. trade relations during the past three decades. Section 2
introduces the rising tide of regionalism, which has affected the trade
policy of Korea and the United States. Section 3 traces the impact of
regionalism on trade relations with a discussion of the redirection
of trade. Section 4 explains Korea’s strategic options in the face of a
regionalist challenge within East Asia and from the United States.
An Overview of Trade Direction and Korea-U.S. Trade.
Korea had long-run trade surpluses with the United States. The
size of the trade surplus went up to about 9.6 million dollars in 1987.
Then, the surplus decreased to 2.5 million dollars in 1990. After that,
Korea’s trade with the United States ran deficits until 1997. A surplus
came back after the financial crisis, thanks to the depreciation of the
Korean currency, and the surplus since has been steadily increasing,
reaching about 8.4 million dollars in 2000.
Korea’s trade direction has changed much over the past 2
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decades. The United States was Korea’s largest single market until
the middle of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Korea diversified its trade
pattern, shifting from large economies such as the United States and
Japan toward small- and medium-sized economies, particularly in
Southeast Asia. At present, its largest market is East Asia, including
China but not counting Japan. Korea’s export share in East Asia
increased from about 13 percent in the 1980s to more than 34 percent
in the 1990s, making it the single most important destination for
Korean exports. The share of U.S. trade in Korean exports has been
gradually decreasing since 1990, down to 20 percent in 1999, from
40 percent in 1986. The share of exports to Japan has decreased
by half, from more than 21 percent in 1978 to 11 percent in 1999.
The biggest change is found in the trade flows between Korea and
China. Korea had no formal relations and little trade with China
until 1990. China, in combination with Hong Kong, has become the
largest importer of Korean products over the past 5 years. China is
expected to loom larger in the future, while the United States is still
one of the largest export markets of Korea, and Japan is the third
market. Thus a greater part of Korean export is concentrated in the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) area. The share of EU is
stagnant, hovering around 10-15 percent. The United States, Japan,
and East Asia comprised more than 65 percent of Korea’s exports
in the 1990s. According to some econometric analyses, the effect of
APEC is large and statistically significant. Korea’s bilateral trade
flows with members of APEC are three times as much as those with
non-APEC countries.1
The Rise of Regionalism.
During the past decade, regionalism has attracted extensive
attention in policy circles, from politicians, and from economists.
The advent of the European Monetary Union (EMU), NAFTA, and
the possibility of an Asia-Pacific economic bloc have generated
widespread debate concerning the causes and consequences of
regionalism. The United States and the EU, the two centers of
regionalism, have worked in harmony to expand the multilateral
trading system since 1945. Both sides of the Atlantic have used the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to defuse conflicts that have proven
intractable in bilateral negotiations.
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However, the stability of bilateral relationships is threatened
with the end of the Cold War and the rise of regionalism. The
United States and the EU have no powerful incentive to look
past commercial differences since the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) collapsed. At the beginning of the 1990s, interest
in regionalism or economic blocs was renewed. Policy circles and
economists began to revive the discussion on regional integration
around 1992, when the European Community decided to establish
a single market. The catalyst of regionalism was fear of a “Fortress
Europe” from the EU’s 1992 program (EC92). Throughout the 1990s,
the EU has both deepened its regional integration through the singlemarket initiatives mandated by the Single European Act of 1985
and continued the process of widening EU membership. Austria,
Finland, and Sweden joined the Union in 1995, and new association
arrangements have been negotiated with prospective members
in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU has also inaugurated an
economic and political dialogue with Asia through the Asia Europe
Meeting (ASEM) Forum.
The United States pushed NAFTA through a series of negotiations
with Canada and Mexico and has sought to expand NAFTA to Chile
and to the 24 participating countries in the Caribbean Basin Initiative
in order to lay the foundation for a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area
of the Americas by 2005. The United States has also joined 17 other
countries in the APEC forum in committing to the achievement of
free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for most
members and 2020 for developing countries.
Patterns of world trade have changed over the past 2 decades.
They are characterized by the move towards regionalism. East Asia,
the EU, and NAFTA all exhibit an increasing tendency for intraregional export. Intra-regional export shares increased between 1978
and 1997 from 52.4 percent to 60 percent among the EU countries,
from 28.5 percent to 47.6 percent among the East Asian countries,
and from 36.7 percent to 49.1 percent among the NAFTA countries.
The largest increase is found in East Asia due to the rapid economic
growth of East Asia during this period: the East Asian countries
have grown richer and loom larger in the world economy.2
Korea-U.S. trade relations need to be analyzed in this new
context. Korea belongs to an informal trading regime of East Asia,
which is in the process of institutionalization. The United States
has already been a key member of NAFTA along with Canada and
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Mexico. New developments in Korea-U.S. trade relations over the
past decade need to be placed in the context of rising regionalism
and the formation of regional trading arrangements in the 1980s.
Jeffery Frankel provides an analysis of the new developments of
the world-trading regime. He discusses four factors as responsible
for the move to regionalism; three are introduced here because they
are highly relevant to understanding the changing Korea-U.S. trade
patterns as well as the transformation of the world trading system.
First, the move to regionalism was triggered by an ambitious EU
plan to make a true common market. The EU’s initiative crystallized
in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, encouraging regionalist reactions
by other areas. Second, a shift of American trade policy accelerated
regionalist trade arrangements. Before the 1980s, the United
States had long upheld the principle of multilateral arrangements.
However, the American strategy changed in 1982. The United
States responded to the European resistance toward multilateral
liberalization with regional cards. Its first reaction was the U.S.Israel Free Trade Area.3
The United States shifted toward regional arrangements, away
from the multilateral approach pursued during the post-war period.
The United States formed the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA) with Canada, and CUFTA was extended
into NAFTA with Mexico’s entry in 1995. And the United States is
willing to expand it by inviting in the members of the Southern Cone
Common Market Customs Union (MERCOSUR)--Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Paraguay. Finally, the regionalist move is spreading
to the developing countries. Mexico’s bid for a free trade area with
the United States in 1990 was a historic turning point, given that
Mexico had feared American dominance through trade. Also the
MERCOSUR was formed in 1991 by the four countries in South
America east of the Andes. The motivation behind regionalism is a
trade-led growth strategy. The developing countries are attempting
to shift their trade strategy from an inward-looking or import
substitution policy to an outward orientation, imitating the East
Asian miracle.
Regionalism came to East Asia in a different form. Asian
regionalism is open in that East Asian countries do not discriminate
against others. Exclusive regionalism was attempted and failed.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed proposed the
creation of an East Asian Economic Group, whose name was
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eventually changed to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC),
centering on Japan in 1989. The EAEC consisted of China, Japan, and
Northeast Asian newly industralized countries (NICs) in addition to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were explicitly
excluded. Mahathir’s plan was a reaction to emerging trade blocs
in Europe and the Americas. His proposal had received attention
from Japan and neighboring countries, particularly during Asia’s
economic crisis of 1997. The United States pressed both Japan and
Korea not to participate in the EAEC, and Mahathir’s proposal was
rejected by both the United States and Japan from the beginning.
Japan feared that the EAEC was in violation of open regionalism and
would discriminate against the United States. Instead, the United
States and Japan established the APEC forum as an alternative.4
Asian regionalism is often said to be open. Open regionalism implies
a commitment to the multilateral trading system. Open regionalism
is defined as a bloc where member countries choose to lower trade
barriers to countries outside the bloc even if the degree of extra bloc
liberalization may not be as thorough as it is with respect to fellow
member countries.5
Changing Trade Patterns of Korea.
Korea’s export patterns demonstrate a considerable shift over
time and region during the 1980-99 period. During the 1980s, the
United States was the largest importer of Korean goods and Japan
was second. However, the export direction of Korea in the 1990s
differed completely. China emerged as the third largest importer
of Korean products in less than 10 years. This is surprising, since
China formally had no trade with Korea at all before 1990. Another
noticeable change was the increasing importance of East Asia as an
export market for Korea. Though the United States remains the
largest importer on the basis of individual country, East Asia as a
region has became the largest export market for Korean goods and
services, not counting Japan.
The distribution of countries exporting goods and services to
Korea shows a similar change. On the one hand, Korea’s share in
imports from Japan decreased from 28.6 percent to 22.3 percent,
while during the same period, the share of the United States
decreased only slightly from 22.8 percent to 21.8 percent. On the
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other hand, East Asia’s exports to Korea increased substantially in
line with their increasing import of Korean products. Particularly,
China’s export share grew during this period. China emerged as
one of the major trading partners of Korea, as it pursued a policy
of liberalization. The diversification of Korean exports and imports
is distinctively strong. Dependence on the United States in exports
was reduced. The big picture is straightforward: East Asia as a whole
region becomes more important, while the trade share of the United
States gets smaller. This has significant implications for the future
of Korea-U.S. relations, not just for trade between the two countries.
Regionalist strategies by the United States could lead Korea to be
attracted to East Asian economic integration. In the long run, Korea
could fear U.S. discrimination and protectionism and could consider
seeking a regional free trade area as a self-help alternative. Any new
protectionist or unilateralist measures taken by the United States
would trigger a parallel response from East Asia, including Korea.
An American slowdown would lead the Asians to overcome the
humiliations over the shattering of the “economic miracle” and go
their own way.
In the short run, however, Korea will continue to be dependent
on the United States, as export markets will not decrease rapidly.
The United States has purchased more Korean goods than any other
country, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis. Trade with the
United States in 1998 was in surplus, which increased to more than
8 million dollars in 2000 after deficits from the early 1990s up to
1997. Korea’s trade deficits with the United States peaked in 1996
at more than 11 million dollars. The surplus with the United States
as a percentage of the total trade surplus of Korea increased from 6
percent in 1998 to 75 percent in 2000. Due to a long recession, Japan
has bought fewer Korean goods than before the crisis. However,
Japan’s large foreign reserves continue to look appealing to Korea.
The idea of the Monetary Fund (MF) is attractive to countries like
Korea that experienced great suffering from the liquidity crisis in
1997. Korea and Japan have been discussing how to establish a free
trade area. To deal with potential trade conflicts with East Asia, the
United States should pay more attention to consolidating Asia-U.S.
relations within APEC if it does not want the East Asian countries to
establish an exclusive economic bloc as a counterweight to NAFTA.
Trade between the United States and East Asia will become more
important over time. During the 1990s, Korea was the eighth largest
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exporter to the United States, and Korea is the sixth largest importer
of American goods and services. The American pattern of trade has
changed during the 1978-99 period. With respect to imports, the
biggest difference was made by China. U.S. imports from China
increased from 1.1 percent in the 1980s to 6 percent in the 1990s.
Thus, mutual dependence between the United States and East Asia
becomes deeper. It would be advantageous for the United States to
maintain close relations with East Asia.
Korea’s Trade Strategy in the Era of Regionalism.
In the era of regionalism, only a few countries do not participate
in economic blocs, so Korea is forced to make a choice. There remain
two possible strategic options: to remain in APEC, or participate in
the establishment of an East Asian bloc. The first strategy is better
than the second for a country seeking trade-led growth. APEC is
not a regional arrangement but a forum of open regionalism. Open
regionalism, unlike regionalism, is in line with the basic principle
of the World Trade Organization (WTO): no discrimination against
nonmembers. In contrast, establishment of an East Asian economic
bloc would divide the world into three blocs. No one gains when
each bloc raises tariffs against members of other blocs.
A bilateral trade pattern depends on geographical distance,
the size of gross domestic product (GDP), per capital GDP, and
cultural factors such as ethnicity and language. Many studies
report that geographical adjacency — the pull of gravity — is the
most important determinant of trade flows between two economies.
Despite technological development, transportation costs still matter.
Closeness facilitates bilateral trade flows.6 For instance, Canada is
the largest trading partner of the United States. This gravity model
would predict that the Korea-U.S. trade flows could not increase
because the two countries are far apart. On the other hand, KoreaJapan or Korea-China trade should grow due to geographical
proximity and shared culture among the three countries. In other
words, the potential trade of Korea with China and Japan should
be far larger than the actual trade now. According to one estimate,
Korea today trades less with Japan and China than with the United
States, despite the geographical and cultural proximity and large
economic size of its neighbors.7 The study suggests that Korea has to
establish a free trade area (FTA) to facilitate the bilateral trade flows
199

with China and Japan. The FTA is expected to have the benefits
of a trade creation effect. Korea’s trade with Japan or China falls
short of the potential trade flow, by 15 percent and 33 percent less,
respectively.8
In contrast, actual trade flows with the United States exceed
potential trade volumes by 9 percent. The gap in East Asia between
potential and actual trade could be reduced by an active trade policy
that links Korea, China, and Japan through a free trade area on a
bilateral or trilateral basis. A free trade arrangement produces both
trade creation and trade diversion unless members do not erect trade
barriers against nonmember countries. Trade diversion occurs with
trade discrimination against a third country. Trade with the United
States would be reduced while trade with Japan and China grew.
Regional arrangements might lead to a shrinking of export markets,
including the United States and elsewhere, even though an expansive
East Asian market provides larger outlets for Korean products.
Therefore, Korea needs to be actively involved in strengthening
APEC, as well as in creating bilateral trade arrangements with Japan
or China. A free trade agreement with Japan or China should not be
pursued without taking into consideration its potential impact on
Korea-U.S. trade relations. Korea has to pressure the United States to
recognize that institutionalization of East Asian regionalism harms
the trade interests of the United States as well as the principle of
free trade. For now, it is more realistic for Korea to pursue bilateral
agreements in particular with Japan and China. At the same time,
Korea needs to emphasize the benefits of open regionalism, a
distinctive character of the APEC area. APEC members are found
to trade 3.3 times as much as similar non-APEC countries.9 To gain
those benefits, Korea needs to commit its trade policy to addressing
two goals of APEC: developing rules of deep integration and
providing a forum to promote trade liberalization. Korea needs to
be more open and must pursue a liberalization initiative program. In
particular, it must be involved in the implementation of agreements
of the APEC forum, simultaneously participating in the regional
cooperation of East Asia.
Conclusion.
Korea’s trade direction has been shifting over the past 2 decades.
With rapid economic growth, the Korean economy tends to
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diversify its trade pattern towards small and medium economies.
Global regionalism anchoring the EU and North America triggered
economic regionalism in East Asia. The United States created a North
American free trade area in 1993 with Canada and Mexico. These
new developments and the financial crisis combined to encourage
East Asian countries to attempt to create their own economic
organization.
A global shift towards bilateral arrangements
from multilateral trade liberalization had an important impact on
the Korea-U.S. trade pattern. In the new environment of strong
bilateral trade flows and regional blocs, Korea, a trade-dependent
country, aims to broaden trade patterns and to negotiate bilateral
arrangements with countries in East Asia. Korea-China trade flows
have grown rapidly over the past decade. Negotiation of a free trade
area with Japan is already in process.
The relative importance of the United States to Korea is shrinking
as East Asia replaces the United States as Korea’s largest export
market. However, the United States still remains a superpower. In
the short run, therefore, it is in Korea’s interest to engage the United
States in East Asia. The United States continues to play the role of
a balancer in East Asia, particularly to prevent North-South Korean
tensions from developing into a military confrontation. However,
regional or bilateral measures taken by the United States since the
early 1980s could threaten the present trade pattern by encouraging
East Asia to establish an economic bloc. East Asian economic
integration will gain momentum if the United States cannot afford
the Asian exports because its economy weakens and protectionist
interests prevail over free traders. To find export markets, Korea
will inevitably strengthen its bilateral trade relations with East Asian
economies. To avoid these potential conflicts, the United States
should make a strong commitment to reestablishing the present
asymmetric relations with East Asian countries within the WTO
in a way that reflects the actual economic share of East Asia in the
world economy. It is in Korea’s interests to keep the United States
involved in East Asia through APEC. APEC is the proper place in
which the United States and Asian countries can seek to recognize
their mutual interests and realize free trade. Working efficiently,
APEC can contribute to weakening regional competition between
economic blocs and discrimination of East Asia and North America
against each other. It is in the interest of the United States not to
leave East Asia to establish an economic bloc and divide the world
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into three blocs. Competitive protectionism among three blocs
would generate the worst outcome.
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CHAPTER 11
SOUTH KOREA’S INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT:
POLICY AND ENVIRONMENT
Kyu-Ryoon Kim
Introduction.
East Asian countries showed remarkable economic growth and
led the world in economic dynamism until the recent financial
crisis. Asian economic dynamism first appeared in the city-states
of Hong Kong and Singapore and then the partial nations, Taiwan
and South Korea. These four tigers have been classified as Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and a model for economic
development of developing countries. Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines followed the developmental paths
of neighboring NIEs and achieved high economic growth in the
1990s. China recorded double-digit economic growth rates during
the 1980s and 1990s. All these phenomena made economic analysts
believe that the East Asian region would lead the world in economic
dynamism in the 21st century.
The financial crisis of 1997 affected South Korea dearly, even
though its economic success has not totally vanished. In fact, the
financial crisis made South Korea rethink its development policies.
Its first task was to overcome the financial crisis. In doing so, it had
to reorganize economic resources to prepare for the next stage of
economic development, realizing that the export-led growth model
alone would be insufficient to provide long-lasting development
in the interconnected world economy. More importantly, South
Korea’s credibility and soundness were questioned by foreign
businessmen and bankers.
Many writers and analysts detected the causes of the Asian
financial crisis.1 While the immediate causes were financial sector
weaknesses with easy global liquidity conditions and the contagion
of financial disturbances across Asian countries, intrinsic causes
were over-investment without adequate returns and inappropriate
industrial policies. The South Korean government was supposedly
providing a favorable business climate and proper developmental
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plans so that its businessmen could expand economic activities
at home and abroad. In reality, the government was frequently
involved in economic activities to pursue embedded interests of
the richer part of the society. As a result, the economy had long
rested on a vigorous trilateral relationship among bureaucrats,
businessmen, and bankers. When the economy was booming, this
trilateral relationship produced high economic growth rates. But
many problems erupted when the economy was in crisis, and the
same nexus was blamed as an intrinsic cause. The question has
been whether South Korea could recover within its Asiatic mode of
economic development--the export-oriented development strategy.
Otherwise, it would be necessary to devise a new framework.
This would entail such measures as macro-economic adjustments,
correction of ill-structured networks, and restructuring of financial
sectors.
This chapter attempts to delineate South Korea’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) policies. In doing so, it is necessary to first
investigate the past record and previous policies on foreign direct
investment. Then I analyze South Korean efforts to promote inward
foreign direct investment after the crisis.
South Korea’s Inward Foreign Direct Investment Policy.
South Korea has undergone three periods of change in its inward
foreign direct investment policy. The first was between 1960 and
1983, when Korea was building its industrial base and actively
pursued an export-led growth development strategy. The second,
between 1984 and 1997, was when South Korea had begun to realize
the importance of FDI, though it tried to liberalize on this only
minimally. The third period began in 1998, right after the financial
crisis hit. (See Table 1.)
South Korea began its industrialization based on export-led
growth in the early 1960s. This was accompanied by allowing DFI
through enactment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 1960.
However, the prevalent policy during this period was to keep FDI
to a minimum. The government preferred foreign borrowing to FDI
because of its history of foreign domination under Japanese colonial
rule.2 Thus the government emphasized control, rather than free
entry, of foreign capital resources.
The government began to allow FDI in the middle of the 1960s,
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Period

Main Contents

Early institutionalization
(1960-1983)

Enacted the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (1960)
Established two Free Export Zones (1970, 1974)

Passive liberalization
(1984-1997)

Adopted the negative list system (1984)
Abolished performance requirements (1989)
Allowed friendly cross-border M&A (1997)

Active promotion
(1998–present)

Allowed hostile cross-over M&A (1998)
Enacted the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (1998)
Ended most restrictions on foreign land ownership
(1998)

Source: June-Dong Kim, Inward FDI, 1999, p. 11.

Table 1. Inward FDI Policy.
especially in the Free Export Zones at Masan and Iri, due to growing
foreign debt and in order to develop light industry. However,
performance requirements, such as export or technology transfer
requirements, were imposed in order to raise foreign exchange
earnings and acquire advanced technology. In the 1970s, South
Korea realized that FDI was necessary to restructure its economy.
The government began to allow FDI in heavy industry sectors.
However, foreign ownership was limited to less than 50 percent, and
the primary purpose of the FDI policy was to support exports.
The government recognized FDI as a key channel for acquiring
advanced technology in the early 1980s. It replaced the positive
list system of restricting FDI with a negative list system in 1984.
This liberalization measure was followed by the abolition in 1989
of performance requirements such as export, local content, and
technology transfer provisions, which had been imposed on foreign
investors.
When Korea became a member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, it brought its FDI
policies in line with international norms and standards by turning
the Foreign Capital Inducement Act into the Act on Foreign Direct
Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement. Under the new Act,
the concept of FDI was expanded to encompass long-term loans.
Foreign investors were allowed to pursue friendly mergers and
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acquisitions beginning in early 1997. However, Korea’s basic
attitude toward FDI was still passive. The government did not pay
much attention to removing various impediments and to promoting
FDI in general until after the financial crisis broke out.3
The financial crisis made the government rethink the utility of FDI
because its economy experienced refusals by foreign lenders to roll
over debt. To overcome the financial crisis as quickly as possible,
Korea actively promoted an influx of FDI. The government enacted
the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) in November 1998,
and other FDI-related laws thereafter. In addition, the government
issued the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Investment Promotion
Act, The Enforcement Regulation of the Foreign Investment
Promotion Act, Regulations on Foreign Investment and Technology
Inducement, Regulations on Tax Reductions or Exemptions for
Foreign Investment, and the Special Tax Treatment Control Act.
The purpose of FIPA is to contribute to sound development through
attracting foreign investment by providing support and facilitation,
formulating policies to design the most supportive and convenient
FDI system in the eyes of foreign investors, and establishing a FDI
system in which local governments take an important role.4 The
more detailed promotional policies are dealt with later.
South Korea’s Inward FDI Records.
The total volume of FDI between 1962 and 1997 was only $25
billion. Since then, the amount of FDI has been really remarkable
— some $40 billion in 1998-2000. (See Table 2.)
Year

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Amount

1,941

3,203

6,971

8,852

15,541

15,690

Cases

556

596

1,055

1,399

2,102

4,136

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, Investment Statistics
Database.
* Based on Notification.

Table 2. Inward FDI Records (Million of Dollars).*
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Compared to other developing countries, South Korea ranked
6th in this regard, as Table 3 indicates. This is remarkable, because
South Korea received much FDI after the financial crisis. It should
also be noted that China and Hong Kong occupy the first and second
position and receive 35 percent of total FDI flows among developing
economies.5
Economy

Percentage

China
Hong Kong, China
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Korea, Republic of
Singapore
Bermuda
Chile
Cayman Islands

19.2
16.0
14.4
6.5
5.6
4.0
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.4

Top 10 total

76.7

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, p. 52.
* Average 1998-2000

Table 3: Largest Recipients’ Shares of FDI Flows
among Developing Economies.*
According to Word Investment Report by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), longer-term
investment prospects for developing Asia remain bright. In this
vein, FDIs to South Korea likely were sustained or increased this
year too. However, the share of incoming FDI in the ROK Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1998 was only 6.1 percent, up from
3.5 percent in 1997. This is quite low compared to the worldwide
average of 13.7 percent; for developed countries, 20 percent; for
developing countries, 17 percent; and for China, 27.6 percent.
As Table 4 shows, FDI to South Korea came primarily from the
United States, the European Union, and Japan. The United States
was predominant before and after the financial crisis, though its
share decreased in 2000. However, much of the FDI from the
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Cayman Islands was reportedly from American enterprises, so the
U.S. share may have remained higher than it appeared.
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Japan
(Share)

255
(8.0)

266
(3.8)

503
(5.7)

1,750
(11.3)

2,449
(15.6)

U. S.
(Share)

876
(27.3)

3,190
(45.7)

2,976
(33.9)

3,739
(24.1)

2,916
(18.6)

E. U.
(Share)

892
(27.9)

2,305
(33.0)

2,889
(32.6)

6,261
(40.3)

4,607
(29.4)

Others
(Share)

1,180
(36.8)

1,210
(17.4)

2,484
(28.1)

3,791
(24.3)

5,718
(36.4)

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, Investment Statistics Database.
* Based on Notification.

Table 4. Inward FDI by Sources (Millions of Dollars).*
It should be noted that Japanese FDI flows to South Korea rose in
1996-2000. The South East Asian countries were its primary investing
location until the financial crisis,6 after which Japanese investors
turned to safer locations. Also the Korean effort to promote FDI to
cure its economic and financial problems made Japanese investors
more interested.
South Korea’s FDI Promotion Policy After the Financial Crisis.
The Kim Dae-Jung administration was born in the midst of the
financial crisis. The foremost task for President Kim was to overcome
the crisis. His administration adopted a series of measures to
restructure the economy, including a comprehensive organizational
structure for promoting investment as much as possible to increase
its foreign reserves.
The administration put forth the following directions.7
1. Foreign investment will be the central axis in improving
the industrial structure.
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2. Foreign investment will be directed to fundamentally
address Korea's fragile industrial structure.
3. Foreign investment will be used to enhance the
competitiveness of the weak areas and materials industry
and strategically nurture them.
4. The investment climate will improve on a continuing basis
so that the impact of foreign investment expands.
5. Post-investment management will be consolidated by
resolving the troubles of foreign investors.
6. There will be continual work towards improving the labormanagement climate.
7. Government will promote solicitation of foreign investment
through close teamwork between the government,
provincial governments and corporations.
8. The systematic support system for foreign investment
solicitation activities will be strengthened.
9. Government will promote a positive attitude and mindset
about foreign investment, ultimately inducing the nation
to actively respond with foreign investment.
In addition, the government established the Korea Investment
Service Center (KISC) in April 1998 as an arm of the Korea TradeInvestment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), a government-sponsored
nonprofit organization. Since its inception in 1962, KOTRA has
played a major role in Korea’s export-led development. Under
the 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act, KISC has assumed a
leading position in KOTRA’s promotion of FDI.
The government also established the Office of the Investment
Ombudsman (OIO) in 1999 to serve foreign investors. A quasigovernment institution, the Ombudsman office is an example of the
initiative the government has taken to resolve the business-related
grievances of foreign investors to ensure an investment-friendly
environment.8
The KISC set forth the direction of FDI related policies as follows.9
First, Korea is steadily liberalizing business sectors to FDI. After
joining the OECD, South Korea streamlined previously restricted
regulations on FDI and brought them to an internationally accepted
level. Second, under the Foreign Investment Promotion Act,
notifications and applications have been simplified, substantially
eliminating red tape and delay in processing applications. Third, one
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barrier for foreign companies has been settled through improving
the system for company public disclosures and for transparent
accounting in keeping with international accounting standards.
Fourth, the South Korean government has made continuous efforts
to strengthen unemployment-related measures, expand the social
safety net, and establish stable labor-management relationships
in a bid to support foreign investment and regain corporate
competitiveness in the world market. Fifth, the government
has tried to change peoples’ negative attitudes towards foreign
investment by publicizing positive aspects of the investment, such
as greater employment opportunities, development of the local
economy, more foreign exchange, and so on. All this is based on the
notion that foreign investors can do business in South Korea just as
South Koreans do.
South Korea’s FDI Environment.
As we have seen above, South Korea’s efforts to attract FDI have
been successful. Now we consider ways to improve this in the future.
The Korea Investment Service Center has outlined South Korea’s
advantages as a location for FDI: a strategic location between two
giant markets, high profitability, an educated and skilled labor force,
strong science and technology development, a developed physical
infrastructure, a strong industrial base, and rapid growth in the IT
industry.10
First, on the location between giant markets, South Korea is
situated in a region with a huge customer base between Japan and
China. In total, South Korea is surrounded by nearly two billion East
Asian consumers, 500 million just in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The Korean peninsula is poised
to emerge as a mammoth transportation hub connecting East Asia
and Europe as North and South Korea are jointly restoring the
"Seoul-Uiju" railway that will boost the economic synergies between
the Eurasian and Pacific economies.
As for high profitability, approximately 2,900 foreign companies
have chosen South Korea as a manufacturing location, and they
perform far better than domestic companies in terms of profitability
and financial soundness. According to a study by the Bank of
Korea, the ordinary profit of international companies (ones at least
50 percent foreign-owned) stood at 11.7 percent of aggregate sales
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revenue in 1999. South Korea has maintained the lowest corporate
tax rates among the 29 members of the OECD. Foreign investors are
free from double taxation if their home country is a signatory to a tax
convention with South Korea, as 53 countries are now.
On the educated and skilled labor force, South Koreans attach
great importance to education, since it has been a vital element in the
country's economic and technological advancement. The labor force
is well educated, the product of a highly organized school system.
More than 97 percent of the workers have education to the level of
vocational training or university degrees. At 98 percent, literacy is
nearly the highest in the world.
Labor productivity has grown by an average of 10 percent annually.
The work force is renowned for its diligence and skill. South Korean
employees worked 50 hours per week on average in 1999. A flexible
working hour system, along with the regular working hour system,
enables employers to offer work in 2-week or 1-month periods,
reducing labor costs and raising competitiveness.
Fourth, South Korea's strengths in science and technology lie in
its high level of investment in research and development (R&D),
its patent registration, and its development of human resources.
There are 2,863 R&D-related institutes in South Korea, including
163 public research institutes; some 258 at universities, colleges, and
junior colleges; plus 2,435 that are corporately owned. Investment in
R&D as a proportion of the gross national product (GNP) increased
from 0.81 percent in 1981 to 2.68 percent in 1999 and is expected to
have hit 5 percent in 2001. South Korea now ranks fifth in the world
in this regard after Sweden, Japan, Finland, and Switzerland.
A package of tax and credit incentives has helped firms raise
their research expenditures to 3-4 percent of gross revenue. Firms
may take a tax deduction of up to 15 percent of total expenditures
on human resource development. A deduction of up to 10 percent
is allowed for investments in research facilities. There is also a
90 percent annual depreciation allowance on research and test
facilities.
Fifth, is developed physical infrastructure. Maritime transportation
is vital for South Korea since 99.7 percent of all exported goods
travel this way. With three coasts, South Korea is well-positioned
as a base for shipments to Northeast Asian markets, being close to
major Chinese, Japanese, and Russian ports. International airlines
operate 802 scheduled direct flights per week between Seoul and
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major cities in North America, South America, Europe, North Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia. Electricity and telecommunications costs
are the lowest in Asia.
As for the strong industrial base, the domestic semiconductor
industry ranks third in the world in production. The dynamic random
access memory (DRAM) sector has developed as the country's most
competitive business, claiming 40 percent of the world market.
The Korean shipbuilding industry became the world's largest in
1999, accounting for 40 percent of the market. South Korea is the
world's sixth largest electronics producer, with 6.6 percent of global
production. The home appliances industry ranks second worldwide
and the related parts sector, third, testimony to their status as major
players in overseas markets.
The petrochemical sector is one of the pillars of South Korea's
industrial base, providing raw materials for such critical industries
as electronics, automobiles, textiles, aerospace, and precision
chemicals. South Korea is the third largest ethylene producer after
the United States and Japan. Domestic production accounts for 15.1
percent of the world total, ranking fifth globally. With top-of-theline technology, low investment costs, and geographical adjacency
to China and other outstanding Asian markets, the outlook for the
industry is extremely positive.
With 16 million users by mid 2000, the Internet industry has
grown rapidly. The country now ranks sixth in terms of Internet
use. The rapid growth of the Internet market is due to the expansion
of e-trade along with the development of such Internet-related
businesses as contents, auctions, and game marketing. The degree
to which Internet-related business has taken off in Korea may be
gauged by the increase in the number of Internet domains from
26,000 in 1998 to 207,000 in 1999. As Internet access skyrockets,
companies are not only using the Internet as a marketing tool, but
also have designated Internet business as a core segment for the
future. South Korea is also the first country to have commercialized
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology, a development
that led to the creation of a global CDMA market, and it maintains
the lowest telephone costs in Asia.
Clearly South Korea offers numerous inducements to foreign
direct investors. However, many of these existed before the financial
crisis or, more precisely, before the administration began to actively
seek FDI. So what made investments increase so much after the
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crisis? Changed attitudes towards foreign investment, an upgraded
FDI promotion policy, and a shift in the mentality of South Korean
businessmen about the usefulness of foreign investment. However,
certain businessmen still consider FDI as a matter of ownership, not
as an opportunity to acquire high technology and advanced financial
systems.
Indeed, small- and medium-sized enterprises11 are, in general, still
reluctant to receive FDI. They have not had enough communication
and contact with foreign businessmen, and most of the owners have
considered FDI more as a way of investing abroad, especially those
in the light-industry sector. Owners are also not accustomed to
complying with transparent accounting systems because they have
long been dependent on private borrowing.
The Office of the Investment Ombudsman (OIO) performed
a survey on the environment for foreign firms in 1999, with 233
responding. About 85 percent cited the market potential as a
primary reason to invest, and about 59 percent said that profitability
had improved in the previous year. On the other hand, taxation and
labor relations were cited as problems. They were dissatisfied about
noninstitutional difficulties, such as unreasonable practices by South
Korean companies and the authorities.
What are the implications of the survey results? First, foreign
firms were, in general, satisfied with the government’s efforts.
Second, they were also satisfied with the business environment
improvements made after the financial crisis. Third, unreasonable
business practices, however defined, were still in place. These
points imply that South Korean business may not be fully utilizing
the opportunities provided by the government on attracting FDI.
Conclusion.
The South Korean government has made efforts to attract foreign
investment as much as possible after the financial crisis. The policy
changes include improvements, such as the adoption of one-stop
service, and other liberalization measures. Owing to these attitudinal
changes, South Korea ranked 6th in receiving foreign investment
among developing countries. Can this trend continue? South Korea
is at the center of the Northeast Asian region. However, it cannot
fully exploit its geo-economic advantages because the Korean
peninsula is divided, while the adamant attitude of North Korea
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inhibits South Korea’s efforts to become the center of economic
cooperation in the region.
The financial crisis affected the economy dearly. It made South
Koreans rethink hyper economic growth. It also raised questions
about the role of politics in economic development. South Korea
has long been accustomed to high economic growth and an exportled development strategy. Now may be the right time to consider a
moderate level of economic growth as appropriate and to put more
emphasis on sustainable development.
We also have to remember the premise that unstable political
conditions affect economic development potential. Stephen Haggard
has pointed out the adverse impact of bad politics: undue political
influence, moral hazard, corruption and private fraud, policy biases,
and economic mismanagement.12 President Kim Dae Jung was
elected in the midst of the crisis and one of his major campaign
promises was to overcome it. He received strong support from the
people in the first half of his term and could pursue restructuring
initiatives. Thus, many economic problems could be solved in a
rather short time. However, South Korea’s political problems still
affect its economy in an adverse manner, and more difficult tasks
may lie ahead.
In the meantime, it may be necessary to rethink the impact of
South-North relations on the South Korean economy. Take the
example of Hyundai. It launched the Mt. Kumgang project in 1998,
welcomed by President Kim and President Clinton. The South
Korean president pointed out that the project bolstered South Korea’s
economic credentials by providing an impression of stability to the
world. However, Hyundai’s investment in North Korea became a
major cause of its economic mismanagement.
It may be too early to evaluate the last 3 years’ performance in
attracting foreign investment. The Asian experience shows that there
can be many ways to achieve industrialization, modernization, and
democratization. The Asiatic mode of development was certainly
different from the Western one. However, its uniqueness may no
longer be an advantage under globalization. It is necessary for us to
recall the true meaning of democracy. A less democratic country is
highly likely to fall into opaque business practices, corruption, and
an inefficient financial sector. The Economist pointed to six myths
about the factors behind East Asia’s economic growth: the virtue of
high investment, small government, flexibility of economic system,
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good governance, the virtues of long-term relationships, and higher
level of universal education.13 These same factors are now seen as
causes of the financial crisis. It pointed out that the cozy relationship
between firms and government was partly to blame for the tigers’
problems.
Finally, now is also the right time to consider strengthening
multilateral cooperation in the Northeast Asian region. Asia has the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN.
However, there is no multilateral cooperative body to handle
Northeast Asian economic problems exclusively. To fully realize
the economic potential of the region, it may be necessary to devise a
new form of multilateral cooperation.
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CHAPTER 12
PROMOTING ECONOMIC COOPERATION
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
Joseph A. B. Winder
INTRODUCTION
Promoting economic cooperation between North and South
Korea has long been a central element in the process of promoting
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. President Park Chunghee included a reference to economic cooperation in his opening to
the North in the early 1970s, and each subsequent government has
added content to its policy on economic cooperation with the North.
Economic cooperation was a major element in the communiquè
issued at the conclusion of the historic summit visit of President Kim
Dae-jung to North Korea in June 2000, and it has been a central focus
of attention in the government-level exchanges that have taken place
since the summit.
In the initial stages, the government looked to the private sector
as the principal instrument for implementing a policy of NorthSouth economic cooperation. There was interest in some elements of
the private sector, and this approach ran less of a risk of generating
strong political opposition. In fact, the government placed tight
constraints on the activities of the private sector in dealing with the
North and put in place strict regulations governing all South-North
economic contact.
Contacts grew slowly and were limited to trade and investment
in a few manufacturing projects. Over time, the government relaxed
the restrictions on private sector activity, and both trade and
investment increased, albeit slowly. In 1988, the government began
a gradual shift in its overall policy approach and began to encourage
the private sector to become engaged in economic cooperation with
the North. The results were positive but meager.
With the election of President Kim Dae-jung in December 1997,
the government’s approach became one of active support and
encouragement of private sector commercial activity in the North.
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Restrictions were eased, and the government devised mechanisms
to assist South Korean firms doing business with the North. Public
funds were made available in support of private sector projects, and
the government made the expansion of business activity an agenda
item for direct government-to-government negotiations with the
North. The private sector responded with a spurt of activity after
the North-South summit, but trade and investment still continued
to grow at a modest pace. Much of the interest in the private sector
in pursuing business opportunities in the North came from firms
whose founders or key officers had been born in North Korea. The
North Korean government courted these people, inviting a number
of senior executives of South Korean companies, who were born in
North Korea, to visit North Korea in April 2000.
The government also moved to engage the public sector directly
in the process of North-South economic cooperation. State firms
began to invest in projects in the North, and the government became
involved in financing and constructing two power plants in the
North, while holding out the prospect of providing additional funds
in support of other infrastructure projects.
In spite of these efforts, private sector interest in undertaking
business ventures in North Korea was limited. The business
environment was difficult; the prospects for profitable ventures
were uncertain, particularly in the short run; there were growing
opportunities in other countries in the region; and business
conditions at home were tough. Increasingly, the government was
forced to take on the primary responsibility for energizing NorthSouth economic interaction. The government assumed the role of
cheerleader, negotiator, and financier with the private sector clearly
in a key but subordinate position. Both sides seemed comfortable
with this new paradigm.
THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY
The government established much of the legal and administrative
framework for controlling and regulating North-South economic
cooperation during the administration of President Roh Tae-woo. In
July 1988, a few months after he took office, President Roh issued a
Special Presidential Declaration promoting North-South economic
interchange, and the government followed up in October with the
“inter-Korean trade measure,” which officially allowed inter-Korean
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trade. In 1989, the government established the Inter-Korean Exchange
and Cooperation Promotion Committee as an oversight body for
all North-South interaction. The Committee has responsibility for
reviewing and passing on all proposals for North-South economic
cooperation. On August 1, 1990, the National Assembly passed the
Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act which expanded the
basis for North-South economic cooperation.
In July 1993 the government of President Kim Young-sam
prepared a plan for inter-Korean economic exchanges and
cooperation as part of the latest New Five-Year Economic Plan. The
government followed up in November 1994 with a series of measures
designed to energize North-South economic cooperation.
Sunshine Policy.
The administration of President Kim Dae-jung made the
promotion of North-South economic cooperation a central element
of government policy. In a policy directive dated April 30, 1998, the
government outlined its new approach, which has been named the
Sunshine Policy. The central theme of this approach is the separation
of business and government. The aim of the policy, as explained by
government officials, is to encourage private enterprises to expand
economic cooperation with North Korea solely on the basis of
economic principles of a market economy, independent of the
political situation in inter-Korean relations.
The Sunshine Policy includes measures to support and encourage
trade and economic interchange between South and North Korea.
The government took steps to ease the tight constraints on private
sector activity with the North. It expanded the number of items which
could be imported from North Korea without a permit, it eliminated
the ban on the export of manufacturing facilities, and it lifted the
ceiling on the size of investment by South Korean businesses in the
North, subject only to a negative list of prohibited areas of business.
In July 2001, the government announced its intention to widen
the range of activities the Export-Import Bank can support. The
Export-import Bank has recommended the modification of a law
which currently classifies inter-Korean trade as “inside exchange,”
rather than foreign trade. A change in the law is needed so that the
Bank can provide export financing for trade with North Korea. The
government has also expressed public support for North Korean
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membership in the Asian Development Bank.
The government did not totally abandon its control over
the process of inter-Korea economic cooperation, however. The
government continues to exercise oversight of North-South
economic cooperation through the Inter-Korean Exchange and
Promotion Cooperation Committee chaired by the Minister of
Unification, and it has maintained the system of a two-step approval
process for investments in North Korea. The government also issued
a pronouncement warning against “excessive competition” between
South Korean firms seeking to do business in the North.
Berlin Declaration.
In addition to providing additional stimulus to North-South
economic cooperation via the private sector, the government also
recognized that it, too, must play a more active, direct role in moving
the process forward. President Kim Dae-jung used the occasion of
a speech in Berlin in March 2000 to articulate a policy of adding a
government-to-government element to the process of inter-Korean
economic cooperation. He said such a program of government-togovernment cooperation is necessary, since “private business can
only do so much to expand social overhead structure, promote
a favorable investment environment, and reform the overall
agricultural setup.” In that speech, President Kim outlined several
specific areas of cooperation between North and South:
• The expansion of social infrastructure, including
highways, railroads, and electric and communication
facilities.
• Government-to-government agreements regarding
investment guarantees in prevention of double
taxation.
• Support for comprehensive reforms in North Korea’s
agriculture sector including the provision by the South
of quality fertilizers, agricultural equipment, and
irrigation systems.
President Kim’s speech in Berlin followed on the heels of an
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announcement earlier that month of plans to cultivate a “peace belt”
in North Korean areas near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with the
construction of a large industrial complex. Unification Minister Park
Jae-kyu said in a speech in April that the government would build as
many factories as possible around the DMZ.
North-South Cooperation Fund.
The government also took steps to increase the resources of
the North-South Cooperation Fund (sometimes referred to as the
Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund) and to expand the purposes for
which it could be used. The Fund had been created by the National
Assembly in August 1990 as a vehicle for funding government-level
humanitarian assistance to North Korea. The government allocated
25 billion won to the Fund in 1991, and increased its resources by an
additional 510 billion won from the period 1992–97. Thus far during
the Kim Dae-jung administration, an additional one trillion won
in government resources have been made available to the Fund.
The government also expanded the Fund’s mandate to encompass
financial support for public and private sector projects in North
Korea. The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion
Committee, which oversees the activities of the Fund, has approved
its use for small and medium firms’ business projects in the North
and for a major tourism project at Mt. Kumgang. The government
decided to reduce the interest rate for loans from the Fund to firms
engaged in inter-Korean cooperation projects from 6 percent to 4
percent beginning in 2002.
The Fund is also expected to be the source of support for
infrastructure projects in North Korea. When the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established, the
Fund was authorized to provide financial support for the Light
Water Reactor (LWR) Project. As of August 2001, the government
had provided 43.7 billion won in loans from the Fund to the Korea
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) for the LWR project. In
September 2000, the oversight committee approved the use of Fund
resources for the construction of railroads and roads linking South
and North Korea.
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Government Entities.
In April 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture announced the
establishment of a 21-member consultation group, which will
provide agricultural expertise to North Korea and will explore the
possibility of developing cooperative projects between South and
North. The group will be comprised of professionals from both
the government and private sectors. Specific areas of cooperation
will include seed potatoes, irrigation systems, and improvement
in the quality and production levels of crops in North Korea. The
government has announced plans to set up a North-South Korea
Information Technology (IT) Support Centre at the Korea IT
Promotion Agency to assist the North-South IT Private Council in its
work on joint projects with the North.
Some South Korean public sector firms have also taken steps to
establish a presence in North Korea.
• The Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation provided $2.4
million worth of cigarette making equipment to the North
in October 2000 in exchange for imported North Korean
cigarettes.
• In June 2001, Korea Resources Corporation signed an
agreement to develop a Tantalum mine in the town of
Abdong North Korea.
The Growth in Inter-Korean Trade.
As a result of the changes in South Korean government policy
beginning in 1988, goods began to flow between South and North
Korea. Due to political sensitivities, inter-Korean trade began as and
remains primarily third-party. Early shipments went largely through
Hong Kong, although with the dramatic growth in trade between
South Korea and China, much inter-Korean trade is now directed
through China. In recent years, more and more inter-Korean trade is
being carried directly between the two countries.
Two-way trade began slowly. By 1992 it had only reached a level
of $173 million. Following the government’s initiatives in 1993 and
1994, inter-Korean trade began to grow, and by the end of 1997, it
had reached a level of $308 million. Inter-Korean trade declined in
1998 as a result of the sharp economic downturn in the South Korean
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Source: Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).

Table 1. South Korean Trade with North Korea.
economy in conjunction with the Asian financial crisis. Total trade
in 1998 fell 28 percent to $221 million with imports falling by $100
million. Inter-Korean trade rebounded in 1999, however, to $333
million, and reached a record level of $425 million in 2000. During
the first 11 months of 2001, inter-Korean trade registered a decline of
9.3 percent, compared to the same period in 2000. Outdated facilities
at Nampo, North Korea’s major port, have led to high transportation
and storage costs, which have hampered the growth of inter-Korean
trade. Table 1 shows the level of inter-Korean trade from 1989
through the first eleven months of 2001.
Much of the growth in inter-Korean trade in recent years is
attributable to increased exports from South to North Korea. Most of
these increased exports are the result of noncommercial transactions,
primarily humanitarian aid, construction materials for the KEDO
LWR project, and shipments to South Korean ventures in the North,
including the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Table 2 shows the
breakdown of South Korean exports to the North by commercial
and noncommercial transactions.
Processing on Commission Trade.
One of the salient features of inter-Korean trade is the Process-
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Source: KOTRA.

Table 2. South Korean Exports to North Korea.
-ing on Commission (POC) regime. Under this regime, which
went into operation in 1992, South Korean firms ship primary or
unfinished goods to North Korea on consignment where they are
processed and then re-exported back to South Korea or elsewhere.
This trade has grown steadily since 1992, and reached $129 million
in 2000 (See Table 3.) This trade represents a substantial portion
of commercial exports and imports between South Korea and the
North. In 2000, for example, 39 percent of South Korean commercial
exports to the North and 53 percent of commercial imports from the
North took place within the POC framework. POC trade declined
by 5 percent during the first 10 months of 2001 due in part to
interruptions in shipping service between the ports of Inchon in the
South and Nampo in the North.
The number of South Korean firms participating in this trade
expanded steadily throughout this period, rising from four in 1992,
to 151 in 2000. During the first half of 2001, 93 firms participated in
POC trade. Most of these firms are small and medium enterprises.
COOPERATION PROJECTS
In addition to inter-Korean trade, the other major element in
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Source: Ministry of Unification.
Note: 1st 10 months of 2001.

Table 3. South Korean Processing-on-Commission Trade
with North Korea.
North-South economic cooperation has been the establishment of
specific cooperation projects in the North by individual South Korean
enterprises. The South Korean government provided for this form
of cooperation in the 1990 Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation
Act. Firms seeking to engage in cooperation projects in the North are
subject to a two-stage approval. In the first stage, a firm must apply
for permission to pursue a cooperation partnership with the North.
This status of “Cooperation Partnership” is, in effect, a license to try
and make a deal. Firms may proceed to negotiate arrangements with
the North, but before they can proceed to fruition, they must obtain a
second approval to pursue a specific cooperation project. Approvals
at this second stage are referred to as “Cooperation Projects.”
Daewoo was the first firm to avail itself of the opportunity
provided by this new policy environment. In January 1992 Chairman
Kim Woo-choong visited North Korea and reached agreement to
invest in nine light industrial joint projects at the Nampo industrial
estate. The venture was subsequently scaled back to three projects,
producing shirts, blouses, bags, and jackets. The venture began
operation in 1995, with Daewoo eventually investing over $5 million
in it.
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A number of South Korean firms sought to emulate the Daewoo
example. In 1995, six firms received cooperation partnership permits,
and four more firms were granted cooperation partnership permits
in 1996. The pace of activity picked up in 1997. Sixteen cooperation
partnership permits were granted in 1997, and another twelve were
granted in 1998. The pace slowed to three cooperation partnership
permits in 1999, one in 2000, and three in the first half of 2001.
The vast majority of these project ideas have not yet born fruit.
Of the 45 proposals approved by the South Korean government as
cooperation partnerships, only 18 have actually progressed to the
stage where they were granted approvals as cooperation projects. Four
were cancelled, and the remainder are pending. Of the 18 approved
cooperation projects, four are associated with the LWR project and
three are associated with the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. These
seven are moving forward. There are three projects in the RajinSonbong special economic zone which are not moving forward. The
remaining eight are in various stages of implementation.
In May 2000, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) issued a
report stating that there are only 20 South Korean firms that have
more than $100,000 in business dealings with North Korea. Table 4
presents the status of the top several firms doing business with North
Korea.
Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO)

$4 billion

Hyundai

100 million

International Corn Foundation

10 million

Samsung Electronics

7 million

Pyunghwa (Rev. Moon)

6.67 million

Daewoo

5 million

Source: Federation of Korean Industries.

Table 4. Firms with Major Business Dealings
with North Korea—May 2000.
There are many other South Korean companies that have a
business presence in North Korea, even though it may be relatively
small. According to the Ministry of Unification, 152 South Korean
companies are operating original equipment manufacturing facilities
in the North.
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IT Sector.
North Korea has made it clear that it attaches a high priority
to cooperation in the information and communications technology
sector. South Korean firms have responded with a variety of
initiatives.
A group of IT firms led by Hanabiz.com have agreed to establish
a joint inter-Korean information and technology company in
Dandong, China. Samsung Electronics, Joongwon, and Unicotec are
active in the joint development of computer software. Several South
Korean firms produce software in North Korea on a commission
basis, and import it into the South. Three dimensional contents and
digital animation are areas of high growth potential for processing
on commission activity. Ntrak and six other partners reached an
agreement to set up software production operations in an interKorean IT complex being constructed in Pyongyang. IMRI and
Hanaro Telecom both produce computer hardware in North Korea
on a processing-on-commission basis. IMRI produces monitor
printing circuit boards and Hanaro produces splitters.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Much of the current interest in North-South economic
cooperation is focused on a few major projects. The two largest ones
involving the private sector were the brainchild of Chung Ju-yung,
the founder of Hyundai. Chung was born and raised on a farm
in Kangwon Province in North Korea and had a driving passion
to reduce tensions and contribute to the process of reconciliation
between North and South Korea. He visited North Korea many
times and established a personal relationship with the North Korean
leader, Kim Jong-il. Chung negotiated the original agreements with
North Korea for each of these projects. One involves a tourist facility
at Mt. Kumgang, and the other is a giant industrial park in Kaesong
just north of the DMZ. Although the initiative for both of these
projects originated in the private sector, the government has moved
in to provide financial and other support for each.
Mt. Kumgang.
The centerpiece and crowning achievement of Chung’s efforts
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to reach out to North Korea was the establishment of a tourism
project centered around the scenic Kumgang Mountain a few miles
across the DMZ in North Korea. Mt. Kumgang is one of the three
mountains that are cultural icons on the Korean peninsula. After
many years of negotiation, Chung finally obtained permission from
the North Korean authorities in 1998 to ferry tourists from South
Korea to Mt. Kumgang, where they could walk on mountain trails
and enjoy a local spa. Hyundai agreed to pay North Korea $942
million in royalties in monthly payments of approximately $12
million through the middle of 2005 to operate the tours, after which
the contract is to be renegotiated. The agreement gives Hyundai
exclusive rights to develop tourism at Mt. Kumgang for a 30-year
period. In additions to royalties, Hyundai agreed to pay a $100
entrance fee for each visitor. Hyundai spent $110 million to build
tour facilities in North Korea, including the spa, theater and docks.
The company also announced plans to spend an additional $250
million on other attractions, including a hotel, golf course, a ski
resort, beach facilities, a shopping mall, and a theme park. Hyundai
also announced its intention to seek government approval to open a
casino in Mt. Kumgang.
The Mt. Kumgang project accomplished its initial objective of
providing a way for South Koreans, many of whom were born in
the North, to visit North Korea for the first time in over 50 years. A
total of 420,000 tourists traveled to Mt. Kumgang from its launch in
November 1998 through November 2001. The numbers grew steadily
through 2000, but have dropped off sharply in 2001. [By November
2002, over 500,000 tourists had visited since 1998. Ed.] The project
has turned out to be a heavy financial drain on Hyundai, however.
According to one report, Hyundai Asan, the unit that manages all the
Hyundai projects in North Korea, has lost over $350 million from the
Mt. Kumgang business since 1998. Hyundai has paid $378.9 million
in fees to North Korea through August, 2001, but was behind on its
payments for the year. [Hyundai Asan’s losses were expected to top
$400 million by the end of 2002. Ed.] It had set the break-even point
for the cruise service at 500,000 visitors per year, but the numbers
have fallen far short of that.
Hyundai Asan’s financial difficulties led it to cut back on the
cruise service. It withdrew the three luxury cruise ships from the
project, leaving in service only a small, fast ship that makes 1-day
trips to Mt. Kumgang. Hyundai has also attempted to renegotiate
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the terms of its agreement with North Korea without success. Due to
the decline of people wishing to visit Mt. Kumgang, Hyundai Asan
has reduced the frequency of sailings from ten per month to once a
week.
In light of Hyundai Asan’s financial difficulties, the South Korean
government decided to provide active support for the project. In June
2001, the government-owned Korea National Tourism Organization
(KNTO) signed an agreement with Hyundai Asan for joint operation
of the Mt. Kumgang tour program. KNTO agreed to purchase
Hyundai Asan’s hotels and service facilities at Mt. Kumgang for
$22 million. The South Korean government approached the North
about the opening of a 13.7 kilometer overland tourist route to Mt.
Kumgang and the removal of land mines in the DMZ. Considerable
progress has been made in both areas, althugh procedural obstacles
remain.
Kaesong Industrial Park.
Hyundai’s second major project in North Korea is an industrial
park in Kaesong. Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung obtained the
agreement of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the establishment
of the industrial park during a visit to the North in June 2000. The
scope of the project as envisaged by Chung is enormous. The total
complex would house 850 industrial firms in a space of 66 million
square meters. With a planned completion date of 2008, the complex
would create 220,000 jobs and generate $20 billion in exports. The
first of three phases called for the construction of a 33 million square
meter complex to house about 200 plants and employ 40,000 workers.
The majority of companies would be in light industries, e.g., fabric,
clothing, bags, toys, electric devices, and shoes.
In July 2000, Hyundai Asan signed an agreement with the Pusan
Footwear Association to build a 1.32 million-square meter complex
designed to house 45 companies specializing in the manufacture of
footwear. Progress on the project was halted for several months in
2001 when North Korea put a hold on North-South dialogue and
cooperation. That hold was lifted in September 2001 in conjunction
with the resumption of ministerial level talks.
In the September 2001 FKI survey of private firms, respondents
were asked what, in their opinion, it would take to ensure the
success of the Kaesong project. Infrastructure expansion was listed
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by 60 percent of the respondents followed by freedom of passage
(24.7 percent) and freedom to manage personnel (11.2 percent).
The state-run Korea Land Corporation (KOLAND) has joined
with Hyundai to develop the project. KOLAND President Kim
Yong-chae visited North Korea in November 2000 to discuss the
project, and KOLAND officials have undertaken a survey of the site
for the industrial complex. The South Korean government made this
project a subject of government-to-government negotiations. In the
sixth round of ministerial-level talks, held in Seoul on September
16–18, 2001, the two sides “agreed to actively carry out the Kaesong
Industrial Complex project, have working-level contacts at an early
date for that purpose, finalize concrete project plans, including the
size of the complex, and start construction.”
Other Groups’ Projects.
Samsung has also shown active interest in inter-Korean economic
cooperation. Yun Jong-yong, the Vice-Chairman of Samsung
Electronics, was born in North Korea. In 1996, Samsung Electronics
began assembling televison sets at the Taedong River Complex
outside Pyongyang and shipping them south. In November 1998,
Samsung unveiled a plan to invest $1 billion per year over a 10-year
period in an industrial complex in North Korea designed to produce
$3 billion worth of electronics products annually. Products include
video cassette recorders, refrigerators, mobile phones, and computer
chip parts. Phase one, originally planned to be completed in 2002,
is to produce $500 million worth of appliances to be re-exported to
the South. This venture remains in the planning stage, and Samsung
has announced its intention to scrap it unless progress is made in
developing the necessary infrastructure.
The Hanwha business group had planned to build a condominum
in the Kumgang tour region, but shelved the project in light of the
current uncertainties over the overall tourism project. Hanwha said
that the group will only consider future investment projects in the
North if Pyongyang signs a government-to-government treaty to
guarantee the investments and commits itself to safeguard South
Korean investments against risks that might come from outside the
projects.
The LG group, the second largest group in the country, has
shelved plans to set up a bicycle assembly plant in the Rajin
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Sonbong industrial complex. The group said it would only proceed
with projects if there were on-land transportation and direct
telecommunications links between North and South.
Railroads.
The reconnection of the railroad links between South and North
Korea and beyond to Europe has been one of the major South Korean
objectives in the economic negotiations with the North. Both sides
are now considering ways to establish railroad links along both the
west and east coasts of the Korean peninsula.
Kyongui Line. The Kyongui line runs for 500 kilometers along the
Korean west coast between Seoul and the Chinese border town of
Shinuiju. Originally constructed in the early days of the Twentieth
Century, the Seoul-Shinuiju and Seoul-Pusan links combined to
form a transport route connecting Japan and Korea to Manchuria
and mainland China. Rail service commenced in April 1906 but was
suspended in September 1945. The railway was destroyed during the
Korean War. The Kyungui line would link up with the Trans-China
Railroad. It would reduce the shipping time from Inchon to Nampo
from 13–14 days to 1–3 days, and substantially lower transportation
costs between South Korea and Europe. In addition, it would be a
visible symbol of the cooperation between North and South Korea,
and a first step as a confidence building measure in easing tensions
in the peninsula.
Upon his return from the North-South Summit in June 2000,
President Kim Dae-jung expressed his determination to reconnect
the Kyungui line; “why can’t we travel by train to Paris and
London? If the severed Kyungui line is reconnected, we would go to
Europe and a new Silk Road will be created.” The government also
advocated a simultaneous connection of an expressway to serve as
an access road to the proposed industrial complex in Kaesong.
At the first ministerial level meeting between North and South
Korea after the summit, the two sides agreed to reconnect the
severed section of the Kyungui line. South Korea has already begun
the work of reconnecting the railroad on its side of the DMZ. On
September 30, 2001, South Korea opened a railway station on the
Imjin River, 6.8 km north of Munsan, the previous northern end of
the railway. Work on the northern side of the DMZ resumed in 2001
after an interruption of several months. A major obstacle is the need
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for an agreement between the militaries of both sides to clear land
mines.
Kyongwon Railroad. The second railway project of interest would
run along the east coast and reconnect the Kyongwon Railway
between Seoul-Wonsan in North Korea and on to Vladivostok.
Russia has expressed substantial interest in this project, and Russian
President Vladimir Putin has discussed the project with both
President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.
The Kyongwon line would link up with the Trans-Siberian
Railroad and would reduce shipping time between Seoul and the
Belarus Republic from 26 days to 16 days. The Korean government
has completed the design of the severed section of the railroad that
would link Seoul to Wonsan. According to press reports, North Korea
has already begun reconstructing its train stations near the border
regions of Russia. Russian officials have already begun visiting
North Korea to determine the feasibility of linking the railroads. A
Russian team in September 2001 made a thorough inspection of the
630 km section that stretched from the Tumen River to Wonsan.
DIFFICULTIES FACING THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In spite of the atmosphere of cooperation and enthusiasm created
by the inter-Korean summit and the various inter-governmental
bodies that have been meeting since then, private sector firms, for
the most part, remain hesitant to commit resources to inter-Korean
business and commercial activity. Some of the hesitation reflects the
continued uncertainty about the economic and business environment
in North Korea. In addition, many of the companies that have taken
steps to engage in business in North Korea have faced a number of
difficulties which may well discourage others.
According to a press report, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry,
and Energy submitted a report entitled “the Present Situation
of Inter-Korean Business Deals by Domestic Companies” to the
National Assembly Committee on Commerce, Industry, and Energy
in September. According to the story, the report states that among
ten business deals that have been approved by current government
authorities from March 1998 to the present, almost all are either
having great difficulties or their earnings cannot yet be estimated.
North Korea’s ban on visits to the Rajin area in the fall of 1998 has
prevented firms from implementing projects in the Rajin-Sonbong
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Special Economic Zone. The North unilaterally raised the price of
an essential input in one project from $3.50 per ton to $100 per ton.
According to the report, even Daewoo, the original investor in the
North, has stopped its dressmaking business in the Nampo factory
district because the North refused to allow technicians and managers
to stay in North Korea.
KOTRA, the government entity that promotes trade and
investment, issued a report in May identifying several issues affecting
the development and growth of inter-Korean cooperation in the IT
sector. One major issue is the prospects for profitable ventures.
According to the report, IMRI is the only company operating in
North Korea in the IT field that is making a profit. The report notes
that most participants in this sector are small and medium-sized
firms that cannot afford substantial investment in North Korea
without a reasonable expectation of profit. The other major issue
is the need to improve infrastructure, including communication
networks and electric power supply.
Transportation difficulties have been one of the major problems
confronting South Korean firms doing business with the north. In
November 2000, North Korea unilaterally closed its port of Nampo
to South Korean ships transporting goods between the Pyongyang
harbor and Inchon. This interruption in sea transportation resulted
in substantial losses for hundreds of South Korean firms engaged in
cross-border trade. Although this problem was eventually resolved,
the lingering uncertainty continues to discourage many possible
participants in North-South economic cooperation.
Many South Korean textile companies that have been engaged
in processing operations in North Korea have begun to move their
operations elsewhere, particularly Vietnam and Indonesia. Some
executives of textile firms report that North Korean authorities now
seem much less interested in the light industry sector, including
textiles. In addition, Korean businessmen complain North Korean
authorities are extremely inflexible. They note that Southeast Asian
countries are prepared to lower their labor costs during the summer
off-seasons, but North Koreans refuse to make these adjustments.
The problem of wages is one that affects many firms and projects
in North Korea. Companies report that North Koreans are also
restricting visits to the north of South Korean technicians and others
for the purpose of technical training and quality control. North
Koreans also reportedly insist on faxing through a third country.
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In September 2000, FKI undertook a survey of 500 largest Korean
firms and 200 biggest foreign firms operating in South Korea. Of the
448 respondents, only 60 said they had plans to undertake business
activities in North Korea. Among the obstacles to pursuing interKorean business that respondents listed are the absence of investment
guarantees, the prevention of double taxation agreements, the lack
of infrastructure, and political uncertainties.
In September 2001, FKI conducted another survey among South
Korea’s 600 largest manufacturing firms. Of the 430 respondents,
DIFFICULTIES
only 51 said they planned
to do business in North Korea. In this
FACING
THE the absence of promising
survey, respondents listed
as obstacles
business, noneconomic PRIVATE
uncertainties, restructuring and other
internal difficulties, and immature
SECTOR market circumstances.
Problems are affecting not only private sector firms. According
to a recent press report, the Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation
has reported a loss of 2.1 billion won since the launch of its joint
business with North Korea. The loss is reportedly due to North
Korea’s heavy transportation fees, worn out facilities, and high
regional costs of the cigarette packs.
THE FRAMEWORK FOR INTER-KOREAN ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
The Kim Dae-jung administration attempted to address the
concerns of the private sector by negotiating changes in the business
environment in North Korea. After the June 2000 summit meeting,
the two sides held ministerial level negotiations to address issues
of concern, particularly investment protection, avoidance of double
taxation, account settlement, and business dispute arbitration. After
a series of negotiations, agreements in each of the four areas were
signed by the two sides at the ministerial-level talks in Pyongyang
from December 12–16, and the ratification process is underway in
both countries. There was the hope and the expectation that the
agreements would be ratified and go into effect within a period
of 6 months or so, but the North Korean decision not to hold the
ministerial-level talks in March 2001 as scheduled resulted in a delay
in the ratification process. Both sides reiterated their intention to
put the agreements into effect at an early date at a ministerial-level
meeting in September 2001. [The latest ministerial talks took place
in May 2003, while talks on inter-Korean economic cooperation took
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place in November 2002. Ed.]
• Agreement on Investment Protection. Under the terms of this
agreement, North Korea grants most favored nation status
to South Korean investors in relation to their investment
earnings and business activities in the north. The agreement
bans the arbitrary expropriation or nationalization of South
Korean investment by the North Korean government. The
agreement also provides for the free remittance of earnings
produced abroad. The South Korean side was unable to get
the agreement of the North to provide for treatment of South
Korean investors as being from a separate, sovereign nation.
• Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation. Under the
terms of this agreement, a company that pays taxes in one
country will be exempted from paying similar taxes in the
other.
• Agreement on Accounts Settlement. This agreement
enables both South and North Korean companies to
conduct transactions through banks designated by the two
governments. It thus avoids the need for companies to settle
accounts through banks in third countries. The two sides
agree that currency for settlement would be the U.S. dollar.
• Agreement on Business Dispute Arbitration. Under this
agreement, the two sides agreed to create a joint business
dispute arbitration committee that will adjudicate business
disputes.
CONCLUSION
Economic cooperation remains a central element of the process
of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. Experience with
various forms of economic cooperation over the past decade or so,
however, demonstrates that there are many obstacles hindering the
development of strong commercial links between North and South
Korea. In spite of the obvious attractions of a common language
and a relatively skilled labor force in the north, there are very few
commercial deals that have been brought to fruition. The North
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Korean environment for business is simply not compatible with
the norms of commercial activities practiced in modern industrial
society.
The South Korean government has been successful over the years
in stimulating a modest level of trade and investment between North
and South Korea. It has adopted a variety of instruments to assist this
policy. The government has increasingly been forced to rely on the
initiative and resources from the public sector to move the process of
inter-Korean economic cooperation forward. The two governments
have negotiated a framework for economic cooperation that offers
a prospect for providing a much more hospitable environment
for South Korean firms to do business in the North. Whether this
environment will be sufficiently attractive to stimulate trade and
investment flows between South and North Korea above the current
modest level remains to be seen.
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